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Knowledge is good, ignorance is bad. So it seems, anyway. But in this dissertation, I 
argue that some ignorance is epistemically valuable. Sometimes, we should suspend 
judgment even though by believing we would achieve knowledge. In this apology for 
ignorance (ignorance, that is, of a certain kind), I defend the following four theses: 
1) Sometimes, we should continue inquiry in ignorance, even though we are in a 
position to know the answer, in order to achieve more than mere knowledge 
(e.g. understanding) while minimizing the effects of confirmation bias. 
2) It’s false that we should believe every proposition such that we are guaranteed 
to be right about it (and even such that we are guaranteed to know it) if we 
believe it. 
3) Being in a position to know is the norm of assertion: importantly, this does not 
require belief or (thereby) knowledge, and so proper assertion can survive 
speaker-ignorance. 
4) It can be permissible and conversationally useful to tell audiences things that 
it is logically impossible for them to come to know: Proper assertion can 
survive (necessary) audience-side ignorance. 
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Cumulatively, this project suggests that, properly understood, ignorance has an important 
role to play in the good epistemic life.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Theses 
Sometimes you’re better off not knowing—even from a strictly epistemic point of 
view. This project articulates a vision of the good (epistemic) life in which agents can 
rightly choose ignorance over knowledge on purely epistemic grounds. This is not to say 
that ignorance is intrinsically valuable or knowledge worthless—that would be far too 
strong. But it suggests a picture wherein agents do not merely aim to know but to know 
the right amount. The honest know when to lie. The brave know when to run away. The 
epistemically virtuous know when to remain ignorant.  
Ignorance can be valuable, I contend, for two main reasons. First, proper 
ignorance can create space for inquiry. We inquire in order to figure things out. So, it’s 
tempting to think that once we are capable of having knowledge, we should always end 
inquiry there. But I argue that in epistemology, as in other domains, delayed gratification 
is a powerful strategy: it’s often better to continue inquiry rather than to settle for 
immediate knowledge. For instance, a detective might reasonably wait to form a 
judgment about the innocence of a suspect until all the evidence has been considered, 
even if a subset of the evidence is sufficient to form a knowledgeable answer now. By 
continuing inquiry, one can often come to know with extra justification or to understand 
or to be rationally certain in the future, whereas closing inquiry can, by activating certain 
kinds of confirmation bias, make these better epistemic outcomes less likely.  
Second, ignorance can be valuable because knowing certain propositions is 
epistemically harmful. Believing propositions like, “I have irrational beliefs about p,” or 
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“My beliefs about p are problematic” can function as self-fulfilling prophecies. In fact, I 
argue that in certain specified contexts, forming these kinds of beliefs can guarantee that 
one will be right about them but at the cost of downgrading one’s overall epistemic 
position. It’s surprising that agents should thus forego guaranteed truths (and guaranteed 
knowledge), but ignorance in these cases can keep us safe from epistemic self-harm.  
The project concludes by examining some of the social aspects of ignorance, 
arguing that assertion can be productive even when either the speaker or the audience is 
stuck in ignorance. I defend a knowledge-friendly norm (the position-to-know norm) that, 
nevertheless, captures the audience-serving insights manifest in Lackey’s (2007) selfless 
assertions, in which the speaker does not believe and so does not know the asserted 
content. I then explore second-person Moorean assertions (e.g. “p, but you don’t believe 
that p”), which can be properly asserted despite necessarily failing to give addressees 
knowledge of their content. I use second-person variants of Moorean paradoxes as a tool 
to explore the reasons we might have for telling audiences things they can’t come to 
know. By doing so, we learn not to confuse the aims of assertion with its norms. 
2. Assumptions 
Those are the theses that I will defend in the following chapters. But before diving 
into the arguments, I want to lay out some of the guiding assumptions that recur 
throughout the project. These aren’t intended to be anything like axioms or self-evident 
principles in the grand old style of the rationalists: they are neither obvious to all nor 
fully precise. Nor do they entail the theses. But these assumptions do express some of the 
core, general commitments upon which this project is built. I won’t fully defend them—
they are assumptions, after all!—but I will briefly characterize them.  
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A. Knowledge is epistemically special. “[I]t makes me wonder, Socrates, ...why 
knowledge is prized far more highly than right opinion?” (Plato 2002, 89). Meno asks a 
difficult question but a sensible one: the presupposition—that knowledge is more 
valuable than right opinion—is importantly right. And it isn’t just that knowledge is more 
valuable than true belief. Knowledge is a special kind of epistemic success that parallels 
the kinds of success we care about in other domains (cf. Sosa 2011). And it plays a 
central normative role in epistemology. If you know that you can’t be in a position to 
know something, that’s a good reason not to believe it.  
Plausibly, the post-Gettier landscape of epistemology has been overly focused on 
knowledge. But to the extent that this is so, it is because the wrong things have been 
ignored, not because post-Gettier epistemology has failed to latch onto something central 
to the field.  
B. Epistemic pluralism about value. Although knowledge is special, it’s not the 
only important thing epistemically. True belief matters. Rationality matters. Epistemic 
justice matters. Understanding matters. Any compelling theory of epistemology must 
balance the idea that knowledge is epistemically exceptional with the idea that knowledge 
is not unique in being epistemically valuable.  
C. Knowledge entails belief. You can’t know what you don’t even believe. Note 
that it’s natural to resist knowledge ascriptions by declaiming belief: 
―C’mon, you know (deep down) that the Dodgers are the better baseball team 
this year. 
―No: I really don’t believe that. 
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 When you believe, you wager your doxastic commitment. Nothing wagered, nothing 
gained. 
D. Belief and assertion are more alike than not. Both take propositions as their 
objects. Both are species of commitment, either doxastic or assertoric. Both are only fully 
proper when based on the right sort of epistemic standing. Both are responsive to 
questions—whether questions on an individual’s research agenda or the QUDs operative 
in a conversational context. As Williamson puts it, “[O]ccurently believing p stands to 
asserting p as the inner stands to the outer” (Williamson 2000, 255–56). 
Some philosophers attempt to explain either belief or assertion (at least partially) 
in terms of the other. So, some think that (sincere) assertion expresses belief, whereas 
Dummett suggests, in contrast, that “Judgment ...is the interiorization of the external act 
of assertion” (Dummett 1973, 362, emphasis mine). I take the question of how belief and 
assertion relate to be a matter for careful theorization. I take the claim that there are deep 
parallels between the two as a datum.  
E. We have (limited but substantial) agency over our beliefs. Of course, we don’t 
have anything like total volitional control over our beliefs. We are subject to implicit bias 
(for instance) whether we like it or not, and this can affect our beliefs before we even 
have a chance to consciously reflect on them. Nor can we simply choose our beliefs at the 
conscious level: I can’t believe just by trying that there are an even number of planets for 
any sum of money, no matter how large.  
But the degree to which this is different from action is sometimes exaggerated. 
Our actions are subject to subconscious influences too, and we can’t just do any old 
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action for arbitrarily large sums of money, either: I can’t fly for money, nor could I maim 
someone I love. 
Gregory Kavka ends The Toxin Puzzle with a comparison between belief and 
intention: 
One cannot intend whatever one wants to intend any more than one can believe 
whatever one wants to believe. As our beliefs are constrained by our evidence, so 
our intentions are constrained by our reasons for action (Kavka 1983, 36). 
 
Kavka is arguing that our intentions are just as constrained as our beliefs. But it is just as 
useful to look at things the other way around: the mere fact that our beliefs are 
constrained by our (evidential) reasons does not force us to give up on the idea that our 
beliefs are, in a limited yet substantial way, under our control. For our intentions are 
certainly as under our agential control as anything is, and they share the same feature of 
being constrained by our reasons.1 
We can’t believe by sheer force of will what we (take ourselves to) have no 
reason to believe; and we can’t intend by sheer force of will what we (take ourselves to) 
have no reason to do. Our ability to exercise agency through volition,2 in intention and 
belief, is activated when our reasons (at least as experienced by us) do not force our hand. 
Kavka says that intentions are only “partly volitional” (1983, 36); the same, I suggest, is 
true of belief. That isn’t as much control over our beliefs as some have hoped for, but it is 
enough. 
3. Themes 
 
1 I set aside free will skepticism, although I don’t presume to say what it means that we have free will in 
some sense. 
2 I don’t insist that this is the only way we can exercise our agency. 
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Finally, I want to briefly highlight a few of the emerging themes that tie the 
project together.  
A. The position to know is an important epistemic concept. In the picture I 
develop, the position to know is not a mere waystation on the road to knowledge: It isn’t 
just assumed that if one is in a position to know that p, one would do best to actually 
know that p. Rather, the position to know represents an interesting point of decision in 
the epistemic life: from it, one can choose to know or one can choose to continue inquiry 
in the hopes of more than mere knowledge, to commit asertorically to a proposition or to 
remain silent. Which path an agent chooses tells us a lot about their epistemic ambitions.  
B. The study of inquiry belongs to epistemology proper. Inquiry is just as central 
to epistemology as knowledge is. How we inquire and what questions we inquire into are 
properly epistemic considerations. These factors may not affect gnoseology, the study of 
what we know.3 But they affect the broader question of what we should believe.  
C. Valuable ignorance reveals epistemic conflict. In many ways, the central 
tension of this project is between the idea that knowledge is epistemically special and that 
knowledge is not the only thing of ultimate epistemic value. Ignorance means (at least 
temporarily) giving up on knowledge. But that doesn’t mean stopping progress toward 
other epistemic goals. Thinking about valuable ignorance is a way to explore those cases 
in which one relinquishes knowledge in the pursuit of some other epistemic good. Like 
fault lines, the presence of valuable ignorance indicates tension beneath the surface. This 
project is thus an exercise in epistemological seismology—recording tensions that reveal 
the shape of conflict between competing epistemic values.   
 
3 I borrow the term “gnoseology” from Sosa (forthcoming). 
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There is only one good, knowledge, and only one evil, ignorance. 
—Socrates 
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VALUABLE IGNORANCE: DELAYED EPISTEMIC GRATIFICATION 
 
Abstract: Sometimes, it is epistemically better to ignorantly inquire into Q than it is to 
know the answer to Q—even when knowledge is readily available. The argument for this 
claim proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that it’s sometimes better to continue inquiry 
into a question than to knowledgeably close it: doing so enables us to remain sensitive to 
future evidence bearing on the question. Then I argue that (usually) when it is better to 
continue than to close inquiry, it is also better to inquire out of genuine ignorance: it is 
epistemically incoherent to ask and answer a question at the same time. A guiding insight 
of the paper is that in epistemology, no less than in other domains, delayed gratification is 
often the best strategy. One shouldn’t always settle for immediate knowledge: one can 
continue inquiry in hopes of even greater epistemic accomplishments (like knowing better, 
understanding, or being certain). 
 
 
1. Introduction 
I spent much of the morning searching for a runcible spoon. Searching was a 
physically active process: my eyes swiveled; my hands rummaged. In the end, I found 
what I was searching for: I then had the runcible spoon. I stopped searching. 
While my eyes were swiveling and my hands rummaging, my mind was doing 
something too: it was inquiring. I was inquiring into the question “Where is my runcible 
spoon?” I wondered where it was, I was curious about its location, and I was sensitive to 
new information about where it might be.1 In the end, I came to know the answer to the 
question I was looking for. It was there, wrapped in a five-pound note. I stopped 
inquiring. 
Why did I stop searching for the runcible spoon once I had found it? It’d be 
awfully silly to search for something that I already had in my (secure enough) possession. 
 
1 Cf. Friedman (2017) 
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There is a norm, it seems, governing searching and having: Don’t search for things you 
already have.  
Once I realize that I have violated this norm—once I discover I’ve been searching 
and having the same thing at the same time—I could return to compliance with the norm 
in one of two ways: I could stop searching for the thing or I could stop having it in my 
possession. Here’s a funny fact: even though the norm just says, “don’t do both,” I 
always resolve this tension in the same way. I always choose to stop searching and never 
choose to stop having. I never chuck my keys into the distance so that my having them 
does not normatively conflict with my searching for them.2 Thus the adage that you 
always find things in the last place you think to look. 
Why the asymmetry? Because aims are asymmetrical. Because one searches for 
things in order to have them. Once I have something, there isn’t a reason to search for it 
anymore. If I’ve got a choice between searching and having, I choose having. 
Plausibly, the same sorts of things that we’ve said about the physical activity of 
searching apply to the mental activity of inquiring. Just as there is a norm not to search 
and have things at the same time, there’s also this (epistemic) norm: don’t inquire into 
questions you already know the answer to.3 We occasionally stumble into doing this, as 
when we inquire about a friend’s plans for the day only to recall that we’d asked before 
and easily would have remembered if we had bothered to reflect. But it’s epistemically 
embarrassing to have done so.4 
 
2 A few cases don’t fit this pattern so clearly. When I hide a toy for my dog, she brings it back to me to hide 
it for her again. She’s more interested in the game of searching for the toy than having the toy itself. We set 
these aside for now. 
3 I defend a version of this norm, building on work in Friedman (2017), in §4.2. 
4 But for an argument that the relevant kind of embarrassment shouldn’t be construed as norm violation, see 
Archer (2018, 601–604). 
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And once again, it seems that there’s an important asymmetry. One inquires into 
questions (often, at least) in order to know their answers.5,6 Once I know something, 
there isn’t a reason to inquire into questions that it is the answer to anymore. If I’ve got a 
choice between inquiring into a question and knowing the answer, I want to choose 
knowledge. Here’s a principle that captures this normative preference: 
Better to Know: Relative to the aim(s) of inquiry on a single, given question, it’s 
epistemically better that the agent knows the answer than that they do not.  
 
It’s better to know the answer to a question than to be ignorant of it. At least with respect 
to the aims of that very inquiry. 
Of course, it’s not flat-footedly true that everything is better to know all things 
considered. There’s a lot of reasons not to know. Some things are secrets, and a few of 
those things should be. Some things are trivial clutter,7 unworthy of spending our limited 
epistemic resources on. Some things are morally bad to know, like how to build an 
atomic bomb or what it’s like to skin a cat. Some things might even be bad to know for 
epistemic reasons: knowing that a given experiment is statistically unlikely to produce 
significant, repeatable results might stop a researcher from achieving the wealth of 
knowledge that would in fact result from running it. And sometimes it’s just better not to 
pry. 
 
5 Perhaps we actually want something stronger: to know answers as answers to their corresponding 
questions. For instance, suppose I am wondering whether Batman is at the party but I know that Bruce 
Wayne is at the party. (For the uninitiated, Batman=Bruce Wayne). In some sense, <Bruce Wayne is the 
party> is the answer to <Is Batman at the party?>, but if someone doesn’t know that Bruce Wayne is 
Batman, if they are not in a position to recognize <Bruce Wayne is at the party> as the answer to <Is 
Batman at the party?>, then one doesn’t seem to be doing anything wrong by inquiring into Q and knowing 
the answer to Q at the same time. Maybe it’s just a blameless violation. Or maybe the norm is really this: 
Don’t inquire into Q and know the answer to Q as the answer to Q simultaneously. 
Having raised this distinction, I’m going to proceed to ignore it for the rest of the paper. From here on out, 
read “knowing the answer to Q” as “knowing the answer to Q” or as “knowing the answer to Q as the 
answer to Q” in accordance with your favored interpretation. See Schaffer (2007) for related discussion. 
6 For a defense of the claim that the aim of inquiry is knowledge, see Kelp (2014). 
7 See Friedman (2018) and Harman (1986). 
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Notice that Better to Know is carefully crafted to avoid such cases. It’s 
compatible with there being moral, practical, and prudential reasons to prefer ignorance 
to knowledge. And because the evaluation is relativized to assessing how an agent has 
done with respect to a single question, epistemic trade-offs between knowing the answers 
to different questions won’t arise.8 Indeed, Better to Know probably strikes us not just as 
true but as obviously so. Isn’t it obvious that, in suitably tailored epistemic contexts, 
knowledge is better than ignorance? 
But Better to Know is false. Or so I’ll argue. It is sometimes epistemically better, 
from the vantage point of inquiry into Q, to be ignorant about Q than it is to know Q.9 In 
particular, it’s often better for agents to be inquiringly ignorant than knowledgeable. 
If we are going to find cases that belie Better to Know, we had better be looking 
at cases in which knowledge is a genuine option for the agent. No one will be impressed 
by the idea that we are better off ignorant when we can’t help it. So, to focus our 
dialectical attention, let’s consider only cases in which agents are in a position to know 
the answer to a question and, if this is something more,10 would come to know the answer 
if they formed a belief about the answer to that question.11 This guarantees that 
knowledge is a fully available option for an agent. Inquiring ignorance in such cases is 
dearly bought, for the (opportunity) cost is knowledge. 
 
8 We thus avoid the concerns about epistemic trade-offs that Firth (1981) and Berker (2013a, 2013b) raise 
for epistemic consequentialisms. 
9 I use the expression “knowing Q” as shorthand for “knowing (the proposition that is) the (complete 
enough) answer to Q.” 
10 On the account of the position to know that I develop in Willard-Kyle (2020), it is something more. 
11 This is what Sosa calls a strong position to know (forthcoming: chapter 6, §3) 
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An agent in this fortunate epistemic situation could then proceed in any of the 
following four ways, depending on whether they believe or not and whether they inquire 
or not: 
A 
Knowing the Answer to Q 
Continuing Inquiry into Q 
B 
Knowing the Answer to Q 
Not Continuing Inquiry into Q 
C 
Not Knowing the Answer to Q 
Continuing Inquiry into Q 
D 
Not Knowing the Answer to Q 
Not Continuing Inquiry into Q 
 
The agent believes and so, given our dialectical assumptions, knows the answer to the 
relevant question in the top row. In the bottom row, the agent does not believe an answer 
to the question and, since knowledge entails belief,12 they don’t know it either. The agent 
continues inquiry in the left column but not in the right. The final alternative, D, is to 
abandon inquiry into a question, neither committing to resolving the inquiry (through 
belief in an answer) nor pursuing it. For the most part, we will be professionally 
uninterested in this alternative. It might be epistemically permissible to abandon inquiry 
much of the time.13 But we’d still like to know what we ought to do epistemically given 
that we are invested in a question. 
My task is to show that agents should sometimes land in box C rather than boxes 
A or B. If that’s right, then sometimes it is epistemically better to ignorantly inquire into 
 
12 I assume the orthodox view that knowledge entails belief, but see Black (1971) for a critique of the 
orthodoxy. If knowledge doesn’t entail belief, then agents might count as knowing in the bottom row. I will 
ultimately argue that sometimes agents ought to end up in box C. If agents know the answer to the question 
in box C (at least in the cases I consider) then my argument won’t establish the conclusion that it is 
sometimes better for agents to be ignorant than it is for them to know. But parts of the argument could be 
adapted to defend an interesting (albeit different) conclusion: that it is sometimes better for agents not to 
believe what they know. 
13 Nelson (2010) argues that we have no positive epistemic duties to believe any particular proposition in 
part because no proposition has (according to Nelson) a purely epistemic demand on our attention. For 
similar reasons, one might suppose that no question has a purely epistemic demand on our attention.  
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Q than it is to know the answer to Q. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue 
that it’s sometimes better to be on the left side of the diagram. Then I show that in all (or 
at least many) of those same cases it’s better to be on the bottom half of the diagram. 
Result: these are cases in which we should be in box C—inquiring but not knowing. 
Let’s sketch the argument again, in a little more detail. First, I’ll argue that 
sometimes, continuing inquiry into Q is epistemically better (with respect to that very 
inquiry) than knowing the answer to Q while also foregoing further inquiry into Q. Here 
is an example of the sort of case I have in mind: 
The Philosophy Student 
 
A philosophy student is studying Descartes’ cogito and trying to make sense of 
what the structure of the argument is. They have read the relevant sections of the 
Meditations several times and listened closely to their instructor’s interpretation 
of the argument. They are a good reader of the text, and their philosophy 
instructor did indeed present an accurate representation of Descartes’ argument. If 
on an exam they were asked the question, “What is the structure of the cogito?” 
they would give a knowledgeable response. Nevertheless, the philosophy student 
is deeply interested in the way that the cogito works, and they remain curious 
about the argument’s structure. They are not yet satisfied with their inquiry, and 
this is partly explained by their (perhaps unarticulated) interest in really 
understanding the argument in a way that enables them to explain how they know 
(to themselves or to someone else). Instead of committing to a belief now, they 
continue wondering and make a note to look up the SEP article on Descartes later 
that evening. 
 
The fact that the philosophy student could know now shouldn’t stop them (I will argue) 
from inquiring. After all, they are aiming for something better than mere knowledge. 
I haven’t said yet whether the philosophy student (or others like them) should 
hold onto knowledge while they inquire. In the second part of my argument, I answer no. 
There’s something incoherent about asking and answering a question at the same time. 
Doing so (in the relevant way) is either psychologically impossible or epistemically 
impermissible and often introduces confirmation bias where it is least wanted. In the 
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relevant cases, it is epistemically better (with respect to that very inquiry) to inquire into 
Q without knowing the answer to Q than it is to inquire into Q with knowledge of its 
answer. 
Returning to our diagram, the first step in the argument says it is sometimes better 
to (inquiringly) be on the left-hand side. The second step says that (in the same sort of 
cases), box A is defective. It’s (at least usually) better to be in box C. The conclusion: 
sometimes it is epistemically better (with respect to one’s inquiry into Q) to inquire into 
Q without knowing the answer to Q than it is to know the answer to Q.  
A 
Knowing the Answer to Q 
Continuing Inquiry into Q 
B 
Knowing the Answer to Q 
Not Continuing Inquiry into Q 
C 
Not Knowing the Answer to Q 
Continuing Inquiry into Q 
D 
Not Knowing the Answer to Q 
Not Continuing Inquiry into Q 
 
A guiding insight of the paper is that in epistemology, no less than in other domains, 
delayed gratification is often the best strategy. One shouldn’t always settle for immediate 
knowledge: one can continue inquiry in hopes of even greater epistemic accomplishments 
(like knowing better, understanding, or being certain).  
It turns out that ignorance has an instrumentally valuable role to play in our 
epistemic lives: it enables inquiry. This is surprising—to call someone ignorant is to 
insult them! But if this paper is right, it can be even worse to be a know-it-all.14 
2. Characterizing Inquiry 
 
14 This is not to deny that certain kinds of ignorance are Very Bad Indeed. The epistemic, social, and moral 
dangers of white ignorance, for instance, have been both well-documented and well-theorized (see, e.g., 
Mills 2007), and it’s important to flag that the thesis of this paper does not undermine the dangers of such 
ignorance. Rather, the focus will be on how ignorance can be epistemically valuable when it creates space 
for positive kinds of inquiry. 
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Ignorance can be valuable, I will argue, because it enables inquiry. But what is 
inquiry? And what is it for an inquiry to be open or closed? In this section, I clear the 
terminological ground. 
2.1 Wondering 
To inquire involves having an inquiring state of mind that is goal-directed, 
question-directed, and characterized by sensitivity to new information (Friedman 2017, 
307–308).15 That isn’t necessarily all that inquiry is: perhaps inquiry also involves doing 
something with the aim of resolving the inquiry—not just having the curiosity itch but 
trying to scratch it.16 But all genuine inquiry at least involves a real, inquiring attitude. 
Prototypical inquiring attitudes include wondering or being curious about a question. 
Inquiring states are question-directed in that they take questions as objects: one wonders 
whether it will snow tonight or why the kids are being so quiet. One doesn’t wonder that 
it will snow tonight.17 One can also inquire into a subject matter, but these can be thought 
of (for our purposes at least) as sets of questions. Questions are goal-directed: to have a 
question is to be on a quest for an answer. This paper will explore what kind of answer 
(or epistemic access to that answer) successfully resolves the aim of inquiry in due 
course. This curiosity and goal-directedness tend to produce sensitivity to future 
information that bears on the question. 
Admittedly, this isn’t the only way the English word “inquiry” is used. one could 
use the English word “inquiry” instead to pick out answering-preparatory activities. For 
 
15 For defense of the claim that inquiry is goal-directed, see Kelp (2014).  
16 I owe the curiosity “itch” metaphor to Miriam Schoenfield. 
17 If one doesn’t mind sounding a bit archaic, one can get away with saying things like “I wonder that 
you’ve succeeded in your quest!” But here “I wonder” means “I am amazed” and not “I am curious.” Or if 
the speaker does have a question, it isn’t whether you’ve succeeded in your quest but (perhaps) how. 
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instance, Ernest Sosa writes that inquiry includes the “things that one does as one 
attempts to put oneself in position to answer one’s question knowledgeably” (Sosa 
forthcoming, chapter 4, §D7). Although not eschewing curiosity (the answer-preparatory 
activities are guided by an aim to know), this approach highlights the active side of 
inquiry. Such activities might include gathering evidence or weighing the evidence one 
already has, for instance.  
Let us draw a distinction. There are inquiring states (like wondering or being 
curious) and inquiring activities (like gathering or contemplating evidence). I can 
inquireSTATE without inquiringACTIVITY by wondering where my runcible spoon is from 
the couch. And I can inquireACTIVITY without inquiringSTATE by rummaging through items 
on the table, as though to find the runcible spoon, disinterestedly.18 
As I use the word, “inquiry” shall always include inquirySTATE and not just 
inquiryACTIVITY.19 Inquiry without curiosity isn’t inquiry at all. At least, it doesn’t qualify 
as what I mean by “inquiry” in this paper.20 One might think that the same goes for 
inquiryACTIVITY: Inert inquiry isn’t inquiry at all.21 I’m sympathetic to this thought, 
 
18 I’m especially grateful to conversations with Ernie Sosa and Sam Carter here for help distinguishing 
between these meanings. 
19 This does not entail that anyone with an inquiringSTATE is thereby inquiring in the sense of this paper. 
Perhaps an agent is curious about a question but does not have a goal to answer the question. If such a case 
is possible, the relevant agent would not be an inquirer in our sense. The question would not be on the 
agent’s “research agenda” (cf. Friedman 2017; Olsson and Westlund 2006). Thomas Kelly’s (2003) case of 
an agent who doesn’t want to know the end of a movie before having seen it (despite, perhaps, in some 
sense, being curious about the ending) may fall into this category, for instance. 
20 This is a bit more restrictive than Friedman who allows that some interrogative attitudes constitutive of 
inquiry may be processes rather than states (2019, 299). Someone could count as inquiring, for Friedman, 
by having the (process) IA of deliberating without having the (stative) IA of being curious. I have a hard 
time imagining an agent who is genuinely deliberating without at least a weak kind of curiosity or other 
stative IA in the background. But these differences needn’t detain us. What will ultimately matter for the 
argument is that inquiring agents “aim to resolve their question” (299) in an epistemically appropriate way. 
Having such an aim is enough to count as a stative IA in my view. 
21 Sapir and van Elswyk (manuscript) say that “inquiry is a goal-directed activity” (emphases mine), and 
even Friedman says that inquiring is “something that we do,” (2019, 297), although she also insists that 
“we should not straightforwardly identify inquiring with acting” (298). 
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although officially I will remain neutral on it.22 If someone wants to use the word 
“inquiry” differently to include agents who are inquiringACTIVITY without inquiringSTATE, 
then (as a matter of English) they have my blessing. But in this paper (to avoid overuse of 
subscripts), “inquiry” shall always denote something that includes inquirySTATE, and I will 
refer to any inquiryACTIVITY that is unaccompanied by inquirySTATE only as 
“investigation.” 
We’re interested in the sort of stative inquiry that involves interrogative attitudes 
because we are interested in the questions that agents ask themselves.23 To capture this 
idea, Friedman (2017, 308) follows Olsson and Westlund (2006) in employing the 
metaphor of a research agenda. A research agenda is to an individual inquirer and belief 
(at least something like) what a question under discussion (QUD) is to a community of 
inquirers and assertion.24 For a question to be on one’s research agenda needn’t mean that 
one is currently paying much attention to it. Just as one can have occurrent and non-
occurrent beliefs, one can have occurrent and non-occurrent inquiries. 
In our lexicon, all genuine inquiries are open inquiries. If Q is on your research 
agenda, you have an open inquiry into Q. Inquiry into Q is closed for an agent when they 
believe a satisfactory answer to Q.25 Beliefs can be weaker or stronger: the sort of belief 
that closes inquiry is full belief. I won’t defend a complete theory of full belief, but here 
is a characterization: Full belief is the thing typically (but not only) produced by 
 
22 Nevertheless, one might think that the sorts of reasons that apply to inquiry will have (rough) parallels 
that apply to investigation. Inquiry into a question provides motivation to investigate it, and investigation is 
more likely to succeed if motivated by genuine inquiry. For more on norms on investigation or evidence-
gathering, see Flores and Woodard (manuscript). 
23 Cf. Whitcomb (2017) 
24 See Roberts (2012) 
25 Cf. Friedman (2019b). I use “closing inquiry” and “settling inquiry” interchangeably, although neither of 
these (in my mouth) entails having closed inquiry successfully. 
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decisions to affirm after conscious, judgmental deliberation;26 it is capable of constituting 
knowledge when appropriately situated epistemically; it enables us to have certain 
affective attitudes toward propositions (like “being happy that p”);27 and, it is a 
counterpart to flat-out assertion. This concept of belief is perhaps a “theoretical posit” 
rather than an ordinary language unpacking of the English words “belief” or “think” 
(Hawthorne, Rothschild, and Spectre 2016, 1402).28 But it’s a concept worth positing:29 
We want something that stands to our research agendas roughly as assertions stand to 
QUDs.  
Admittedly, we sometimes conclude an inquiry with less than full belief, as when 
a gameshow contestant loses curiosity in a question after making their best guess (where 
a guess is conceptualized as involving a weaker kind of commitment than full belief).30 
But I do not think such cases should be thought of as closing inquiry, even when making 
the guess plays a role in enabling the agent to end an inquiry. This is because it would be 
sensible for the gameshow contestant to continue wondering whether they got the answer 
 
26 Cf. Sosa (2015) 
27 I owe this suggestion to Matt McGrath. See his (manuscript). 
28 See also Sapir and van Elswyk (manuscript) who usefully use hedged assertions as a tool to defend the 
permissibility of open inquiry in conjunction with (at least) weaker-than-full belief. Whitcomb (2017, 158–
59) and Avery (2018, 600) make similar observations. 
29 This posit is not an invention of recent analytic philosophy. Sextus employed a similar (if not quite the 
same) distinction: 
When we say that sceptics [cognate to “inquirers”] do not hold beliefs, we do not take ‘belief’ in 
the sense in which some say, quite generally, that belief is acquiescing in something; for Sceptics 
assent to the feelings forced on them by appearances—for example, they would not say, when 
heated or chilled, “I think I am not heated (or: chilled)’. Rather, we say that they do not hold belief 
in the sense in which some say that belief is assent to some unclear object in the sciences (Sextus 
2000, 6, emphases mine). 
30 I’m grateful to Matt McGrath and especially Ernie Sosa for stimulating conversation about guessing and 
the gameshow contestant, which I can only gesture at here. For an alternative viewpoint that sees guessing 
as a variety of inquiry-closing judgment rather than a kind of assent that plays no inquiry-closing function, 
see Sosa (forthcoming). In the background of my favored view is the thought in the spirit of Friedman 
(2019b) that a distinguishing feature of full belief against other doxastic attitudes is precisely its inquiry-
closing function.  
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right after having made their guess whereas (I will argue in §4) it would not be sensible 
to continue inquiring into a question that one fully believes an answer to. 
In any case, from here on out, we will restrict our attention to full, outright, and 
occurrent beliefs (and occurrent inquiries) unless otherwise noted. While occurrent, full 
beliefs commit the agent to an answer to a question, mere dispositions to believe do not. 
Dispositional beliefs (as opposed to dispositions to believe)31 may fall somewhere in the 
middle, and it’s unclear whether agents with dispositional beliefs in the answer to a 
question should take the inquiry to be resolved. Likewise, for tacit, fragmented,32 
implicit, or otherwise “offline” beliefs. I propose that, methodologically, we focus on the 
clear case of occurrent and outright belief, leaving open how our findings may apply to 
less robust or less immediate varieties.  
What counts as a satisfactory answer—an answer that, when believed, effectively 
closes inquiry? This is a question we will return to in §4. For now, it’s enough to note 
that all complete (that is, exhaustive) answers count as satisfactory answers, but not every 
satisfactory answer is complete. To see how an incomplete answer might nevertheless be 
satisfactory in our still-to-be-considered sense, consider questions like this: 
1. Where can I buy a cup of coffee?33 
Here are two satisfactory answers to this question: 
 2. You can buy coffee at Hidden Grounds. 
 3. You can buy coffee at Penstock Coffee Roasters. 
 
31 See Audi (1994) for the seminal articulation of this distinction. 
32See Egan (2008) 
33 Example from Moyer and Syrett (2019, 8) and (forthcoming). 
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Notice that these answers aren’t complete: neither exhaustively includes all the places 
one could buy coffee (or even those nearby). Suppose you know (2) but not (3). You still 
count as knowing where I can buy a cup of coffee (at least in most conversational 
contexts). And we would not infer from your knowing where I can buy a cup of coffee 
that you know I can buy coffee at Penstock: you might count as knowing just in virtue of 
knowing that I can buy coffee at Hidden Grounds. Question (1) prompts mention-some 
rather than complete answers in most conversational contexts (Hintikka 1976). 
Importantly for our purposes, believing (2) as the answer to (1) counts as closing inquiry 
into (1) in most contexts.34 
Our definitions for open and closed inquiry have some important consequences. 
First it isn’t definitionally ruled out that a question could be open and closed for an agent 
at the same time: if it is possible for an agent to have Q on their research agenda while 
also (fully, occurrently) believing an answer to Q, then inquiry into Q is both open and 
closed for them. Second, one doesn’t have to have inquired into Q in the past for inquiry 
into Q to be closed now. If I have always believed that Santa exists, the question whether 
Santa exists is closed but has never been (merely) open for me. Third, not all inquiries 
that were open before but are not open now are thereby closed now. When I stopped 
wondering how Santa delivers all those presents in one night, I ended inquiry without 
closing it, for I did not replace my wondering with a belief in a complete answer to the 
corresponding question (the inquiry wasn’t closed, it just ended). Finally, some questions 
get stuck (or set) open, but their being set is not another way of being closed. Agnostics 
 
34 One could insist: “No, I really meant where are all the places I can get a cup of coffee‽” But this isn’t the 
way the question is intended in most contexts. 
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have not closed inquiry on God’s existence even if they are convinced that they are 
unlikely to ever form an opinion one way or the other.35 
2.2 Taking Questions Up 
I now want to introduce a new notion, that of taking up a question.36 It’s one thing 
to wonder about a question or to have it on one’s research agenda. But sometimes one 
aims to do more: sometimes one tries to answer it. But usually one doesn’t simply try to 
answer a question no matter what. I could try to answer a multiplication question by 
believing the first answer that comes to mind. But that’s not good epistemic behavior, at 
least not for forming full, outright beliefs.37 When I take up a question, I try to answer the 
question to a certain epistemic standard, even if the reasons I’ve picked that question to 
take up (rather than some other one) are (partly) moral or prudential. Our question now: 
What is (or should) that standard (be)? Given that I’ve taken a question up and that my 
primary aim at the moment is to do well in my inquiry into Q, how should I decide 
whether to close inquiry or continue it? 
Here’s a plausible answer inspired by Better to Know: I should close inquiry just 
in case I would do so knowledgeably.  
 
35 If this leads the agnostic to lose interest in the question of God’s existence, then inquiry into the question 
of whether God exists will be neither open nor closed for them: inquiry will have expired. But the agnostic 
might still have an open inquiry into the question of God’s existence if they still wonder whether God 
exists (despite their stipulated conviction that their wondering will never receive an answer). 
36 I borrow this terminology from Sosa (forthcoming) in whose mouth it has a slightly narrower meaning:  
“When you consciously inquire on whether p, you consciously take up your question with a view 
to alethic affirmation at a minimum, or to the more ambitious aim: to judging (to affirming on 
whether p, to do so alethically, and not only correctly but aptly) (forthcoming, chapter 4, §D5). 
37 I leave open that there may be other kinds of doxastic commitments (guesses, “hedged” or otherwise 
provisional beliefs, etc.) for which it is epistemically appropriate to commit oneself (in the relevant way) 
without being in a very good epistemic position.  
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The Knowledge Rule: If one is taking up the question Q, then one should close 
inquiry into Q just in case one would thereby know the answer to Q.38,39 
 
The “should” has wide scope: one can always comply with The Knowledge Rule by not 
taking a question up. It’s helpful to break up the embedded biconditional in The 
Knowledge Rule into two directions: 
LTR: If one is taking up the Question Q, then if one closes inquiry into Q one 
should thereby know the answer to Q. 
 
This is something like a knowledge norm on closing inquiry.40 Since we’ve said that 
(full) belief closes inquiry, it’s a knowledge norm for (full) belief. Or at least belief in the 
answers to an important class of questions (the questions one takes up). Although not 
uncontroversial, I find this norm, or something in its vicinity, quite plausible.41 Nothing 
that I say here will challenge the left-to-right direction. Now let’s look at the other 
direction: 
RTL: If one is taking up the Question Q, then: one should close inquiry into Q if 
one would thereby know the answer to Q. 
 
 
38 Although I’m not sure anyone has defended precisely this knowledge- and question-centric norm, the 
literature is replete with defences of biconditional norms in the neighborhood, sometimes with other 
epistemic or semantic properties (e.g. justification or truth) playing a central role, or with the notion of 
considering a proposition instead of taking up a question. Some prominent examples are listed below: 
Chisholm: “We may assume that every person is subject to a purely intellectual requirement—that of 
trying his best to bring it about that for every proposition h that he considers, he accepts h if and only if h is 
true” (1977, 14). 
Feldman: “For any proposition p, time t, and person S, if S considers p at t, then S has a duty to have the 
attitude toward p that fits the evidence S has at t concerning p” (2002, 368). 
Sosa: “When one faces judgmentally a question whether p,” one aims “to affirm alethically re <p?> iff 
one’s alethic affirmation would be apt,” where such apt affirmation entails knowledge (forthcoming, 
chapter 3, §A2). 
39 A difficulty for The Knowledge Rule that I shall (mostly) pass over is what to say about questions that 
do not have a uniquely correct and satisfactory answer (as for mention-some questions). What is the answer 
in such contexts? I do, however, make some suggestions bearing on this topic in §4.2. 
40 For a defense of this view, see Kelp (2014). 
41 See Willard-Kyle (2020). 
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This says once you can have knowledge, you ought to take it. Once you’ve taken up a 
question, you aim to come to close inquiry if doing so meets a certain standard. The RTL 
direction says that knowledge is the standard one should hold inquiry to. 
Let’s press pause. Some epistemologists will think that I have unfairly privileged 
knowledge in the discussion so far. Just as there are competing epistemic norms on 
proper assertion, so there are competing epistemic norms on proper belief. Some will 
think knowledge is an important threshold, but others would prefer to focus on variants 
like The True Belief Rule, The Reasonable Belief Rule, and so on.42 Expositionally, 
it’s useful to focus on just one such rule, and, as author, I call dibs on picking which one. 
But I hope that, so long as one’s own favored rule does not require absolute certainty, it 
will be clear enough how what I say about The Knowledge Rule applies to variants of 
the rule. There will be some important (but not maximally good) threshold at which one 
could successfully close inquiry and a corresponding question about whether we should 
always close those inquiries that have been taken up when we have the opportunity to do 
so successfully.43 
 
42 As flagged in an earlier footnote, Chisholm (1977) suggests a principle in the neighborhood of The 
Truth Rule. Kvanvig argues that truth is the goal of inquiry, although he at least grants for argument that, 
in some sense, “successful inquiry yields knowledge” (2003, 9). Feldman defends an evidentialist version 
of the rule, explicitly noting that Clifford’s (1877) evidentialist rule is introduced under the subtitle “The 
Duty of Inquiry” (Feldman 2002, 363). 
Plausibly, there is a tight link between inquiry-closing belief and QUD-closing assertion. Sosa, for instance, 
suggests that “If knowledge is the norm of assertion, it is plausibly also the norm of affirmation, whether 
the affirming be private or public,” (Sosa 2011, 48) and Williamson says that belief stands to assertion “as 
inner stands to outer” (Williamson 2000, 255–56). (See Willard-Kyle (2020, 344–46) for recent discussion 
of these analogies.) If that’s right, then it is easy to imagine the literature on norms of assertion mirroring 
potential answers to the question of what properly closes inquiry: truth for Weiner (2005), reasonability for 
Lackey (2007), having supportive reasons for McKinnon (2013) and so on. (Although it’s noteworthy that 
Kvanvig (2011) proposes a different norm for assertion—justification—than he does the goal of inquiry—
truth. So, we should not assume that all authors will grant the proposed parallelism.) 
43 I’m grateful to Zach Kofi for pressing for greater clarity on this point. 
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Press play. This principle—that, conditional upon taking up a question, one 
should close inquiry just in case one would thereby come to know—is attractively simple 
and cleanly partitions those cases in which we should close inquiry from those we should 
not. As is often the case, however, the simple answer runs into difficulty upon closer 
examination. And it isn’t just that The Knowledge Rule is false in some nitpicky way: 
it’s false in a way that gives us insight into the way that ignorance can play an 
epistemically useful role in our lives. 
3. On Behalf of Continuing Inquiry 
In the remainder of this paper, I offer an argument against The Knowledge Rule 
(and, by extension, Better to Know). Recall our space of options for agents who would 
know the answer to a question they are taking up upon closing inquiry with a full belief: 
A 
Knowing the Answer to Q 
Continuing Inquiry into Q 
B 
Knowing the Answer to Q 
Not Continuing Inquiry into Q 
C 
Not Knowing the Answer to Q 
Continuing Inquiry into Q 
D 
Not Knowing the Answer to Q 
Not Continuing Inquiry into Q 
 
In this section, I’ll argue that when we don’t want to simply abandon inquiry (option D) it 
is sometimes epistemically better to land in the left-hand side of this figure. Sometimes, 
continuing inquiry into Q is epistemically better (with respect to that very inquiry) than 
knowing the answer to Q while also foregoing further inquiry into Q. 
In §4, I’ll go on to argue that when we are genuinely inquiring, we should also 
forego knowledge (putting us in box C). But in this section, I’m only arguing that it’s 
often better to continue inquiry, knowledgeably or ignorantly, than not to, even when one 
would knowledgeably refrain from continuing inquiry.  
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3.1 The Dual-Threshold Model for Success in Closing Inquiry 
Before getting to the cases, let’s address a question: What does it take for inquiry 
to be closed successfully? I contend that this question is ambiguous between two readings 
and that The Knowledge Rule ultimately goes wrong by only being sensitive to one of 
them.  
Here is one thing it might mean for inquiry to be closed successfully: that the 
agent has met their own (epistemic) goals for the inquiry. Agents might want to achieve 
knowledge, but that doesn’t have to be the thing they care most about. An agent can be 
driven by a desire to know but they can also be driven by a desire to understand, or to 
have justified beliefs, or to have certainty, or to know that they know, or merely to have 
the right opinion. There are lots of good epistemic things in the world, and, at first glance, 
it isn’t obvious why it would be epistemically bad to aim for any of them.  
But, in fact, we don’t seem to be happy with epistemic agents anytime they’ve 
achieved their own individual aims. Sometimes, their epistemic sights aren’t raised high 
enough. Someone who comes to a full belief in a true answer to a question but just by 
guessing has fallen short of full epistemic success. Yes, they got something epistemically 
valuable (right opinion) and perhaps that is the thing that they (individually) cared about, 
but there’s some other epistemic standard that they have fallen short of, and that standard 
(whatever it is) seems to play a more prominent role in our evaluation of their belief than 
the agent’s internal goal of (merely) having a true opinion. Despite the plurality of 
valuable epistemic things in the world, at least one of them seems special for belief-
evaluation.  
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I think that the special epistemic standard is knowledge. Others think it is 
something else. But whatever the special epistemic standard is, we face two puzzling 
questions: (1) If there are many genuine epistemic values, why is just one of them marked 
as special for belief formation? (2) How do we make sense of the variety of potential 
epistemic aims for inquiry in a normatively coherent way? I will say something brief 
about each of them. 
First, why think that one standard for belief is epistemically special? One reason 
is that we need a standard of commitment release for inquiry (Kelp 2014). Kelp asks us to 
suppose that a detective promises to resolve an inquiry into a central question of a 
criminal case. We need some agreed upon standard for when the detective has secured 
the right sort of epistemic access to the answer to count as having successfully completed 
the inquiry. A default epistemic standard for inquiry gives us a way to do that.44 
But we don’t need to think that this is a norm that only applies to inquiry-driven 
professionals. Whenever anyone asserts something, they are answering a question 
operative in the conversational context (a QUD), even if that question is implicit. And 
similarly, when we form full beliefs, we do so in response to (perhaps implicit) questions 
on our research agenda. If you assert that p, I need to know (at least in a rough way) what 
sort of epistemic standard you take yourself to have met Otherwise I won’t know how to 
update my beliefs in response to your public affirmations. Having one special epistemic 
standard helps us to coordinate our social responsibilities for asserting and for appropriate 
uptake in response to testimony.45 On the assumption that assertion closely parallels full 
 
44 Kelp argues, and I agree, that the relevant standard is knowledge. 
45 I develop this story in more detail in (Willard-Kyle 2020, 333). 
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belief, that’s a good reason to think that belief, too, has a special epistemic standard 
among the many epistemic goods. 
Second, how do we make sense of plural, potential epistemic aims for inquiry in a 
normatively coherent way? Here, a grading metaphor is instructive.46 When one takes a 
class, there’s a single standard that separates a passing grade from a failing one. Broadly 
speaking, a passing grade in a class indicates a (minimally) successful performance. But 
while some students do aim to merely pass, most aim for something better. Some students 
aim for an A, or at least a B. To do as well as they can, or better than Brad, and so on. 
Each of those grades represents a level of performance that is objectively valuable and 
objectively more valuable than merely passing.  
Suppose you ask a student whether they performed successfully in their class. 
Passing the class is the minimum success condition for this kind of performance. But a 
student might reasonably take themselves to have fallen short of full success if they did 
not, in addition, get the (objectively valuable) grade that they wanted.  
If a student aims too low, they can get the grade they want without thereby 
counting as succeeding. At least not in any robust sense. Imagine a student who says, 
“Hey, I got a 40%, which is even better than the 35% I was aiming for!” “Not good 
enough,” we respond. Even though 40% does represent work of some degree of objective 
worth (more than 35% does, for instance), it doesn’t represent enough worth to qualify as 
a success according to our special standard of a passing grade. So, there is a kind of 
asymmetry. A student fully succeeds when they get the grade that they want only if the 
grade they want reaches a certain level (at least a passing grade).  
 
46 I’m grateful to Carolina Flores for suggesting the grading metaphor. 
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Let’s steer back toward epistemology. As there are a variety of potential academic 
performances in a class, so there are a variety of potential epistemological performances 
in response to an inquiry, many of which are objectively epistemically valuable (justified 
belief, knowledge, understanding, etc.). Certain epistemic performances don’t get a 
passing grade: they don’t meet the special standard of success that is relevant to belief 
formation. I’ve suggested that the relevant standard is knowledge, but our main concern 
in this section is that there is a minimum threshold for success not what it is.  
But the minimum threshold is not the only threshold relevant to successful 
performance. It also matters what threshold the agent was aiming for. Like a student who 
aims not just to pass but to get an A+, it’s laudable to seek the higher epistemic goods. 
It’s good to seek not just knowledge but knowledge+.47 
What is knowledge+? Knowledge+ is the collection of epistemic goods that (1) 
entail knowledge and (2) are better than mere knowledge. It’s good to know, but it’s even 
better to know that one knows (KK): when you know that you know, you don’t just know 
the answer, you know that you got it right. KK entails knowledge. So, KK is one variety 
of knowledge+. Alternatively, knowing requires a certain degree of justification. But one 
can have knowledge with even more justification than knowledge requires.48 Knowledge-
with-extra-justification entails and is better than knowledge: knowledge-with-extra-
 
47 Thanks to Matt McGrath for suggesting the umbrella term. See McGrath (manuscript) for a distinct but 
related way of identifying a dual-criteria for success in belief-formation.  
48 This, or something like it, is plausibly true even on a knowledge-first epistemology according to which 
one’s evidence is one’s knowledge. Suppose I know that p⊃q and that p and (knowledgeably) infer q. On 
Williamson’s (2000) picture, my evidence for q now has an evidential probability of 1. If I then also learn 
that r∧(r⊃q), I seemingly acquire new evidence bearing on q but my evidential probability for q doesn’t go 
up. (After all, it was already 1!). But this doesn’t mean there isn’t something better about my new epistemic 
position with respect to q—my knowledge that q is more robust and secure since it is supported by two 
separate arguments that entail it. It’s just that this betterness cannot be cashed out in terms of evidential 
probabilities. 
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justification is thus another variety of knowledge+. If you understand well enough to 
explain how you know that p, then you also know that p. But it’s better to understand 
well enough to explain how you know that p than merely to know that p, so that too is a 
kind of knowledge+. The same is also plausibly true for other states like knowing full 
well49 or being rationally certain. 
Since knowledge+ entails knowledge, aiming for knowledge+ meets the 
minimum threshold for epistemic success for closing inquiry. So, like the student who 
aims for an A (and unlike the student who aims for a 35%), it seems there is nothing 
epistemically inappropriate about agents aiming for knowledge+. We typically admire 
people who want not just to know but to understand, who want their (knowledgeable) 
beliefs to be especially justified, to know that they know, and so on.  
At least, there’s not anything inherently inappropriate about agents aiming for 
knowledge+. Perhaps some varieties of knowledge+ are too lofty for us to properly aspire 
to on certain questions. Call this the Icarus objection: on this view, seeking knowledge+, 
at least of a certain kind, is epistemic hubris. Suppose, for instance, that I am walking 
down the street and see a parked car. I am in a position to know that it is a parked car. 
But I could try to aim for rational certainty, a species of knowledge+. I could go kick the 
tires to make sure it isn’t a cleverly designed car façade or ask passersby if they also see a 
car there to rule out that I’m hallucinating it, or work through the dream arguments of Al-
Ghazali and Descartes. This sort of behavior may strike us as bizarre, epistemically 
fetishistic even. I might achieve a kind of knowledge+ by testing additional evidence for 
the car’s existence, but the sort of agent who cannot resist such inquiries seems destined 
 
49 See Sosa (2011) 
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for a bad end. Not aiming higher at knowledge would keep us safe from this kind of 
epistemic tragedy. 50  
I think there’s room to take a hard line here: although such behavior is strange and 
impractical, one could argue that there isn’t anything epistemically wrong with it. In the 
end, the agent really is raising the quality of their epistemic position with respect to 
whether there is a car there. We even sometimes encourage our students to try on this 
doubt-inducing epistemic lens, despite the danger of skepticism—at least from the safety 
of the epistemology room. But the hard line is not required. Here is what is important for 
my argument: for at least some questions, there is a gap between the minimum success 
condition for closing inquiry and the highest epistemic status that an agent could 
reasonably aim for. Perhaps we shouldn’t aim for anything like rational certainty for 
perceptual beliefs, for instance. But we can reasonably aim for extra-justified (i.e. more 
than is required for knowledge) knowledge. And we can plausibly aim much higher than 
that when contemplating mathematics, for instance. In §3.2, I will present several cases in 
which it seems legitimate for agents to aim for at least some species of knowledge+. 
We now return to our original question: what does it take for inquiry to be closed 
successfully? We’ve seen that there are two things this could mean: (1) meeting the 
minimum success condition (knowledge), or (2) meeting one’s own, individual aim with 
respect to an inquiry. For the second category, not just any individual aim will do. The 
target must be genuinely epistemically valuable (e.g., no aiming for false belief) and at 
least as the minimum success condition, which I’ve suggested is knowledge. When one’s 
individual aim is a species of knowledge+, goals (1) and (2) are both (at least potentially) 
 
50 I’m grateful to Carolina Flores, Matt McGrath, and Ernie Sosa for conversation on this point. 
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legitimate and yet come apart in interesting ways. There are, then, two relevant thresholds 
defining success for closing inquiry. 
The dual-threshold model for successful inquiry holds these two things in tension: 
the thesis that knowledge is special, and a commitment to epistemic value pluralism. We 
need a socially available, epistemic standard for when an inquiry has been answered well 
enough for belief and testimony. I think that standard is knowledge. But there are a 
million epistemically good things besides knowledge, and agents can appropriately aim 
for many of them (those that count as knowledge+) while still upholding the knowledge 
requirement. We can respect the centrality of knowledge without stripping agents of the 
epistemic right to aim for even better things. 
Like an A+, knowledge+ signifies that one has earned more than the bare 
minimum required for success. This isn’t to disparage those who stop at knowledge. 
Much of the epistemic life can be run efficiently on the pass/fail model. But thinking 
about knowledge+ allows us to recognize a wider range of achievements. 
We’ve found a reason to be suspicious of The Knowledge Rule: it is insensitive 
to the agent’s epistemic goals during an inquiry. It says that knowledge is the standard an 
agent should hold inquiry to but makes no mention of the (perhaps higher) individual 
aims an inquirer may bring to an inquiry. We will now consider some cases in which 
agents aim for knowledge+. 
3.2 Cases 
Sometimes, an agent is in a good enough position to know now but has reason to 
hope that they may be in a position to have knowledge+ later if they continue inquiry. 
Consider the following cases: 
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The Detective 
 
A detective is working through several bins of evidence to determine the 
innocence or guilt of a suspect. After looking through the evidence in 19 of 20 
bins, the detective is extremely confident, and rightly so, that the suspect is 
innocent. Accordingly, she is also reasonably quite confident that the evidence in 
the 20th bin will also support, or at least not overturn, what the detective takes to 
be a compelling case for the suspect’s innocence. And indeed, it will turn out that 
the 20th bin does not contain any defeaters for her belief, the suspect is innocent, 
and there aren’t any Gettier-traps or other knowledge-defusing devices nearby. 
Nevertheless, not yet having looked in the 20th bin, she reasons that it would be 
epistemically irresponsible of her to close inquiry now. After all, there is new, 
easily obtainable, significant evidence that is available to her. And she chooses 
not to close inquiry until she has considered the rest of the easily obtainable 
evidence in the final bin. After all, she wants to be extra sure she gets this one 
right. 
 
The Scientist 
 
A team of scientists has performed and logged the results of 100 tests of a certain 
chemical reaction to inductively determine whether their hypothesis is correct. All 
but two of the tests confirmed the hypothesis and, in the circumstances of the 
experiment, it would be reasonable (and in fact correct) to write off the two 
disconfirming results as testing errors. On the basis of the experiment, the 
scientists would be justified in believing the hypothesis, which, it will turn out, is 
true and knowable. The team of scientists meets to decide whether or not to close 
their inquiry and write their paper on the basis of their results so far. Despite their 
very good evidence, the scientists decide not to close inquiry yet. Rather, they 
continue inquiry and decide to run one more round of 100 tests. After all, they 
already have the equipment set up, and it won’t take as long the second time. And 
they are proud of their exacting epistemic standards in the laboratory.  
 
The Philosophy Student 
 
A philosophy student is studying Descartes’ cogito and trying to make sense of 
what the structure of the argument is. They have read the relevant sections of the 
Meditations several times and listened closely to their instructor’s interpretation 
of the argument. They are a good reader of the text, and their philosophy 
instructor did indeed present an accurate representation of Descartes’ argument. If 
on an exam they were asked the question, “What is the structure of the cogito?” 
they would give a knowledgeable response.51 Nevertheless, the philosophy 
student is deeply interested in the way that the cogito works, and they remain 
 
51 Some philosophers think we are not often in a position to know substantive philosophical theses. Notice, 
however, that the philosophy student is answering a question about the structure of Descartes’ argument, 
not a substantive question of, e.g., epistemology or metaphysics. So, I don’t think we need to be overly 
concerned that knowledge is available to the student in this case. 
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curious about the argument’s structure. They are not yet satisfied with their 
inquiry, and this is partly explained by their (perhaps unarticulated) interest in 
really understanding the argument in a way that enables them to explain how they 
know (to themselves or to someone else). Instead of committing to a belief now, 
they continue wondering and make a note to look up the SEP article on Descartes 
later that evening.52 
 
In all three cases, it’s extremely intuitive that it’s both permissible and indeed 
better for the subject to continue inquiry until they’ve finished gathering the specified 
evidence. Maybe it’s not wrong of them to stop inquiry right now. After all, their 
evidential situations are already quite good. But we think the ones who continue inquiry 
have done even better, epistemically speaking. They have been more thorough, more 
rigorous, more epistemically responsible. And, plausibly, part of the reason they have 
been more rigorous is that they were (permissibly) aiming for more than mere 
knowledge. They wanted to be sure or to understand or to be extra justified: they wanted 
knowledge+. 
We are trying to show that it is sometimes epistemically permissible and better, 
relative to the goals of inquiry on a specific question, to continue inquiry even though one 
could knowledgeably end it. These cases suggest that this is, indeed, true. I want to say 
more about why, on reflection, this shouldn’t be so surprising theoretically, but first, it 
will be helpful to ward off some potential misconceptions. 
 
52 Similar cases appear elsewhere in the literature. For instance, Joseph Raz (1975, 37–38) considers cases 
in which an agent waits to decide until they will be in a better position to judge because they will be in 
better cognitive condition (i.e. more alert) and have more time to evaluate evidence they already have. 
Schroeder (2012, 471–72) considers cases in which you know that there is incoming evidence and argues 
that this can give you a “right-kind” of reason to refrain from belief. Compare also to discussion in 
McGrath (forthcoming, §1) and (manuscript), who notes both “future-comparative” and “goal-related” 
reasons that may bear on suspension, and to the reasons cited to continue investigation throughout Flores 
and Woodard (manuscript). One notable difference between the cases in the literature and mine is that these 
cases focus on the ambition of the inquirers to achieve more than mere knowledge. 
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First, it’s compatible with it being better for the detective and scientist to continue 
inquiry that it would also be permissible for them to stop (or, indeed, for them to give up 
on the investigation altogether). The claim isn’t that it’d be wrong to know, only that it’d 
be even better to continue inquiring. Second, it’s compatible with its being better for our 
protagonists to continue inquiry that, at a certain point, it would be counterproductive for 
them to look at more evidence. Suppose that the scientist has looked at 1,352 of 4,000 
test tubes, and each of the first 1,352 has confirmed the intended hypothesis. Perhaps in 
this case, the returns on inquisitive investment have diminished to the point that it’s no 
longer better for the scientist to continue inquiring. Maybe, maybe not. But in any case, 
there’s no incoherence in thinking that it’s better for the scientist to look at samples 101–
200 even if it’s not better for the scientist to look at samples 1,353–4,000. 
One might be worried that something about the professional norms of detectives 
or scientists or philosophers is interfering with our judgments about what is epistemically 
better. Sure, it’s better for (e.g.) detectives to be extra thorough and continue inquiry even 
when they could knowledgeably close inquiry, but (the objector insists) that is because 
the professional norms of detectives require unusually stringent standards beyond the 
norms of everyday epistemic agents.53  
But I don’t think the professional standards are actually interfering with our 
judgments of the case. For one thing, detectives and scientists (and—one dares to hope—
 
53 Feldman (2002) is representative of this view:  
“[W]here there are reasons to gather evidence, they are nonepistemological or else there is no duty to 
gather evidence at all. We may have moral or prudential duties to learn about topics involving our health or 
important political issues. Philosophers and other academicians may have duties arising out of their 
positions to learn about the latest information in their fields. These are highly intellectual matters, but the 
duties arise not from some general intellectual requirement we all have, but out of moral or prudential 
considerations. Thus, where there are duties to gather evidence, they are not epistemological duties” (2002, 
382). 
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philosophers!) are supposed to be professionally good epistemic agents. If detectives and 
scientists do better to continue inquiry, it’s presumably because there is something 
epistemically better about continuing inquiry. It would be shocking to discover that the 
generic, professional norms of detectives and scientists require them to act in 
epistemically worse ways than in professions in which the aims are not explicitly 
intellectual.  
That doesn’t mean there is no difference at all between the lay investigator and 
the detective. Perhaps the detective has a professional duty that we do not normally 
have—a duty to look at all the relevant, available evidence before concluding inquiry. 
But (if so) that’s a duty for the detective to do something that would be epistemically 
praiseworthy (though perhaps not required) for any inquirer properly situated to do. Note 
that changing the story so that the detective or scientists is an amateur—and so not 
beholden to professional norms—doesn’t obviously change our intuitions about the case. 
What matters, ultimately, isn’t whether the agents are professionals but whether the 
agents are curious in the question in the sort of way that leads them to aim for 
knowledge+. And curiosity does not, by itself, smuggle in professional or otherwise non-
epistemic norms. Being beholden to professional norms may be one way to acquire (or 
have reason to acquire) the relevant kind of curiosity, but it isn’t the only way to have it. 
Curiosity is democratic: it visits the lay and the learned alike. 
One might also be worried that high stakes are interfering with our judgments. 
Perhaps in high stakes contexts, we don’t get to count as knowing unless we have 
especially good epistemic standing that requires (or tends to require) more rigorous 
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inquiry, such that the agents in our story don’t have knowledge yet.54 But the cases don’t 
seem to depend on the question involving high stakes. Perhaps there are high stakes 
involved in the detective’s inquiry, but the scientist might be studying samples of mere 
theoretical interest, and there certainly isn’t much riding on whether the student gets 
Descartes’ argument right (we can suppose she has safely earned her A by this point in 
the course). The stakes of a situation might affect what epistemic goal an agent is (or 
should be) aspiring to (mere knowledge or knowledge+), but it is the goals themselves 
and not the stakes that are operative in these cases. 
One could argue that although these are clearly cases in which the agents should 
continue to investigate (that is, to inquireACTIVITY) it isn’t obvious that these are cases in 
which the agents should continue to inquire in the sense of this paper that entails having 
an inquiring attitude like wondering.55 But I think this is an odd way to read the cases. 
Imagine a superintendent telling the detective: “Now, it’s alright for you to continue to 
investigate who committed the crime—just make sure you don’t wonder who did it!” 
And it’s easier to imagine the philosophy student planning to read and investigate more 
about Descartes’ argument because they are genuinely curious, not despite their lack of 
curiosity. In future sections, I’ll argue that there are significant question-relevant costs for 
these agents not to inquire in a way that involves genuine curiosity (§3.3) or to close 
inquiry by forming a belief before ending their investigation (§4.3)—as a rule, we tend to 
be better investigators when we are also open inquirers. For now, it’s enough to note that 
 
54 See Fantl and McGrath (2002) and DeRose (2002) for classic pragmatic encroachment and contextualist 
interpretations of high stakes situations. 
55 This is perhaps the view defended by Hall and Johnson (1998), at least if they take the relevant kind of 
acceptance to conflict with genuine inquiry: 
“[W]e think you should follow an anti-sceptical synchronic epistemic duty and accept (now) any 
proposition which your present evidence supports. What [our principle] says is that you should also 
continue gathering evidence” (1998, 133). 
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the cases are most naturally read as ones in which the agents do not just plan to 
investigate in the future but in a curious state of inquiry now. 
Let’s take stock. We seem to have cases that suggest that, sometimes, even though 
they are in a position to know, it’s epistemically better for people to continue inquiry than 
to knowledgeably close it. The relevant cases are those in which agents aim for 
knowledge+. But cases by themselves may not convince us if we do not see how they fit 
a broader pattern. Now I’ll try to provide some broader motivation for why agents should 
sometimes continue inquiry instead of settling for immediate knowledge.  
3.3 Wine ought to end inquiry 
Knowledge is great. But it isn’t the best thing epistemically. One can know, but 
one can also know better, or know that one knows, or understand, or be rationally certain. 
Keeping inquiry open enables agents to aim for these higher epistemic goods. Agents 
may not have to raise their epistemic standards in this way, but it’s to their credit if they 
do. Inquiry can have a wide number of epistemic aims. It might be that all of the 
appropriate ways to close inquiry entail having knowledge. But that doesn’t mean that 
mere knowledge is the only appropriate goal. It’s laudable to aim for knowledge+. 
Stopping inquiry too early comes with an opportunity cost: one could know right 
now, but one might thereby miss out on knowledge+ in the future. It’s easy to overlook 
opportunity costs. It’s also intuitive that (within our financial means) we should always 
accept bets with a positive expected outcome, even though we really shouldn’t do so if it 
precludes making a better bet later. But opportunity costs are real costs, and we ignore 
them to our disadvantage in epistemology as in life generally. 
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I find it helpful to think about this problem for inquiry in relation to Pollock’s 
(1983) aging wine paradox. In the aging wine paradox, we are asked when to open a 
bottle of wine that ages well in perpetuity: for any time t, it is true that the wine will taste 
better if opened at t+1 than if it is opened at t. The puzzle: it seems like it would always 
be wrong (from the perspective of practical rationality) to drink the wine. After all, it 
would always be better to wait longer. But if it’s always wrong, then one should never 
drink the wine, which is worse! I accept the following (Pollockian) judgment about the 
aging wine paradox: it’s always permissible to drink the wine, but it is still better to wait. 
For any time t, it’s permissible to open the wine at t, but also: for any time t, it’s better 
(practically speaking) to open the wine at t+1 than at t. Waiting to open the wine is thus 
never required but always supererogatory. 
There’s an analogy between the wine paradox and our decision about when to end 
inquiry. Just as it is initially puzzling when I should open the wine, so it is a puzzling 
question, “When should I close inquiry?” Like a fine wine, inquiry ages well—inquiries 
of a certain vintage, anyway. Inquiry allows us to be sensitive to new evidence. And for 
many propositions, new, significant evidence is constantly incoming. We’ll have more 
information tomorrow (or next year, or next decade) about the fundamental laws of 
physics, about whether my friend will show up for coffee, about the latest arguments for 
the free will debate. And we also have more opportunity to reflect further on information 
we already have.  
Of course, this isn’t true for every proposition. I briefly acknowledge the frequent 
exceptions: sometimes, we have reason to think our epistemic situation will get worse 
over time. At the moment my friend shows up for the party, I probably have as good of 
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evidence for their being there as I’ll ever have. Tomorrow, I’ll be relying on my memory, 
and my memories of everyday events like that tend to fade over time.56 Or I could know 
that my epistemic faculties will be compromised later so that I’m in as good a position 
now to judge on a question as I ever will be. These are cases of a bad epistemic terrain, 
where I know that additional inquiry will not lead to improved epistemic position.57  
In other cases, inquiring well might lead to an improved epistemic position, but I 
could know that I am unlikely to inquire well given the circumstances. Perhaps I know 
that if I start inquiring into the cause of my symptoms now before my checkup, I won’t 
be able to stop myself from reading horror stories on WebMD that will be not only 
psychologically but also epistemically counterproductive. In other cases, I might need to 
“buy in” to a subject matter or undergo a certain perspective-shift by believing certain 
things before I can productively inquire into related questions.  
Finally, there are numerous cases in which there are morally or pragmatically 
inflected (and perhaps also epistemic) reasons not to continue inquiry. It could be obvious 
that I’ve reached the point of marginal returns on future inquiry, such that the (epistemic 
or practical) cost of keeping inquiry open is too great to justify continuing. Systemic 
racism, sexism or other forms of prejudice may make continued inquiry unsafe for 
members of oppressed groups to pursue. And there might be moral or practical reasons 
that I simply have to form a judgment on a question now: it’s no good waiting until the 
 
56 Thanks to conversation with Matt McGrath and Ernest Sosa here. 
57 McGrath (forthcoming) considers such cases under the guise of “epistemic worsening” and Friedman 
(2019a) considers patterns of reopening inquiry whereby an agent's epistemic position deteriorates over 
time. 
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cyclist hits me to stop inquiring into whether we’re on a collision course, no matter how 
good my future evidence will be.58 
I emphasize: we must be careful not to overgeneralize the extent of cases in which 
continued inquiry is advantageous. We must always remain sensitive to the local (yet not 
thereby unsystematic) epistemic, social, and psychological factors that bear on the 
expected epistemic payoff of inquiring further. 
Nevertheless, it often happens that we can reasonably expect to be in a better 
epistemic position to judge if we wait to judge until later than if we judge now. Such 
cases are not universal, but neither are they modally remote. The point isn’t that inquiring 
ignorance is always the right tool for the job, it’s that inquiring ignorance is a valuable 
tool to have in our epistemic toolkit. 
In Pollock’s discussion of the wine paradox, he describes the puzzle-making 
feature of the case as involving “some type of act which can only be done once, but the 
longer it is postponed the greater the expectation value for doing it” (Pollock 1983, 417). 
Now, it’s not quite true that one can only close inquiry once. One can close inquiry and 
reopen it later only to close it again a second time.  
But that doesn’t mean there aren’t real costs to closing inquiry early. There is an 
opportunity cost in lost sensitivity to future evidence from the time of closing until (if 
ever) it is reopened. Inquiry into Q gives agents extra sensitivity to new evidence bearing 
on Q. If I’m wondering whether the train has come yet, I’m more likely to hear the train 
whistle, even from a distance. And I’m more likely to correctly use that information to 
 
58 Thanks especially to Carolina Flores, Thony Gillies, Caley Howland, and Dee Payton for helping me to 
think about these and other epistemically dangerous contexts for inquiry. 
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make a judgment about whether the train has come. Inquiry keeps you question-sensitive 
and evidence-hungry.59 
The aging wine paradox also gives us another way to think about the dual-
threshold model for inquiry. Here are two questions: (1) When is the wine good enough 
to drink? (2) When should I open the bottle? These questions are obviously related. One 
shouldn’t open the bottle if the wine isn’t good enough to drink. But that doesn’t mean 
one should open it as soon as the wine is good enough to drink (although one may). It’s 
reasonable to hold out for more than mere drinkability. In the same way, it’s reasonable 
to hold out for knowledge+ even when knowledge is already within our reach. 
4. Against Closing Inquiry 
So far, we’ve argued that it’s sometimes better to continue inquiry than to close it, 
even if one could close it knowledgeably. But this doesn’t automatically mean that we 
should choose ignorance over knowledge in such situations. Knowledge is great, and so 
is continuing inquiry. Why not just do both? The detective could simultaneously know 
that the suspect is innocent and still inquire into whether they are, turning out the contents 
of the final box of evidence. The scientists could know their hypothesis to be true while 
still inquiring into whether it is, checking the final results of the experiment.  
Indeed, it may initially strike us as hard to understand the prolonged inquiries of 
our protagonists as anything but knowledgeable. We stipulated that the detective (for 
example) was in a position to know that the defendant was innocent but continued inquiry 
anyway. Perhaps the detective recognized that she was in this situation and thought to 
herself, “Even though I am in a position to know that the defendant is innocent, I will 
 
59 I owe the “evidence-hungry” metaphor to Ezra Rubenstein. 
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choose to continue inquiry.” But if that is what the detective is thinking, it’s especially 
hard to resist the intuition that she is continuing inquiry knowledgeably. If we know we 
are in a position to know that p, it’s psychologically difficult for us to avoid coming to 
know p itself. And failures to make this obvious inference seem like an epistemic failing, 
not a success story. 
But I don’t think this is how we need to understand the psychology of our band of 
inquirers. Although we the audience (having peeked inside the box and the final test 
tubes or having already read the SEP article) can see from our privileged, third-person 
vantage point that the agents are in a position to know, nothing in our story demands that 
the detective or philosopher or scientists themselves know that they are in a position to 
know the answer to their continuing inquiries. 
But how should we understand the agency of our protagonists? What is the 
thought process that would lead them to continue inquiry sans knowledge even though 
knowledge is within their grasp? The answer, I think, is that they aren’t thinking about 
knowledge at all. They are thinking about whether they are satisfied with the progress of 
their inquiry so far. What it takes to satisfy inquiry has an open texture: it depends on 
what the agent’s epistemic aims (explicit or implicit) in that context are. And, as we’ve 
noted, those aims could be more stringent than mere knowledge. It’s this diversity of 
higher epistemic aims that allows agents to overlook the fact (even when it’s available to 
them) that they are in a position to successfully close inquiry with knowledge. And this is 
proper. After all, if the agent isn’t aiming at (mere) knowledge but at (some variety of) 
knowledge+, then they should be more sensitive to whether or not their inquiry has 
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progressed to the point that can give knowledge+ than to whether or not their inquiry has 
progressed to the point that can give mere knowledge.60 
This explains why agents don’t as a matter of fact simply stop inquiry as soon as 
they are able to do so knowledgeably: sometimes they are sensitive to other epistemic 
standards. But we might still wonder whether it wouldn’t be better for agents to continue 
inquiry knowledgeably. Knowledge is a good thing even if it wasn’t the good thing the 
agent was looking for.  
Attractive though knowledgeable inquiry may seem, it is not epistemically proper. 
Inquiry into a question should be accompanied by genuine ignorance constituting an open 
stance as to its answer. Here is the basic thought: it’s incoherent to ask and answer a 
question at the same time. And since inquiring is a way of asking and knowing is a way 
of answering, one shouldn’t do both. In what follows, I articulate three strategies for 
making good on this idea that it’s incoherent to (inquiringly) ask and (knowledgeably) 
answer a question simultaneously.  
4.1 Incoherence as (Psychological) Impossibility 
The first strategy for making good on the intuition that it’s incoherent to ask a 
question one knows the answer to is to argue that doing so in the relevant sense is 
psychologically impossible. There are lots of everyday cases that make this strategy look 
implausible at first glance—I ask about a friend’s plans even though (I now recall) I 
already knew they would be at the party. But we’ve restricted the scope of our argument 
 
60 Some philosophers view the sort of agency that aims for such lofty cognitive achievements with 
skepticism. Thus, Kvanvig writes, “To inform someone that she had found the truth but had fallen short of 
[even mere!] knowledge would be met, I submit, with relative indifference” (2003, 148). This is no doubt 
true for some agents. But I think that the existence of cases in which agents diligently pursue long inquiries 
that achieve a high degree of epistemic success suggests that agents are often enough aiming (or at least 
sensitive to) a much higher goal than mere truth.  
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to occurrent beliefs and occurrent inquiries. When I asked my friend about their plans 
even though I knew they would be at the party, I was able to do that because my mind 
was, in some sense, not fully attentive to what I knew. If both my wondering and my 
believing were at the forefront of my mind, could I really wonder about a question that I 
also know the answer to? Could I have the thought, “p, but is it really the case that p?” 
and retain my full belief that p through the end of the sentence? 
Here is a reason to think not: it’s hard to wonder about things we know on 
demand. Try right now to wonder whether you have just read this sentence. I find that it’s 
hard for me to do so just by trying. I can’t just generate curiosity in the question, and a 
plausible explanation for why I can’t be curious in the question is that I also can’t help 
but believe (and also know) the answer. On this way of thinking, curiosity needs doubt 
like fire needs air.  
One strategy by which I might be able to get myself to wonder about something I 
know is to attend to various skeptical arguments, perhaps working through the 
Pyrrhonian modes, for instance.61 But this method only works by inducing doubt and so 
removing outright belief.62 In contrast, it’s easy to induce at least some curiosity in 
questions about which I have no opinion just by raising them: I can easily wonder how 
many stars there are or what dogs dream about. Maybe our minds just aren’t structured to 
(occurrently) wonder about things we (occurrently) believe answers to.63 Just as it's very 
 
61 See Sextus (2000) edited by Annas and Barnes for the definitive translation of the Pyrrhonian modes in 
Outlines of Scepticism. 
62 For reflections on the relationship between doubt and belief, see Moon (2018). 
63 Things get trickier when the relevant beliefs are not obviously of the knowledge-producing kind. It isn’t 
obviously impossible to believe the answer to a substantive philosophical thesis while inquiring into it, for 
instance. Nor is it obviously impossible to believe religious propositions like “God exists” while still 
inquiring into whether or not God does. Notably, these are also cases in which it’s unclear whether agents 
really have full beliefs in the relevant sense. Fleisher (2017, forthcoming) argues that philosophical 
“beliefs” are often better understood as endorsement, and certain (though not all) varieties of religious 
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difficult (and perhaps impossible) to believe a proposition that we have no evidence in 
just by trying, so it’s very difficult (and perhaps impossible) to wonder about a question 
that is fully closed for us. Knowledge is curiosity averse.  
4.2 Incoherence as (Epistemic) Impermissibility 
Although the argument above is suggestive, we won’t rest the weight of the paper 
on it. Alice thought one couldn’t believe impossible things. The Queen claimed to believe 
six impossible things before breakfast.64 And philosophers have yet to decide who was 
right, even when the relevant impossibilities are obviously incoherent upon full 
reflection. The Queen’s philosophers won’t be much impressed by our first argument. 
After all, if we can manage to believe the blatantly impossible, we can surely also 
manage to ask questions we know the answer to, perhaps even occurrently.65  
Lest we underestimate the human capacity for accepting cognitive conflict, we 
hasten to a second way of articulating the incoherence between inquiring and knowing: 
inquiring while knowing violates an epistemic norm. Friedman (2017) and Whitcomb 
(2017) are among the groundbreakers for this approach:  
 
commitment may be better understood as faith than outright belief. I don’t at all mean to insist that we 
don’t have philosophical or religious beliefs. Some of us certainly do. But I think it’s telling that the sorts 
of cases in which there is unclarity about whether we can (or can permissibly) inquire into a question that 
has an answer we are doxastically committed to are also cases in which there’s unclarity about whether the 
doxastic commitment at issue is best classified as outright belief. 
64 See chapter 5 of Lewis Carrol’s (1899) Through the Looking Glass. 
65 This echoes Friedman (2017), who is among the Queen’s philosophers: 
“It is commonly thought that subjects can have conflicting beliefs at a time, ...that a subject can both 
believe p and believe ¬p at a single time. Certainly, everyday experience taken on its face makes this sort of 
thing look not only possible but commonplace. There are typically (typically unnoticed) conflicts across 
our vast doxastic databases. But once we admit that doxastic conflict is possible, why shouldn’t we admit 
that possibility in full generality? Just as a subject can be conflicted with respect to her beliefs on some 
matter, she should be able to be conflicted with respect to her beliefs and suspendings on some matter” 
(2017, 305). 
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Ignorance Norm for Inquiring: Necessarily, if one knows Q at t, then one ought 
not to be inquiring into Q at t.66,67,68 
 
This section defends the Ignorance Norm for Inquiring and offers a new response to 
the charge that the motivating linguistic data for the norm can be otherwise explained in 
the same way that Moorean paradoxes can. But first: Why think that this norm is true? 
One reason is that it sounds odd to claim to know and wonder about something at 
the same time. As Friedman notes, utterances like 
1. ??I know the Yankees are winning the game, but are the Yankees winning the 
game? 
or 
2. ??I know the Yankees are winning the game, but I wonder whether the Yankees 
are winning the game. 
are deeply puzzling.69 Why is the speaker asking whether the Yankees are winning if they 
already know the answer to their own question? Normally, you answer someone's 
questions in order to inform them. But you wouldn't be informing your friend by 
answering them: after all, they already know. Of course, not all questions express a 
(genuine) desire to be informed. There are leading questions, rhetorical questions, and 
 
66 This is modeled after Friedman’s original version, which reads thus: Ignorance Norm for the IAs: 
Necessarily, if one knows Q at t, then one ought not have an IA towards Q at t. (Friedman 2017, 311) 
IAs, in Friedman’s nomenclature, are “interrogative attitudes,” attitudes like wondering and being curious 
about. Since I’ve defined inquiry into a Q so as to entail having an IA toward that Q, I have reframed the 
norm as applying directly to inquiry.  
67 Whitcomb (2017) defends a related norm: The Ignorance Norm: Inquiring is constitutively governed by 
the norm inquire as to what Q’s answer is only if you don’t know Q’s answer. (Whitcomb 2017, 152) 
So do Sapir and van Elswyk (manuscript): “One ought not inquire into Q at t and know pQ at t.” 
And Hawthorne (2004) suggests something similar for the speech act that corresponds to inquiring: “[A]s 
knowledge is the norm of assertion, ignorance is the norm of questioning” (Hawthorne 2004, 24). 
68 Friedman (2019b) also argues—and I agree—that there is a normative conflict between full belief and 
inquiry. See Whitcomb (2017) and Sapir and van Elswyk (manuscript) for the contrary view. 
69 A similar construction shows up in Kvanvig (2003) who writes: “It makes no sense to say, ‘I know that it 
is raining, but I believe further inquiry is warranted’” (149) and also in Whitcomb (2017, 149). 
   
  
47 
 
riddles. But those phenomena don't seem descriptive of our case—your friend really 
wants to know. But they already know! So, what response could you make that would 
satisfy them? 
I think the most plausible way to interpret the sentence is that, although the 
speaker knows the answer to their question, they aren't entirely psychologically at ease 
about it: they need some extra (re)affirmation. (Yes, the Yankees really are winning—it's 
ok.) This, at least, is comprehensible. But it doesn't feel “epistemically happy” (Friedman 
2017, 310). You might overlook it if your friend needs extra assurances once or twice, 
but the situation quickly gets ridiculous when iterated: 
Speaker: I know the Yankees are winning the game, but are they winning the 
game? 
 
You: Yes, it's ok. The Yankees are winning. 
 
Speaker: Ok, good. I'm glad to know that: but are the Yankees winning the game? 
 
You: Yes… 
 
Speaker: Ok, good: I'm glad to know that: but are the Yankees winning the game? 
 
You: ... 
 
If there's nothing epistemically unhappy about the original case, it's hard to explain why 
things get progressively worse in the iterated version. 
But perhaps even though it's problematic to say (and also to believe) that one 
knows the answer to Q and is inquiring into Q, that doesn’t give us a strong reason to 
think there is a norm against knowing and wondering together. Compare “Friedman 
sentences” to Moorean paradoxes: 
3. ??The Yankees are winning, but I don't know that the Yankees are winning. 
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Both Friedman sentences and Moorean paradoxes sound strange to say despite being 
semantically consistent70 and describing possible states of affairs—it’s possible that the 
Yankees are winning while I don’t know that they are; it’s possible that I know the 
Yankees are winning while I also wonder whether they are.71 Indeed, Whitcomb goes so 
far as to call related constructions “Moore-paradoxical questions” (Whitcomb 2017, 
149).72 
But Moorean paradoxes teach us an important lesson: we shouldn’t infer too 
quickly from a thing’s being bad to say that the thing said expresses a normatively 
defective state. After all, there isn’t automatically anything normatively defective about 
the thing expressed by a Moorean Paradox being true. One can’t infer from the truth of 
<The Yankees are winning, but I don’t know that the Yankees are winning> that I have 
done something wrong. I’m not required to know every truth. I’m not even required to 
know the truth of every proposition I’m attentive to. Perhaps I have misleading 
evidence—the boisterous cheering of Red Sox fans nearby—that (misleadingly) prompts 
me to think that the Yankees are losing. If so, the Moorean paradox would be true, but I 
would be epistemically innocent. 
Maybe Friedman sentences work the same way. Maybe even though it's bad to 
say (to the world or to oneself), “I know the answer to Q, but Q?” it’s not automatically 
 
70 Although see Gillies (2001) for a defense of the unorthodox view that Moorean paradoxes are 
semantically inconsistent 
71 We set aside, for this section, the arguments in §4.1. 
72 Although Whitcomb discusses both forms, he spends more time focusing on variants of the form, “p, but 
is it the case that p?” I’ll focus, instead, on the ways that the linguistic profiles of Moorean paradoxes differ 
from “I know that p, but is it the case that p?” Whitcomb presents an interesting argument especially 
focused on the earlier form to an ignorance norm on inquiry, an argument that begins with the assumption 
that knowledge is the norm of assertion. One dialectical advantage of focusing on the latter form (what I 
call “Friedman sentences”) is that, since knowledge is built into the first conjunct, arguing for an ignorance 
norm on inquiry doesn’t require a corresponding view about the relationship between knowledge and 
assertion.  
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bad to both know the answer to Q and inquire into Q, which is what the Ignorance Norm 
for Inquiring requires. So, if Friedman sentences are to support the Ignorance Norm 
for Inquiring, we must be able to distinguish the kind of awkwardness in Friedman 
sentences from the kind of awkwardness in Moorean paradoxes.  
Friedman considers the relevance of Moorean paradoxes, and her way of 
distinguishing them from her sentences rests on her thesis that having an inquiring 
attitude entails suspending judgment. Since, in Friedman’s picture, inquirers into Q have 
thereby suspended judgment on Q, agents who both inquire into Q while knowing (and so 
believing) the answer to Q find themselves in doxastic conflict.73 Just as it’s wrong to 
believe p and also to believe ¬p, so it’s wrong to suspend judgment on Q while believing 
p as the answer to Q. In the former case, the conflict arises because agents are committed 
to contradictory answers to a question. In the latter case, the conflict arises because belief 
commits the agent to an answer whereas suspension of judgment involves a commitment 
to neutrality: belief requires partiality and suspension impartiality.  
Having argued that those who inquire into Q while believing an answer to Q are 
mired in doxastic conflict, Friedman now has a distinction to drive a wedge between her 
sentences and Moorean paradoxes. For Friedman thinks that “[c]lear-eyed assertions of 
first-personal doxastic conflict” are “worse by a mile” than third-personal reports of 
doxastic conflict but that this is “not the pattern we find in ...Moore-paradoxical 
assertions” (Friedman 2017, 312). 
But there are two reasons to hope for a different explanation than Friedman gives 
us. The first is dialectical: Friedman’s thesis that to inquire (or at least to have an IA) is to 
 
73 Although see McGrath (forthcoming) for an argument that suspension of judgment is not, strictly 
speaking, a doxastic state 
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suspend judgment is controversial.74 One might think, instead, that suspension of 
judgment is putting judgment off (McGrath forthcoming) or intentionally omitting 
affirmation (or denial) because of an insufficiently high confidence toward a proposition 
(Sosa forthcoming). We won’t settle this debate here. But it would be nice to have an 
explanation of how Moorean paradoxes and Friedman sentences differ that does not 
depend on Friedman’s account of suspension.  
The second reason is this: it’s unclear whether Friedman sentences (or Moorean 
paradoxes) exhibit the cross-personal pattern that Friedman suggests. Moorean paradoxes 
do sound worse by a mile when expressed in the first person, and Friedman sentences 
don’t obviously improve when taken out of it.  
In fact, I think the best way to distinguish Moorean paradoxes from Friedman 
sentences goes in the opposite direction of what Friedman (2017) suggests. That 
Moorean paradoxes dissolve when taken out of the first-person present gives us a reason 
to think that there isn’t an underlying norm prohibiting the thing expressed (p’s being true 
and S’s not knowing that p is true): the air of paradox only arises when an agent commits 
to that being true of themselves right now. Instead, there’s something wrong with 
committing to (through saying, to oneself or to the world) a Moorean proposition, not 
with the proposition being true. There are different stories about why this is so—one is 
that asserting a sentence commits the agent to being able to know it and (first-person 
present) Moorean paradoxes are unknowable.75 In contrast, the dysfunction of Friedman 
sentences, I shall argue, is robust enough to survive third-personal and suppositional 
 
74 Avery Archer (2018) explicitly argues against this aspect of Friedman’s picture, for instance. 
75 See my (2020, 336–40), which builds on chapter 11 of Williamson (2000), for this explanation of why 
Moorean paradoxes are not properly assertable. 
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contexts.76 This suggests that there is really something wrong with the state of affairs 
underwriting Friedman sentences rather than (merely) something wrong with 
committedly expressing them. 
First, consider how Moorean paradoxes dissolve in the third person: 
4. The Yankees are winning, but they don't know the Yankees are winning. 
But we still feel that something is amiss when Friedman sentences are put in the third 
person: 
5. ??They know that the Yankees are winning, but are the Yankees winning? 
or 
6. ??They know that the Yankees are winning, but they are wondering: are the 
Yankees winning? 
Even if (6) is possibly true, we strongly feel that the agent is not behaving well 
epistemically, evincing the presence of a violated epistemic norm. We see a similar 
pattern for the past tense, where the awkwardness of Moorean paradoxes dissolves but 
the awkwardness of Friedman sentences merely gets stirred around: 
 7. The Yankees were winning, but I didn’t know that the Yankees were winning. 
 8. ??The Yankees were winning, but were the Yankees winning? 
Similarly, the oddity of Moorean paradoxes dissolves when embedded under suppose: 
9. Suppose that the Yankees are winning but I don't know that the Yankees are 
winning. 
Again, this sounds totally fine! There is no intuition that (in the suppositional context) I 
have automatically done something wrong epistemically (recall the misleading evidence 
 
76 Friedman does briefly consider sentences of this sort in an intriguing footnote in her (2019b, fn. 18). I 
agree with much of what she says there.  
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from the boisterous Red Sox fans). But embedding Friedman sentences under “suppose” 
does not remove our intuition that bad epistemic things are happening (in the 
suppositional context): 
10. ??Suppose that I know the Yankees are winning but I am wondering whether 
the Yankees are winning. 
There's nothing wrong with supposing this, of course. But it’s clear that, in the world of 
the supposition, I've done something awkward. Moreover, it’s confusing to give advice to 
both know and inquire at the same time. 
11. ??You should both know that the Yankees are winning and wonder whether 
the Yankees are winning.  
But if knowing and wondering simultaneously were permissible, we’d expect (11) to, at 
least occasionally, be good advice to give. 
The analogy between Moorean paradoxes and Friedman sentences has broken 
down. The awkwardness of Friedman sentences is more robust, capable of surviving 
third-person, past tense, and suppositional contexts. An epistemic norm has the right kind 
of normative profile to explain our robust disapproval of agents who know and inquire 
simultaneously across such contexts. In each case, the ignorance norm on inquiring—the 
norm that one shouldn't inquire and know simultaneously—explains the awkwardness of 
Friedman sentences.77 
But let's take a step back. It's one thing to notice that the awkwardness of certain 
sentences gives us evidence that a given norm must be true. It's another to give an 
 
77 For this section on Moorean paradoxes and Friedman sentences, I’m heavily indebted to conversations 
with Caley Howland and Thony Gillies. 
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explanation of why that norm holds. Why are knowledge and inquiry normatively allergic 
to each other?  
Knowledge and inquiry are normatively related because questions and answers 
are normatively related. It is good for questions and answers to come in pairs: Questions 
want answering. And answers aren’t answers at all unless they are answers to questions. 
One reason to think that questions and answers are supposed to come in pairs is this: 
When a question does not have an answer, it is a defective question. And at least if we 
know a question is defective, we shouldn’t ask it. The question “Why does the sun rise in 
the West?” is defective: the sun, if it rises at all, rises in the East. There is no true answer 
to that question. And because it has no true answer, it’s a question we don’t and shouldn’t 
ask.  
That’s a reason to think questions and answers should come in pairs and not 
alone. Here’s a reason to think that three’s a crowd: you should never believe different 
complete answers to the same question. If you believe <Colonel Mustard is in the 
library> as the complete answer to <Where is Colonel Mustard?>, you shouldn’t also 
believe <Colonel Mustard is in the billiards room> as this would also completely answer 
the same question. When you have a complete answer to a question, one is barred 
epistemically from believing any competing answers to that same question, at least 
without giving up one’s first belief. Complete answers saturate questions: questions only 
have room for one. 
But what about incomplete answers that are, nevertheless, satisfactory? Recall 
that, intuitively, “I can buy a cup of coffee at Hidden Grounds” is a satisfactory answer to 
“Where can I buy a cup of coffee?” But surely that doesn’t prohibit me from also 
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believing “I can buy a cup of coffee at Penstock Coffee Roasters!” So, shouldn’t I be able 
to inquire into the question “Where can I buy a cup of coffee?” even while believing one 
(but not all) of the satisfactory answers to that question? 
That’s a tempting thought, but—intriguingly—the ban on inquiring into questions 
we know satisfactory answers to holds up even when those satisfactory answers are 
incomplete. Notice that Friedman sentences maintain their awkwardness for satisfactory-
but-incomplete answers: 
10. ??I know I can buy coffee at Hidden Grounds, but where can I buy a cup of 
coffee? 
11. ??I know I can get to Penstock Coffee Roasters by taking a right on Third, but 
how can I get to Penstock? 
Perhaps these don’t sound quite as bad as when we embed complete answer and question 
pairs in Friedman sentences.78 One reason that they might not is that expressing (10) or 
(11) might indicate that the speaker was really asking for an exhaustive answer with a 
sentence that (as it so happens) prompts a mention-some answer request in most contexts. 
So, in (10), for example, the speaker might be saying: “I know I can buy coffee at Hidden 
Grounds, but where (are all of the nearby places) where I can buy a cup of coffee?” But I 
think that (10) and (11) are clearly awkward if we hold fixed that the speakers are asking 
mention-some questions. Notice how much the sentence improves when we slightly alter 
the question by eliminating the known answer from the question with “else”: 
12. I know I can buy coffee at Hidden Grounds, but where else (i.e. other than at 
Hidden Grounds) can I buy a cup of coffee? 
 
78 I’m indebted here to Moyer and Syrett (forthcoming) and especially to conversation with Morgan Moyer. 
   
  
55 
 
13. I know I can get to Penstock Coffee Roasters by taking a right on Third, but 
how else can I get to Penstock? 
Much better! Here’s a suggestion: When we believe a complete answer to a question on 
our research agenda, we tend to remove the question from our research agenda to cohere 
with our answer. But when we believe a satisfactory-yet-incomplete answer to a question 
we once inquired into, we sometimes modify our question instead to exclude known 
answers from the set of possible answers to our new question. By changing the question, 
we accord with the Ignorance Norm for Inquiring. By following the norm, we also 
significantly improve the sentences: this further evinces the truth of the norm. 
We are now in a position to make good on our promise to say what answers count 
as satisfactory. Satisfactory answers are all and only those to which the Ignorance Norm 
for Inquiring applies. A mark of satisfactory answers is whether or not they sound 
awkward when embedded in Friedman sentences.  
Questions and satisfactory answers are complementary. Questions want 
satisfactory answers: answers aim to satisfy questions. This is why they come in pairs. 
And that’s why it’s both impermissible and incoherent to ask and answer the same 
question at the same time. 
4.3 Incoherence as (Inquisitorial) Inefficiency 
Let us return to our chart. There are four ways an agent who has been inquiring 
into Q could proceed, given that they would know if they formed a belief: 
A 
Knowing the Answer to Q 
Continuing Inquiry into Q 
B 
Knowing the Answer to Q 
Not Continuing Inquiry into Q 
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C 
Not Knowing the Answer to Q 
Continuing Inquiry into Q 
D 
Not Knowing the Answer to Q 
Not Continuing Inquiry into Q 
 
In §3, I argued that it is sometimes better to be on the left-hand side of the chart: 
continuing inquiry allows us to aim for more than mere knowledge, and agents can 
reasonably aim for more than mere knowledge even when knowledge is available. In this 
section, I’ve argued that, if one is on the left-hand side, it’s better to be in box C than in 
box A. Inquiry is best done from a place of ignorance. 
There is something incoherent about being in box A. Perhaps it’s impossible to 
(occurrently) know the answer to Q while (occurrently) inquiring into it. But I’ve placed 
more weight on the idea that even if it is possible, there is a norm that makes knowing the 
answer to Q and inquiring into Q simultaneously epistemically impermissible. In this 
subsection, I articulate a third strategy for making good on the idea that it’s incoherent to 
ask and answer a question at the same time: Confirmation bias makes us inefficient 
inquirers once we have already committed to an answer.  
Closing inquiry by forming a belief subjects agents to confirmation bias, making 
them less likely to respond appropriately to future—especially disconfirming—evidence. 
In this section I’ll argue that we should be sensitive to the costs that confirmation bias 
imposes on closing inquiry by forming a belief, even when that belief would constitute 
knowledge. We incur these costs whenever we close inquiry, so unlike the arguments in 
§4.1 and §4.2, this argument gives us a reason not to close inquiry whether we are 
inquiring or not (i.e. a reason to avoid being in either box A or B). Recall our 
protagonists from §3—the detective, the team of scientists, and the philosophy student. 
They decided that there was an opportunity cost to not continuing inquiry—to taking the 
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relevant question off their research agenda. Without continuing inquiry, they would be 
less likely to be sensitive to future evidence in a way that would give rise to knowledge+. 
Those same agents should also think that their chances of getting knowledge+ take a hit if 
they choose to close inquiry by forming a belief. Forming a belief will activate 
confirmation bias and make them less likely to interpret future evidence appropriately, 
making future knowledge+ less likely in turn. 
But what is confirmation bias? Although there is widespread agreement that 
confirmation bias exists, there are many distinct phenomena that fly under its banner, and 
there is disagreement about how functionally unified the discrete phenomena are. 
Admittedly, some of them do not apply only when we have beliefs or favored hypotheses 
but when we do any kind of inquiry. In particular, Klayman and Ha (1987) show that 
humans tend to prefer “+testing” (roughly “looking for the presence of what you expect, 
as opposed to looking for what you do not expect” [Klayman 1995, 386])79 even when 
this is not the optimal procedure for inquiry. This particular variety of confirmation bias 
is not obviously exacerbated by closing inquiry since the relevant hypothesis does not 
have to be preferred for the bias to have an effect. Nor are all forms of confirmation bias 
(at least, obviously) normatively dysfunctional. Koehler (1993) is quick to note that an 
observed tendency to rate disconfirming evidence as lower in quality than confirming 
evidence may be consistent with Bayesian approaches to rationality since they explicitly 
allow an agent’s prior beliefs to factor into the evaluation of future evidence. Despite 
these caveats, there remains significant scientific evidence that agents tend to 
 
79 Klayman (1995, 386) seems to suggest that +testing might not be best classified as a species of 
confirmation bias at all. 
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systematically ignore or otherwise improperly assess counterevidence once they have 
formed beliefs.80 I briefly recall some of the most compelling studies below. 
Anderson, Lepper, and Ross (1980) show that “even after the initial evidential 
basis for their beliefs has been totally discredited, people fail to make appropriate 
revisions in those beliefs” (1980, 1042). In their study, students given fictitious evidence 
for a hypothesis maintained their raised levels of confidence in the hypothesis even after 
they had been informed that the evidence was made up. The failure to fully erase the 
weight of discredited evidence was exacerbated by, although not limited to, cases in 
which agents had developed a theory that “explained” the truth of their prior belief.  
In another study, Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) show that, at least for socially 
sensitive topics, people become more polarized, not less, when confronted with 
ambivalent sets of evidence. Instead of having a moderating effect, exposure to mixed 
evidence tends to make people more polarized than they had been before. Interestingly, it 
wasn’t necessarily the case that participants completely ignored the study that constituted 
counterevidence their previous belief; rather, they were more willing to accept criticisms 
of studies they disagreed with and so “rebound” to prior levels of confidence than they 
were for confirmatory studies (Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979, 2105).  
A resulting vast literature on confirmation bias shows that there are real costs to 
closing inquiry too early: it causes us to ignore or improperly weigh future evidence. If it 
 
80 The psychological literature is admittedly not always very clear about what kind of doxastic state is the 
minimum one for instigating the relevant kinds of confirmation bias. It’s quite plausible that various kinds 
of doxastic commitment that fall short of the full, occurrent belief of traditional epistemology also instigate 
confirmation bias. My argument here only requires that full belief is sufficient for instigating certain 
varieties of confirmation bias. 
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is important enough to us to avoid these epistemic costs, it can be rational for us to forego 
knowledge, at least temporarily.81  
But one might accept all this and insist that it has little bearing on epistemic 
normativity. What we ought to do is both (1) close inquiry now and (2) vigilantly resist 
the effects of confirmation bias. And we can fight the effects of confirmation bias—to a 
degree. Hernandez and Preston (2013) show, for instance, that increasing disfluency 
during one’s evidential evaluation (e.g. by reading information written in hard-to-read 
font) can reduce, although not eliminate, the effects of confirmation bias. So, there’s hope 
that we can resist confirmation bias in certain cases.  
Indeed, I think that sometimes the right thing to do is to close inquiry while 
resisting confirmation bias as well as one can. But often the better strategy will be to not 
yet close inquiry. First, effortful resistance mitigates the risk of confirmation bias but, as 
Hernandez and Preston (2013) note, the bias does not disappear. So, there are still costs to 
closing inquiry even if they are not as high when accompanied by effortful resistance as 
they might have been. But second, we often just don’t have the cognitive capacity 
available for the resistance strategy to be successful for one inquiry, let alone to pursue 
resistance as a general strategy for engaging the many inquiries we pursue in the course 
of an ordinary day. Life doesn’t give us that kind of cognitive space. Moreover, 
Hernandez and Preston show that when we are under significant cognitive load, the 
 
81 Levi (1991) succinctly anticipates this general thought when discussing “uncoerced contraction” of 
belief: 
“[C]ontraction does not import error from the inquirer's point of view. It incurs a loss of information. But if 
this loss is accompanied by the opportunity to undertake an inquiry to settle the question as to the truth of 
the rival theories without begging the question, there may be a benefit in doing so to compensate for the 
initial loss of information. If this is right, a good reason for implementing an uncoerced contraction would be 
that it allows a promising theory incompatible with current doctrine to be examined without prejudice” (Levi 
1991, 153). 
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mitigating effects of disfluency on confirmation bias evaporate (2013, 181). So, always 
resisting confirmation bias—and incurring the cognitive load that such resistance brings 
with it—can’t be a good general strategy for handling the costs of such bias. 
One might suspect that by bringing in factors about psychological bias, a non-
epistemic kind of normativity has been smuggled in. But I think this is exactly the kind of 
real-world normativity that epistemologists should care about. It’s useful to compare this 
kind of epistemic situation to a case in ethics. Suppose you ought to apologize to your 
friend for something you did, and it would really be best if you apologized sooner rather 
than later. But right now you are still upset—you are bearing a high emotional load—and 
you know that if you try to go apologize now, you’re likely to end up saying something 
hurtful that you’ll regret, whereas if you take some time to cool off, you will be more 
likely to offer a carefully-worded apology. Should you apologize now or later?82 There’s 
a clear sense in which you should apologize later. This despite the fact that it would, in 
some sense, be better if you could apologize now while also vigilantly avoiding saying 
anything hurtful. But since you know you will likely say something hurtful if you 
apologize now, it often makes sense to wait. Apologizing well now isn’t a genuine option 
for you. In any case, I’d rather be friends with the sort of person who makes the delayed 
but well-offered apology. 
Similarly, given that I know I am the sort of person who is subject to confirmation 
bias, I would rather be the sort of person who (at least sometimes) waits to close inquiry 
 
82 This is, perhaps, a trickier question than it first appears and one that ethicists have spent considerable 
time wrestling with. If it helps, one can read the cases as ones in which apologizing well now or (in the 
epistemic case) believing and yet successfully resisting the effects of confirmation bias aren’t genuine 
options for the agent. They are beyond the agent’s ability and so beyond their obligations. But see, among 
others, Goldman (1978) for critical discussion of related issues. 
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when there’s a high chance of doing better epistemically in the future. Perhaps ideal 
epistemic agents, unencumbered by cognitive biases or with an unlimited cognitive 
capacity to handle them, have no reason to continue inquiry in the sorts of cases we have 
been discussing. Ideal epistemic agents can close and reopen inquiry at will without 
thereby changing their sensitivity to new evidence. Maybe we can even approximate this 
ideal with special effort in limited domains for limited periods of time. But for those of us 
who are not currently operating at an ideal epistemic level, it can be better to keep inquiry 
open in than to knowledgeably close it. 
4.4 All Together Now 
In §3, I argued that it’s sometimes more important to continue inquiry than to 
have knowledge. In such cases, it’s better to be on the left side of our chart than the right.  
A 
Knowing the Answer to Q 
Continuing Inquiry into Q 
B 
Knowing the Answer to Q 
Not Continuing Inquiry into Q 
C 
Not Knowing the Answer to Q 
Continuing Inquiry into Q 
D 
Not Knowing the Answer to Q 
Not Continuing Inquiry into Q 
 
In this section, I’ve argued that there’s something epistemically defective about being in 
box A. So, if one is on the left side of the chart, it’s much better to be in box C than it is 
to be in box A. 
Our first strategy suggested that it’s not even obvious that it’s psychologically 
possible for us to be in box A once we’ve limited the scope of our claim to occurrrent 
beliefs and inquiries. If that’s right, then C is the only box one can inhabit on the left side 
of the chart. So, if it’s better to be on the left side of the chart than the right (if it’s better 
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to inquire than to know), then it’s better to inquire in ignorance than it is to know. 
Sometimes, it’s better to be (inquiringly) ignorant than (un-inquiringly) knowledgeable. 
Our second strategy was to argue that it’s epistemically impermissible to know 
the answer to a question one is inquiring into. Don’t ask and answer a question at the 
same time. If this is right, then (if it’s better to be on the left side) it is at least usually 
better to be in box C than in box A.  
Why only usually? Well, most norms can be overridden or outweighed by 
competing values. So, it’s possible that special circumstances conspire to make it right 
for us to violate the epistemic prohibition on knowing while inquiring (perhaps we have 
special reason to know the answer to Q and also special reason to remain as sensitive as 
possible to new evidence bearing on Q). But the ultimate conclusion of this project is 
modest enough to allow for such special circumstances. The thesis: sometimes it is 
epistemically better (with respect to one’s inquiry into Q) to inquire into Q without 
knowing the answer to Q than it is to know the answer to Q. This allows that the norm 
may be overridden in certain cases. But given that there is a stable norm prohibiting 
knowing the answer to Q while inquiring into Q, it would be surprising if a great many of 
the cases in which it is better to be on the left side of the chart were not also going to be 
ones in which it is better to be in box C than in box A.  
The third strategy was to show that inquirers into Q who know the answer to Q 
(and thereby believe an answer to Q) incur the costs of certain kinds of confirmation bias. 
The mere fact that there are costs does not by itself mean that we should never pay them. 
But it seems that these costs are going to matter most for the same sort of agents we 
considered in §3. If an agent is aiming for knowledge+ (but only knowledge is presently 
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available to them), they have reason to remain sensitive to future evidence. One way to 
do that is to continue inquiry; another is not to close it. Quite plausibly then, many of 
those agents who opted to continue inquiry rather than end it in §3 should also opt to 
avoid the costs of confirmation bias by foregoing immediate knowledge. 
If the thought of foregoing knowledge is unsettling, it may be a comfort to note 
that our protagonists are not giving up everything good about their current epistemic 
standing by continuing inquiry. Importantly, if the inquiry goes well, they are very likely 
to remain in a position to know the answer to the question they are inquiring into. In these 
circumstances, the inquirer maintains equal epistemic access to knowledge even though 
they genuinely forego having it. And this may make the sacrifice seem less reckless.83,84 
When it’s better to inquire than not to, it’s often better to inquire from a place of 
beliefless ignorance than from knowledge. Beliefless ignorance preserves a genuinely 
open stance to the ongoing inquiry. 
5. Two Ways of Furthering Inquiry 
I’ve argued that sometimes, even when one is in a strong position to know, it can 
be better to further inquiry without belief (and so without knowledge), thereby increasing 
 
83 I’m grateful to Susanna Schellenberg for conversation on this point.  
84 It’s also compatible with my view that agents hold onto some doxastic state weaker than full belief while 
continuing inquiry (a high confidence, for instance). I don’t have much to say here about the epistemic 
norms that may govern doxastic commitments that are less than full belief. But I think there’s room for 
happy collaboration with, for instance, Will Fleisher’s (2018) and (forthcoming) work on the doxastic 
attitude of endorsement, which is explicitly tailored for contexts in which (perhaps for social epistemic 
reasons) researchers need to take some kind of a (doxastic) stand on an issue even though knowledge is 
inappropriate. Fleisher focuses on cases in which knowledge is inappropriate because agents do not have 
knowledge available to them (because of entrenched peer disagreement, for instance); in the context of my 
project, knowledge might sometimes be inappropriate for researchers because what they ought to do (or at 
any rate are doing) is to inquire. 
Space precludes a full discussion. But to those who worry that foregoing knowledgeable belief is too high a 
price to pay for inquiry, I offer that Fleisher’s work may provide the key to allowing inquirers to maintain a 
kind of immediate (albeit not knowledgeable) doxastic success. (Thanks to Andy Egan for conversation on 
this topic.) 
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the likelihood of permissibly achieving knowledge+ in the future, rather than to settle for 
immediate knowledge. An important piece of the argument (§4) has been that furthering 
inquiry in the relevant way while also knowing the answer is epistemically inappropriate.  
But (I will now suggest) it can be permissible to know the answer to a question 
and yet further inquiry in some sense. In this section, I distinguish between two ways of 
furthering inquiry: continuing inquiry and advancing inquiry. I concede that it is 
sometimes epistemically better to knowledgeably advance inquiry than to ignorantly 
continue it. But not always: there remains an important role for ignorantly continuing 
inquiry in the healthy epistemic life.  
I’ve been focusing on the species of furthering inquiry that I have been calling 
continuing inquiry. To continue inquiry into Q is for Q to remain on one’s research 
agenda: that is, to continue to have a goal-directed interrogative attitude toward a 
question that provokes sensitivity to new evidence.85 But that doesn’t describe all cases of 
furthering inquiry. Indeed, furthering inquiry in this way can look quite odd in certain 
cases. 
Suppose I am talking to my friend over coffee and they tell me that they have quit 
their job. This is surprising to me, since they had always expressed that they were quite 
happy with their position, a post they had securely held for a long time. I remain deeply 
curious about my friend’s situation. I don’t merely want to know about their decision to 
quit, I want to understand it: I want, that is, a kind of knowledge+. And I immediately 
want to ask them more about quitting their job. But it would be extremely strange for me 
to withhold belief that my friend has quit their job while I (inquiringly) try to understand. 
 
85 Recall discussion in §2.1 and in Friedman (2017, 307–308). 
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Instead, I fully believe that my friend has quit their job, and my further inquiry will take 
the form of follow-up questions: Why did you quit your job? When did you do so? Did 
something unusual happen at work recently? 
In fact, it’s hard to see how I could even coherently ask some of these questions if 
I did not already fully believe that my friend had quit their job. Asking when they quit, 
for instance, presupposes that they already have. And while I could ask if something 
strange happened at work recently whether or not I believe they have quit, that question is 
newly salient to me because I am looking for a potential explanation for why they have 
quit. 
This series of follow-up questions constitutes a way of furthering inquiry on the 
subject of my friend’s quitting their job. But it isn’t continuing inquiry as we’ve defined 
it. Let us say instead that such follow-up questions advance inquiry. Advancing inquiry 
doesn’t continue inquiry into the same question, but it furthers inquiry into a subject, 
where a subject is understood as a set of questions that are related or unified in the right 
way.86 More carefully, an agent advances inquiry only if (i) Q and Q′ are questions that 
belong to the same subject and (ii) at least in part because the agent has closed inquiry 
into Q, they open inquiry into Q′.  
So far, I’ve just said that there’s a way of furthering inquiry that doesn’t amount 
to continuing inquiry. That by itself doesn’t make trouble for my argument. Unless, that 
is, every time that I’ve argued it would be best to continue inquiry it would actually be 
better to advance inquiry. For those who advance inquiry, unlike those who continue it, 
come to believe and so (in the good case) know the answer to their initial question.  
 
86 For our purposes, we can be fairly open about what it takes for questions belonging to a common subject 
to be related “in the right way.” 
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And, indeed, in many cases, advancing inquiry can recoup some of the advantages 
I have been claiming for continuing it. For one way to improve our epistemic status with 
respect to a proposition is to learn more about related questions. Suppose that I know that 
my friend has quit their job on the basis of their testimony and I then learn (on the basis 
of further testimony in response to a follow-up question) that they had been harboring 
doubts about the leadership of the company for the last year. This gives me additional 
evidence for the proposition that they have really quit (more than I needed for 
knowledge, since their initial testimony was sufficient). So, I now have a variety of 
knowledge+ that my friend has quit their job. And I have achieved this knowledge+ 
without giving up knowledge during the interval between my friend’s initial testimony 
and their answer to my follow-up question. Isn’t this a better strategy? 
This problem may seem particularly acute when the follow-up question is 
explicitly epistemic in character—for instance, if Q is whether p and Q′ is whether I know 
that p.87 Suppose, for instance, that an agent is curious about p and is not inclined to be 
satisfied with inquiry into whether p until they (are in a position to) know that they know 
that p. Here are two ways that they could get there: 
The Method of Delayed Gratification: S is inquiring into the question of 
whether p. At t1, S arrives in a strong position to know that p is true. But S 
withholds judgment about whether p. Later, at t2, S arrives in a strong position to 
know that they know that p. They knowledgeably close inquiry, coming to believe 
that p. Simultaneously (or soon after), they may form the additional belief that 
they know that p is true.  
 
The Scaffolding Method: S is inquiring into the question of whether p. At t1, S 
arrives in a strong position to know that p is true. S knowledgeably closes inquiry, 
coming to believe that p. S immediately (or soon after) opens inquiry into a new 
question: whether S knows whether p. Later, at t2, S arrives in a strong position to 
know that they know that p. They knowledgeably close inquiry, coming to believe 
that they know that p is true. 
 
87 I’m grateful to Ernie Sosa for helpful discussion on this and related points. 
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Note that, as in the conversation with the friend who quit their job, The 
Scaffolding Method has an important advantage over The Method of Delayed 
Gratification. Only by following The Scaffolding Method does S get to know the 
answer to whether p from the interval t1–t2. And both methods produce similar epistemic 
situations at t2. In the end of both stories, S can know both p and that they know that p. 
Moreover, by employing The Scaffolding Method, S preserves an interrogative attitude 
toward a p-involving question. So, it’s at least arguable that S will reap many of the 
inquiry-activated benefits that I’ve claimed for The Method of Delayed Gratification. 
So, why give up knowledge during the interim? Why delay gratification when one can 
scaffold instead? 
My response is partly concessive. I think that The Scaffolding Method is 
sometimes the best strategy. Note that those who follow The Scaffolding Method 
respect the Ignorance Norm for Inquiry, that one shouldn’t both know an answer and 
inquire into that very same question simultaneously. So, any reason to employ The 
Method of Delayed Gratification over and against The Scaffolding Method will arise 
from the decision-theoretic reasons considered in §3 (loss of sensitivity to new evidence 
bearing on the question) and §4.3 (the costs of confirmation bias). These decision-
theoretic reasons will, of course, be quite sensitive to local factors about the particular 
agent’s epistemic and psychological situation.  
Nevertheless, I think that there are often strong reasons to prefer The Method of 
Delayed Gratification to The Scaffolding Method. Agents who employ one method 
rather than the other are asking and have answered different questions, and this has the 
potential to shape the intermediary inquiry between t1 and t2 in important ways.  
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When following The Method of Delayed Gratification, S is inquiring into 
<whether p> (Q) and not (at least until the very end of the story) <whether I (S) know 
that p> (Q′). Although both questions are at least loosely about p, Q′ has a distinctively 
epistemic character and is likely to make different evidence salient. For instance, whether 
I believe that p and what the nature of knowledge is are relevant considerations that bear 
on Q′ but not (in the typical case) on Q.88 But if what I’m really interested in is whether p 
and not whether I know that p, then I should want to remain most sensitive to evidence 
without the epistemic character made salient by Q′. 
As discussed in §4.3, S may also activate different varieties of confirmation bias 
by utilizing The Scaffolding Method. Between t1 and t2, S already believes that p. So, 
it’s not just that by using this method S is prompted to be sensitive to evidence (of an 
epistemic character) that is irrelevant to Q, S is also introducing confirmation bias to 
evidence that bears directly on the first-order question Q.  
The advantage to The Scaffolding Method is that one gets to know the answer to 
one’s initial question earlier. In some cases, this will be worth it. And when the evidence 
is clear-cut enough, we may not even be able to help proceeding in this way. But the 
Scaffolding Method brings with it (a) sensitivity to evidence bearing on epistemically-
inflected higher-order content, which may distract from the agent’s guiding interest in the 
subject, and (b) confirmation bias on the first-order question. When those costs are high 
enough given an agent’s goals in inquiry, they should still prefer The Method of 
Delayed Gratification. 
 
88 Cf. Alston (1980). 
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Finally, I want to reflect on the different phenomenology of following one method 
rather than the other. There’s an important difference between (a) being disposed to 
remain unsatisfied with an inquiry until one (e.g.) is in a position to know that one knows 
the answer and (b) being curious about (not just whether p but also) whether I know that 
p. Sometimes I am deeply interested in a question and have high standards for answering 
it. When I am deeply interested in a question in this way, I don’t typically lose curiosity 
in that first-order question midway through the inquiry and gain curiosity in a closely 
related but distinct higher-order question about my epistemic standing. Rather, I preserve 
my curiosity in the first-order question throughout the entire inquiry. This 
phenomenology fits much better with The Method of Delayed Gratification than The 
Scaffolding Method.  
Recall, for instance, the detective from earlier in this paper. When they look at the 
20th bin of evidence, here are two questions whose curiosity could be motivating their 
search: (1) Is the suspect innocent? Or (2) Given that the suspect is innocent, do I know 
that the suspect is innocent? Unless the detective is of a surprisingly epistemological 
bent, I think it’s much more natural to suppose that they are inquiring into the first 
question. They are curious about the suspect’s innocence not their own epistemic 
accomplishments. And that’s the question they want to retain evidential sensitivity 
toward as they examine the contents of the final bin. 
Again, the goal is not to insist that all inquiry must fit this mold. It’s very natural 
when discussing my friend’s job situation over coffee to stop wondering whether they 
have quit their job and to become curious about the why and the how instead. Or in the 
epistemology room, it’s natural to spend a lot of time thinking about whether we know 
   
  
70 
 
that we have hands and not just whether we have them. But it’s also natural for the 
protagonists of this paper—the detective, the team of scientists, the philosophy student—
to maintain curiosity in their initial questions throughout the inquiry. The Method of 
Delayed Gratification and The Scaffolding Method represent two modes of inquiry 
that are both more demanding than merely knowing the answer to a single question. 
Which method it’s reasonable for an agent to employ may depend on the shape of their 
curiosity as much as anything else. When an agent’s curiosity is fixated on a single 
question, prompts high standards for satisfaction, and when the agent is particularly 
motivated to remain sensitive to evidence bearing on the initial, first-order question, it is 
often more sensible to adopt The Method of Delayed Gratification than its competitor.  
6. Knowledge-Hoarding and Its Limits 
I want to think once more about our protagonists from earlier in the paper (the 
detective, the scientists, and the philosophy student) and to work out with the full 
argument in view why, at the moment we interrupt their lives, it’s better for them to be 
ignorant than knowledgeable on the question they are taking up. Then I want to step back 
and think about the kind of epistemic life someone who takes the advice of this paper 
might be inclined to live. 
Our philosophy student didn’t just want to know what the structure of Descartes’ 
argument in the cogito is—they were intensely interested in the question and had greater 
ambitions than mere knowledge. They wanted to understand the structure of the 
argument, to be extra justified in their beliefs about the argument, and to know the 
structure of the argument well enough to be able to articulate it in a clear way when 
asked: they wanted knowledge+. It’s not necessarily that they cognized these aims in this 
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way, but they weren’t disposed to feel satisfied with inquiry that didn’t end with this kind 
of epistemic achievement. The student has read the text very well and would know (but 
not know+ in the relevant way) what the structure of Descartes’ argument in the cogito is 
if they formed a belief about it. But they haven’t yet. The student could proceed in any of 
the following four ways: 
A 
Knowing the Answer to Q 
Continuing Inquiry into Q 
B 
Knowing the Answer to Q 
Not Continuing Inquiry into Q 
C 
Not Knowing the Answer to Q 
Continuing Inquiry into Q 
D 
Not Knowing the Answer to Q 
Not Continuing Inquiry into Q 
 
They don’t follow path D. That would be to abandon inquiry into a question that they 
remain deeply interested in. They don’t follow path B, for they want to continue inquiry! 
After all, they still want knowledge+ and all that’s available to them right now (we’ve 
stipulated) is knowledge. They are more likely to get knowledge+ if they continue 
inquiry. Continuing inquiry will keep them sensitive to new evidence. What’s more, 
choosing to know the answer would introduce a kind of confirmation bias, and that would 
(often) make it less likely that they would get knowledge+ in the future. They could, 
nevertheless, follow path A, committing to both continuing inquiry into their question 
and knowledgeably believing the answer. Or at least maybe they could—this is a difficult 
psychological trick to pull off if one keeps both things at the front of one’s mind. But 
even if they could pull it off, this is an impermissible epistemic state to be in. It’s 
incoherent to ask and answer the same question at the same time. And one still has to 
reckon the costs of confirmation bias if one takes this route. Better to avoid path A as 
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well. That leaves path C: continuing inquiry while withholding belief and so remaining 
ignorant of the answer.  
Ignorance is the price of inquiry—at least inquiry of a certain kind. One must 
forego knowledge if one wants to permissibly inquire into a question while retaining 
heightened sensitivity to new evidence. But the price is reasonable if knowledge+ is both 
the agent’s (desired enough) aim and (likely enough) reward.  
Although it’s initially surprising that ignorance might play such a prominent role 
in the life of virtuous epistemic agents, I think that the vision of epistemic life that 
accompanies it is attractive. It requires a certain humility to sit with ignorance during an 
inquiry. Humble inquirers want the answer, but they don’t need to be the most 
knowledgeable person in the room: they aren’t know-it-alls.89 
But humility is not meekness. On the contrary, agents are encouraged to be 
epistemically ambitious! Knowledge isn’t the best there is, nor is all curiosity sated by it. 
Have courage to aim for the higher things. It may be that knowledge is often good 
enough. But it would be sad, I think, for an epistemic agent never to try for more. Such an 
agent lacks a full capacity for wonder.  
Ambition requires patience: the higher things do not often come easily. And those 
who have the appetite for knowledge+ must have the maturity and self-control to exercise 
delayed epistemic gratification. They must resist believing too soon. The idea that 
restraint is central to the well-lived epistemic life is deeply Cartesian: 
If, however, I simply refrain from making a judgement in cases where I do not 
perceive the truth with sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am 
behaving correctly and avoiding error. …[T]he perception of the intellect should 
always precede the determination of the will. In this incorrect use of free will may 
be found the privation which constitutes the essence of error (Descartes 1984, 41). 
 
89 I’m grateful to Susanna Schellenberg for conversation on this point. 
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Good inquirers (Descartes says) keep their wills from interfering with the perception of 
the intellect. Descartes is not merely concerned with the error of being wrong but the 
error of having arrived at the truth “by pure chance” (41): not just the error of being 
wrong but the error of not being epistemically successful “with sufficient clarity and 
distinctness.” We need not have Cartesian standards about what counts as “sufficient 
clarity and distinctness” or a Cartesian theory of the will to appreciate the Cartesian 
insight that the restraint to withhold our judgment until our epistemic goals have been 
achieved is an important epistemic skill.  
In contrast, the knowledge-hoarder grasps at knowledge as soon as they can. 
Lacking a full capacity for wonder—the capacity to be motivated in their inquiry by a 
desire for more than mere knowledge—the knowledge-hoarder thereby lacks epistemic 
ambition. Or if they have ambition, they are immature, unable to practice delayed 
epistemic gratification, the restraint necessary to achieve the greater epistemic goods. Or 
perhaps they are overly risk-averse, unable to stomach the risk of foregoing knowledge in 
a venture for knowledge+. Too proud to sit with the ignorance that proper inquiry 
requires. The knowledge-hoarder may know more, but those who can accept ignorance 
make better inquirers.90 
Unlike that of the knowledge-hoarder, this project presents a picture of 
epistemology that is inquiry-positive. Inquiry is not just a dutiful means in the generation 
of knowledge, but an epistemically valuable and wonder-filled state in its own right in 
which we remain sensitive to evidence, attentive to questions, and from which we are 
able to pursue a wide range of epistemic aims. And not just inquiry but ignorance too 
 
90 Thanks to Carolina Flores for conversation about the dangers of knowledge-hoarding. 
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turns out to have an important role to play in the epistemic life: ignorance can be 
epistemically valuable. Although knowledge is allergic to inquiry, ignorance gives us the 
space to be good inquirers. Sometimes we inquire with the aim of achieving more than 
mere knowledge, and sustained ignorance helps us get there. It’s often especially 
appropriate for us to do this if we have reason to expect new evidence to trickle in, or if 
we are willing to dedicate future time to interpreting the evidence we have, or if we are 
about to acquire a new cognitive skill. Or if we are filled with a deep enough sense of 
wonder. In epistemology, as in life, delayed gratification is often the best strategy.91 
  
 
91 I am deeply grateful to Sam Carter, Andy Egan, Danny Forman, Chris Frugé, Thony Gillies, Michael 
Glanzberg, Verónica Gómez Sánchez, Caley Howland, Zach Kofi, Andrew Moon, Morgan Moyer, Dee 
Payton, Ezra Rubenstein, and Susanna Schellenberg for reading past versions of this paper and for 
discussions on related topics. Each prolonged my inquiry in valuable ways. I owe special debts to Carolina 
Flores, Matt McGrath, and Ernie Sosa who were writing on related themes, who indulged me in repeated 
discussions about this paper, and whom I am glad to count as my co-inquirers.  
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 AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF INFALLIBILITY 
 
Abstract: According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one 
knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle—
made famous in Descartes’ cogito—is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order 
propositions one can’t be wrong about but shouldn’t believe anyway: believing them would 
immediately make one’s overall doxastic state worse.  
 
 
1. The Doctrine of Infallibility 
A proposition is epistemically infallible for an agent just in case that it’s 
impossible for that agent to falsely believe it: 
Infallibility: A proposition p is infallible for S iff it’s impossible that S falsely 
believes that p.  
 
This definition closely resembles the following: 
Infallibility*: A proposition p is infallible for S iff it’s necessary that if S believes 
that p then S truly believes that p. 
 
If, necessarily, all beliefs are either just true or just false—as I believe they are—then 
infallibility and infallibility* are equivalent. I shall suppose that they are equivalent 
throughout the rest of the paper, although there is interesting territory to explore for those 
who believe that some propositions are neither or both true and false. 
Since one can’t be mistaken about one’s infallible beliefs, it’s tempting to think 
we should always believe them. When there’s no risk of false belief, why not? At least, if 
we’re in a position to recognize that a proposition is infallible for us, surely then we may 
believe it. As Alston says, “one could hardly have a stronger (epistemic) justification for 
holding a certain belief than the logical impossibility of the belief’s being mistaken” 
(Alston 1971, 229). Consider, then, the doctrine of infallibility: 
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Doctrine of Infallibility: If S knows <necessarily, if she herself were now to 
believe that p then she would truly believe that p> then it is thereby (rationally) 
permissible for S now to believe that p. 
 
In slogan form: You’re always permitted to believe (known) guaranteed truths. 
I argue, however, that not all propositions known to be infallible may be believed. 
In fact, some propositions that are known to be infallible should be disbelieved!  
The doctrine of infallibility emerges as a battleground between two otherwise 
attractive philosophical theses: one the one hand, veritism, the thesis that accuracy is the 
fundamental epistemic good, and on the other hand what I shall call reflectivism, the 
thesis that one’s reflective attitudes about one’s first-order beliefs make at least some 
difference to the epistemic quality of those first-order beliefs or one’s belief system. 
Although the thesis of this paper is that the doctrine of infallibility is false, a recurring 
theme is that reflectivism is in tension with veritism.  
2. Clarifying “Infallibility” 
Some clarifications are in order. First, infallibility is sometimes ascribed to agents 
in relation to a proposition or subject matter (e.g. “The Pope is infallible about matters of 
faith when he speaks ex cathedra”). Thus, Alston writes: “one can be said to be infallible 
vis-à-vis a certain subject matter provided one cannot be mistaken in any beliefs he forms 
concerning that subject matter” (Alston 1971, 229). Talking about infallible agents might 
suggest to the reader some kind of super-knower or an agent with extra-special epistemic 
access to some domain (like a Pope, prophet, or supercomputer).  
Terminologically, I prefer to speak in the opposite way: Infallibility is a property 
that propositions have in relation to agents. This serves to emphasize that infallibility (as 
used in this paper) requires no special competence on the part of the agent for whom a 
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proposition is infallible. All necessary mathematical truths are infallible for infants, for 
instance, though of course infants do not know that those truths are infallible for them. 
Focusing on propositions rather than “subject matters” also allows us to be more 
fine-grained in targeting particular beliefs. That I exist is infallible for me (in my sense), 
but it’s at least not obvious that I couldn’t be mistaken about the subject. Suppose I 
believe that I am a fiction, for instance, and that strictly speaking I don’t exist.1 Or that 
there are no selves at all. I’d then be mistaken about the question (or subject) of whether I 
exist even though, necessarily, if I believed <I exist> I’d be right. One can be mistaken 
about a subject matter even if one can’t be mistaken in believing a particular proposition 
that is an answer to a question belonging to that subject matter. 
My definition of “infallibility” also differs from certain other uses in the 
literature. For instance, Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath suggest that an agent knows 
(and perhaps also believes) that p infallibly when there is no epistemic chance for them 
that not-p (2009, 11). This definition is in some ways more and in some ways less 
restrictive than the one used here. It is less restrictive because it counts as infallible those 
propositions for which an agent has maximal justification: there’s no epistemic chance 
that not-p for such agents. But it is often still possible (though not epistemically possible, 
perhaps) that agents could be wrong about a proposition for which they have perfect 
justification: they could have had different evidence, for instance. Fantl and McGrath’s 
definition is, in other respects, more restrictive than mine because they leave open that a 
belief in a necessary proposition may be fallible (e.g. when a math student believes an 
 
1 See Lebens (2015) for an intriguing articulation of a view in this neighborhood. 
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axiom on the basis of testimony rather than by working out the proof [cf. 2009, 8]) even 
though, necessarily, if they believe the axiom, they will be right. 
Nor does my use of “infallibility” perfectly overlap with the notion employed in 
what Jessica Brown calls “probability 1 infallibilism” (Brown 2013, 626), the sort of 
infallibility one has toward a proposition when it has probability 1 conditional on one’s 
evidence.2 A proposition could have less than probability 1 and yet still be infallible for 
me. Necessary truths that I can’t conceptualize may not have probability 1 for me 
(because I may not have any evidence bearing on them) and yet be such that, necessarily, 
if I believe them, I will be right.  
Second, what I mean by “infallibility” is related to but distinct from what some 
authors mean by “incorrigibility.” It’s useful to briefly disentangle them. Frank Jackson 
discusses the view that “it is logically impossible to be mistaken about certain of one’s 
current mental states” under the guise of an “incorrigibility thesis” (Jackson 1973, 51). 
This is an obviously related notion, but one that comes apart from my definition of 
infallibility. Nothing in my proposal centers on an agent’s own mental states, and, as for 
Alston, there is be a difference between one’s ability to be mistaken about a proposition 
(by believing either that it is true or that it is false) and one’s inability to be mistaken in 
believing of a particular proposition that it is true. 
Sydney Shoemaker’s definition of incorrigibility is closer in that it is conditional 
upon a kind of affirmation of the truth of a proposition: “If a person sincerely asserts such 
a statement it does not make sense to suppose, and nothing could be accepted as showing, 
that he is mistaken” (Shoemaker 1963, 215). Shoemakerian incorrigibility is a kind of 
 
2 Brown (2013) has Williamson’s E=K thesis particularly in mind. 
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public infallibility. If a person believes an infallible proposition, their (sincerely believed) 
assertions of the same will be incorrigible in Shoemaker’s sense—after all, no 
proposition that is true can be shown to be mistaken. But not all (Shoemakerian) 
incorrigible propositions are infallible, for a proposition might be incapable of being 
disproved but false, nonetheless.  
There may, however, be a sense in which my infallibility is a kind of 
incorrigibility. Incorrigibility is (according to one way of thinking) the inability to be 
corrected. An agent might be uncorrectable with respect to a proposition because (a) they 
are unable to change their mind (or, at any rate, to have their mind persuasively changed 
from the outside) or (b) any change of mind would not constitute a correction, i.e. 
because the belief in question was already true. Any belief in an infallible proposition is 
incorrigible in the second sense. 
3. On Behalf of the Doctrine of Infallibility 
But before defending the surprising conclusion that the doctrine of infallibility is 
false, let’s give the doctrine its due. The doctrine is deeply intuitive and for good reason. 
First, the doctrine has historical pedigree. It is to infallibility that Descartes appeals at the 
climax of the cogito: 
[Suppose] there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately 
and constantly deceiving me. …[L]et him deceive me as much as he can, he will 
never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. …I 
must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true 
whenever it is put forward by me3 or conceived in my mind. (Descartes 1984, 7) 
 
 
3 I take believing a proposition to be at least one way of putting it forward. 
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It’s the infallibility of “I exist” that makes the wheels of the cogito turn and—on at least 
one way of reading Descartes4—makes it the first item to fully survive the scrutiny of 
Descartes’ method of doubt.  
The cogito illustrates the benefit of having a principle whereby guaranteed truth is 
sufficient all by itself to license belief. If the doctrine of infallibility were false, that 
would mean that Descartes had not yet done enough (at this point in the Meditations, at 
least) to show that we are permitted to believe that we exist! Descartes is often accused of 
making the standard for defeating skepticism too high: rarely has he been accused of 
making the standard too low. 
Contemporary epistemologists continue to appeal to Cartesian infallibility at 
crucial junctures. Ernest Sosa, for instance, appeals to infallibility to ward off dream 
skepticism. Having argued that in dreams “we do not really believe; we only make-
believe” (Sosa 2007, 8), Sosa claims that if we really believe that we are dreaming we 
must not be dreaming: If we were dreaming, our “belief” wouldn’t really be a belief at 
all, but only a make-belief. We should affirm (and neither suspend nor deny) that <I am 
awake> “since only about that option [i.e. affirming] is it obvious to me now that if I take 
it I will be right” (Sosa 2007, 19).5 
A second reason for the doctrine of infallibility emerges from a particular picture 
of epistemic value. “Believe truth! Shun error!” says Williams James (1907, 18). 
 
4 There’s an important exegetical question about how Descartes’ notion of infallibility employed in the 
cogito relates to the clarity and distinctness criterion that takes center stage in Meditation III. I am grateful 
to Christopher Frugé and Ram Neta for excellent discussion on alternative interpretations of Descartes, 
which unfortunately cannot be captured in a footnote. 
5 Cf. Wittgenstein: “The argument ‘I may be dreaming’ is senseless for this reason: if I am dreaming, this 
remark is being dreamed as well—and indeed it is also being dreamed that these words have any meaning.” 
(1969, 383). An important difference is that, for Wittgenstein, the belief “I am dreaming” can only be true 
or senseless whereas for Sosa it can only be true or not a belief at all.  
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Epistemically, “these are our first and great commandments” (17),6 and—a more 
ambitiously reductive epistemologist might have added—the only ones.  
James’s aphorisms are suggestive of one of the main characters in our dialectic: 
epistemic veritism (cf. Goldman 1999, 5). According to veritism (as used here), the only 
fundamental epistemic value is accuracy.7 Whatever else can be said for and against this 
view, it is attractively simple. James’s aphorisms are telic: believing truth and shunning 
falsehood are goals that epistemic agents ought to promote.8 James notes that an agent 
might emphasize one of these goals more than the other. A cautious believer might be 
hesitant to believe when there is even a small chance of error (cf. Kelly, 2014). Infallible 
beliefs, however, are such that there is some chance they will lead to true belief and no 
chance that they will lead to false belief. If the only—or, at any rate, the most 
fundamental—epistemic goods are believing truly and avoiding false belief, then there’s 
seemingly always a good decision-theoretic reason to take a chance on infallible beliefs: 
There’s an opportunity (indeed a certainty!) to gain an epistemic good without any risk of 
epistemic harm. 
One could accept the doctrine of infallibility without being a veritist of this stripe, 
but veritists should be especially attracted to the doctrine of infallibility. Adding a true 
belief always improves accuracy, at least if one can do so without adding any false beliefs 
or removing true ones.9 And there’s no obvious reason why believing an infallible 
 
6 Intriguingly, James himself fluctuates between believing the truth (1907, 18) and knowing the truth (17) as 
the positive epistemic commandment. In this paper, I shall represent James as endorsing the commandment 
to believe the truth, although this is a simplifying, historical fiction. 
7 Cf. Goldman: “[T]rue belief is the ultimate value in the epistemic sphere” (2001, 32). 
8 For a non-telic, or at least anti-consequentialist, version of veritism that falls outside the sort targeted in 
this paper, see Sylvan (2018). 
9 Berker (2013a), building on Firth (1981), argues against veritism on the grounds that it permits 
wrongheaded tradeoffs, allowing agents to believe obvious falsehoods to gain true beliefs downstream: 
veritists ignore “the epistemic separateness of propositions” (2013a, 365). Since the cases in this paper that 
   
  
82 
 
proposition would require one to also acquire false or abandon true beliefs. Indeed, the 
very plausibility of the doctrine of infallibility is likely to be seen as an argument for 
veritism. If guaranteed truth is by itself sufficient to license belief, a good explanation is 
that accuracy is what matters most in epistemology. 
Third, the doctrine of infallibility, or at least a principle that entails it, explains the 
right verdict in certain tricky cases that reverse the normal causal direction of fit between 
mind and world. Note that the doctrine of infallibility is a weak version of a family of 
principles that permit agents to believe when they know that their belief would have some 
truth-oriented property or other if believed. In particular, the 
Doctrine of Infallibility: If S knows that <necessarily, if she herself were now to 
believe that p then she would truly believe that p> then it is thereby (rationally) 
permissible for S now to believe that p. 
 
is entailed by the 
Doctrine of Truth: If S knows that <if she herself were now to believe that p 
then she would truly believe that p> then it is thereby (rationally) permissible for 
S now to believe that p. 
 
For if S is permitted to believe p in virtue of knowing that she wouldn’t be wrong about 
p, then she is surely permitted to believe p in virtue of knowing that she couldn’t be 
wrong about p.  
The doctrine of truth echoes Velleman’s (1989a/2000) articulation of epistemic 
freedom, in which he argues that one is “entitled to say,” and, Velleman suggests 
elsewhere, believe, what “wouldn’t be false if [one] said it” (Velleman 2000, 40).10 It 
turns out that the doctrine of truth is extremely useful in explaining why we are permitted 
 
might cause trouble for veritism don’t depend on tradeoffs of the relevant sort, I will stay neutral on 
whether veritists are committed to permitting them. 
10 Elsewhere (2000, 40), Velleman suggests that the agent must have evidence that they wouldn’t be wrong 
about p, bringing Velleman’s principle even closer to my formulation of the doctrine of truth. 
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to believe certain propositions when the ordinary direction of fit between mind and world 
is reversed. Indeed, several authors including Velleman (2000, 40, 44), Reisner (2013, 
§2), Kopec (2015, 404), Raleigh (2017, 332–333), Drake (2017, 4901) and Dahlback 
(forthcoming) appeal, at least implicitly, to something like the doctrine of truth in order to 
make sense of such cases.  
Here’s a representative case from Dahlback (forthcoming). A friendly demon 
guarantees that the result of a coin flip will match your belief about whether it is heads or 
tails. Dahlback reasons that so long as we know that we are in such a situation, we are 
permitted either to believe that the coin will land heads or that it will land tails (and so 
not heads) since we’d know that our belief was correct. In this case, the doctrine of truth 
seems to yield the proper result. It does seem permissible to believe either that the coin 
will land heads or that it will land tails.  
Importantly, this seems right even though the evidence favors neither the thesis 
that the coin will land heads nor that it will land tails: the favoring evidence runs out. By 
“favoring evidence,” I mean evidence that favors one attitude or contiguous range of 
attitudes over its competitors. Normally when the evidence favors neither p nor not-p we 
are required to suspend judgment. But in this case, to suspend judgment would to 
“willingly cast aside the promise of truth” (Drake 2017, 4902). One can’t follow the 
evidence to the conclusion that the coin will land heads or tails—one simply believes and 
thereby makes oneself right. That the antecedent evidence favors neither thesis is 
important: It makes clear the role that the doctrine of truth plays (or seems to) in 
explaining the permissibility of believing either that the coin will land heads or that it will 
land tails.  
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As Dahlback notes, an important feature of the case is that the ordinary causal 
direction of fit between mind and world is reversed: the belief is a kind of self-fulfilling 
prophecy. We are guaranteed to be right not because our mind is tracking the world but 
because the world is tracking our mind. That the doctrine of truth can deliver the right 
verdict in such cases—when the favoring evidence seems to run out—is a strong point in 
its favor. Considered broadly, such cases fit neatly with the reductive gloss on James 
sketched earlier. True and false beliefs are what matter. So long as you knew you’d be 
right, who cares (our imagined Jamesian shrugs) whether how you got there was by 
following the evidence? After all, one’s self-fulfilling beliefs and one’s evidence remain 
“subjunctively linked” insofar as the belief “creates adequate evidence for it[self]” (Foley 
1991, 102). And if the goal of following the evidence is to find the truth, then we may ask 
with Velleman (1989b, 63): “Why would rules [to follow the evidence] designed to help 
one arrive at the truth forbid one to form a belief that would be true?” What’s important 
isn’t how you get there but that you knew you’d be right at journey’s end. 
I’ve suggested that the ability of the doctrine of infallibility to explain why we are 
permitted to believe that the coin will land heads is a point in its favor. But some 
disagree: some think that we are not epistemically entitled to believe that the coin will 
land heads (although we may, for instance, be pragmatically entitled to form the belief 
that the coin will land heads). There’s an important debate to be had here about the right 
and wrong kinds of reasons for belief (see Kavka 1983; Resiner 2009; Schroeder 2012) 
and whether we aim sometimes to have true beliefs or only to believe what is true (Antill 
2020). Intuitions on this subject can be hard to leverage. For instance, Kopec (2015), 
Raleigh (2017), Drake (2017) and Dahlback (forthcoming) use cases of self-fulfilling 
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belief to argue for a robust permissivism whereas Antill (2020) argues against 
interpretations like theirs (in part) precisely because they lead to robust forms of 
permissivism.  
Philosophically, there’s much left to resolve. Dialectically, however, we may 
sidestep this issue. Those who insist that we don’t properly respect our evidence (because 
we don’t follow it) in cases of self-fulfilling beliefs will already be skeptical of the 
doctrines of truth and infallibility. For the doctrine of infallibility does not require that 
agents have beliefs that are arrived at by following the evidence: it allows beliefs that 
they merely know they are guaranteed not to be wrong about. And, in cases of self-
fulfilling belief, these criteria can come apart.  
I think, however, that the defender of the doctrine of infallibility is right to take 
our intuitive permission to believe either way in certain cases of known-to-be self-
fulfilling beliefs as evidence for their view. One further point in favor of this 
interpretation, articulated in Raleigh (2017, 338–339), is that the corresponding principle 
according to which we are not permitted to have beliefs that are guaranteed to be false is 
also highly plausible. For instance, no one should believe <p, but I don’t believe that p> 
(cf. Raleigh 2017, 329; Reisner 2014, 482). One doesn’t (necessarily) decide not to 
believe this proposition by weighing the evidence for it: one can simply decide to reject it 
on the grounds that one can only believe it falsely. 
In any case, I will ultimately argue that the doctrine of infallibility is false because 
there are particular (known-to-be) self-fulfilling judgments that we are not epistemically 
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entitled to make. But my argument won’t depend on any qualms about the propriety of 
self-fulfilling beliefs in general.11 
4. The Problem of Easy Downgrade 
So, there’s much to be said for the doctrine of infallibility. It anchors prominent 
anti-skeptical arguments, encourages us to take smart epistemic bets, and helps explain 
some otherwise tricky cases when the evidence follows our beliefs rather than our beliefs 
the evidence.  
Nevertheless, the doctrine of infallibility is false. Although we usually make our 
overall epistemic state better by believing in such a way that we couldn’t be wrong, we 
can also make our overall epistemic state worse.  
The doctrine of infallibility is false because it makes it too easy to permissibly 
acquire defeaters for our beliefs (or at least too easy to rationally downgrade them). A 
belief is defeated by another belief, in the stipulative sense of this paper, when the second 
belief makes the first lose some positive epistemic status. Suppose I believe it is noon but 
then learn that the clock I had based my belief on runs an hour late. My belief that the 
clock is running an hour late defeats the justification for my belief that it is noon. Losing 
justification is one way of losing a positive epistemic status; so, the belief has been (in 
our sense) defeated. (Note that our sense of “defeat” is intentionally broader than those 
that require loss of some particular epistemic quality like justification or knowledge.) 
It’s controversial just when defeat happens. To get a grip on the problem for the 
doctrine of infallibility, let’s begin by considering a very permissive defeat principle. 
 
11 See Berker (2013b, 376–377) for an argument against veritism that does rest on qualms about the 
propriety of self-fulfilling beliefs in general. Notably, however, Berker explicitly restricts his case to beliefs 
that are not known to be self-fulfilling. 
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Although many (the author included) will find this first-pass defeat principle ultimately 
unconvincing, it will help us to identify a recipe for finding infallible propositions that 
ought not be believed. This recipe will give us a strategy for cooking up counterexamples 
to the doctrine of infallibility that can be adjusted for philosophical taste. Here is the first 
principle: 
Easy Irrationality: Necessarily, it is irrational for S to believe that p if S 
believes that it is irrational for S to believe that p.  
 
The principle Easy Irrationality has some plausibility. Suppose S believes that it is 
irrational for her to believe some proposition, but she believes it anyway. The agent 
apparently displays a lack of appropriate epistemic reflection. She believes she has no 
good reason for believing p and believes it anyway. Something seems to have gone 
wrong epistemically. 
 Easy Irrationality is thus one avatar (though not the only one) of our second 
character: reflectivism. It’s one way of expressing the intuition that one’s reflective 
attitudes about one’s first-order beliefs make at least some difference to the epistemic 
quality of those first-order beliefs. 
Let’s not worry too much about whether this principle survives scrutiny.12 What I 
want to argue here is that if Easy Irrationality is true then there are certain infallible 
propositions that should not be believed.  
Suppose an agent knows both p and Easy Irrationality. They consider whether 
they may believe, in addition, that it is irrational for them to believe that p. They ask 
themselves, “Suppose I were to believe that it is irrational for me to believe that p. Would 
that belief be true?”  
 
12 See Coates (2012) for a critique. 
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Absolutely! For according to Easy Irrationality, believing that it’s irrational to 
believe that p is enough to make believing that p irrational. Simply having the belief 
makes it so. More than that, since Easy Irrationality is a necessary truth, it’s impossible 
that the belief could be false. The agent knows that the belief <it is irrational for me to 
believe that p> is infallible for them. The agent knows that, necessarily, if she herself 
were to believe <it is irrational for me to believe that p> then she would truly believe <it 
is irrational for me to believe that p>. 
But obviously, it’s wrong to believe that a belief is irrational just because Easy 
Irrationality makes that higher-order belief infallible. This would lead an agent to have a 
worse set of beliefs overall if p was otherwise rational to believe (and if there wasn’t 
independent reason to doubt that it was rational to believe that p). The first-order belief 
could become needlessly irrational. 
This is most clear in the case in which, antecedent to forming the easily-
irrationalizing belief, the agent had been in a position to know and rationally believe both 
<p> and <it is rational for me to believe that p>. The agent then has (at least) two 
choices: 
A. Believe <it is rational for me to believe that p> and believe <p>. 
B. Believe <It is irrational for me to believe p> and believe <p>. 
In this situation, the agent should clearly choose A over B. For only by choosing A will 
the agent emerge with two beliefs that are both true and rational. For if Easy 
Irrationality is true, then choosing option B will result in an irrational belief that p. 
But even if the agent hadn’t been in a position to know that their first-order belief 
was rational, it seems wrong to believe <it is irrational for me to believe that p> merely 
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because one would be right. Doing so takes too cavalier an attitude toward the possibility 
of downgrading the rationality of one’s first-order beliefs. One is making it irrational to 
believe something without any evidence that one’s epistemic situation forces this 
undesirable outcome. Something seems to have gone wrong. 
Maybe what’s gone wrong is Easy Irrationality. After all, many epistemologists 
think defeat is hard to come by. Lasonen-Aarnio (2010), Coates (2012), Williamson 
(2014), and Weatherson (manuscript), for instance, all argue against Easy Irrationality 
or analogues of it. Nevertheless, thinking about Easy Irrationality was valuable, for it 
has given us a template for thinking about how certain higher-order beliefs could in 
principle be infallible. Consider the following infallibility recipe: 
Infallibility Recipe: Necessarily, if S believes that it is F for S to believe that p 
then it is F for S to believe that p. 
 
Easy Irrationality is true just in case we can plug in “irrational” as the ingredient for 
“F.” As noted, if defeat is hard then simply believing that a belief is irrational might not 
be enough to make the first-order belief irrational. But it still seems that negative higher-
order epistemic appraisals make their corresponding first-order beliefs worse in some 
way, even if it doesn’t always make them irrational. Our task is to find some F that 
captures whatever way it is that first-order beliefs become worse upon receiving negative 
higher-order appraisals.  
There are four broad ways that one might argue that no negative, epistemic 
property satisfies the infallibility template. First, one might endorse extreme level-
splitting,13 the view that the quality of our belief systems is not at all impacted by the 
relationship between our lower- and higher-order beliefs. 
 
13 I borrow this term from Horowitz (2014), although my use is more restrictive. 
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Extreme level-splitting seems unduly strong. If we think it’s a total disaster to 
believe that p but believe p anyway, surely that lowers the quality of our first-order belief 
or our belief system in some way. If extreme level-splitting is true, then we can 
completely ignore our higher-order beliefs when evaluating their first-order counterparts. 
That stretches credulity. Surely there are better ways to argue that nothing satisfies the 
infallibility template. In other words, endorsing extreme level-splitting violates the 
intuitive thesis we’ve called epistemic reflectivism: our reflective beliefs about first-order 
beliefs have at least some impact on the quality of our corresponding first-order beliefs or 
belief system.  
I take the falsity of extreme level-splitting as a datum. But even those who 
embrace a degree of level-splitting don’t explicitly endorse the extreme thesis that 
second-order beliefs have no effect on the quality of first-order beliefs of belief systems. 
Coates (2012) argues that agents can rationally believe that their belief that p is irrational 
while, nevertheless, rationally believing that p. This view doesn’t entail extreme level-
splitting though, since it’s consistent with all this that believing that it’s irrational to 
believe p makes one’s belief that p worse in some way even if it doesn’t make it flat-out 
irrational. Similar observations apply to Weatherson’s claim that “what we should believe 
can come apart from what we should believe that we should believe” (manuscript) and 
Williamson’s (2014) view that one can know that p while knowing it is improbable that 
one knows that p.  
 These views are suggestive, however, of a second strategy for arguing that the 
infallibility template is never truly instantiated: One could argue that although negative 
higher order beliefs affect first-order beliefs in some way, no negative property is such 
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that believing a belief has that property automatically makes the corresponding first-order 
belief bad in that very way. After all, we can be mistaken—even rationally mistaken—in 
our first-order beliefs. Why should our second-order beliefs be any different? On this 
picture, believing that one’s beliefs are bad in an F-ish way does indeed make them worse 
(extreme level-splitting is false), but one’s first-order beliefs may be made worse in a G-
ish way rather than an F-ish way. 
 This strategy is consonant with the view of defeat articulated by Lasonen-Aarnio 
(2010). Lasonen-Aarnio argues persuasively that we shouldn’t confuse our evidence 
being such that it’s unlikely that we know that p with our actually not knowing that p 
(2010, 10). An agent might have evidence that their visual capacities are misfiring, but if 
their visual capacities are operating well, and if the agent bases their belief solely on their 
visual capacities, it might be that “being stubborn pays off” (2). If this is right, agents 
who stubbornly believe what they are unlikely (on their evidence) to know may 
nonetheless emerge with full knowledge. 
But Lasonen-Aarnio is equally emphatic that we can, nevertheless, genuinely 
criticize agents who believe against the evidence—they are being unreasonable. After all, 
they are risking a lot (epistemically-speaking) by forming a belief that, according to their 
evidence, is very unlikely to constitute knowledge. It’s just that they might not be 
criticizable in the way that we first thought. They still get to count as knowers, but 
unreasonable knowers.  
Indeed, if Lasonen-Aarnio could not explain why agents who believed (and 
thereby came to know) in the face of significant (but ignored) counter-evidence were 
criticizable in some way or other, that would speak against her account. It adds 
   
  
92 
 
significantly to the plausibility of the overall picture that she does not give the 
unreasonable knower uniformly positive marks. We need to be cautious about saying how 
higher-order criticisms negatively impact first-order attitudes—but that doesn’t give us 
reason to doubt that they do so. 
It’s important that the most plausible views according to which defeat is difficult 
nevertheless preserve ways to criticize agents whose first-order beliefs are in tension with 
their higher-order ones. For it will allow us to fill in the infallibility recipe by going 
general. Our second strategy for avoiding the problem of easy defeat said that negative 
higher-order epistemic appraisals make their first-order counterparts worse in some way, 
just not automatically in the way we believed them to be worse. To counter this strategy, 
we can move to a principle that uses a sufficiently general negative, higher-order 
appraisal. Consider: 
Easy Problems: Necessarily, if S believes that it is problematic for S to believe 
that p then it is problematic for S to believe that p.14 
 
“Problematic” is such a general, negative term that any way of making a first-order belief 
worse counts as problematic. So, it seems that Easy Problems is true even if more 
specific principles like Easy Irrationality are not. 
Unless our third strategy for resisting the infallibility recipe succeeds. Our second 
strategy was to argue that although believing that one’s beliefs are bad in an F-ish way 
makes them worse, it always makes them worse in a G-ish way and not an F-ish way. 
Our third strategy admits that there is some sufficiently general F such that believing a 
belief to be F makes it worse in an F-ish way. But it denies that the first-order belief must 
be bad enough to make it F outright. So, for instance, the defender of the third strategy 
 
14 I’m grateful to Laura Callahan and Ernie Sosa for conversation that led to this version of the principle. 
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insists that although believing that it is problematic to believe p entails that it is more 
problematic to believe that p than it might have been otherwise, it doesn’t make believing 
p problematic outright. It treats “problematic”—or any F that might otherwise satisfy the 
infallibility template—as a threshold term, such that being more F does not entail being F 
(just as being taller than something doesn’t entail being tall).  
It’s unclear whether this strategy is properly motivated—it’s far from obvious that 
“problematic” is relevantly like “tall.” But instead of pressing this line, we’ll look for a 
term that avoids the objection altogether: an F such that being more F (than whatever) 
entails its being F outright. 
We can do this by stipulating new terminology that does not operate with this sort 
of threshold. Let’s introduce the term “besmirched”: An agent’s belief is besmirched just 
in case a belief is (epistemically) problematic to any degree. “Besmirched” maintains the 
generality of “problematic” but, by stipulation, is not a threshold term. 
One need not be terribly worried to discover that one has a besmirched belief—in 
certain epistemic circumstances, one probably should believe that one has besmirched 
beliefs (as may also be true for “irrational” and “problematic”). Nevertheless, there is 
something unfortunate about such beliefs. The best of the best beliefs are unaccompanied 
by any negative higher-order epistemic appraisals—even slight ones. And believing that a 
belief is besmirched is one way to have such a negative higher-order epistemic appraisal. 
Accordingly, the following thesis is true: 
Easy Besmirchment: Necessarily, if S believes that it is besmirched for S to 
believe that p then it is besmirched for S to believe that p. 
 
The slightest stain besmirches: being more besmirched (than whatever) entails being 
besmirched outright. So, Easy Besmirchment escapes our third objection. 
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Suppose an agent knows that p and knows that Easy Besmirchment is true. They 
consider whether to believe, in addition, that it’s besmirched for them to believe that p. 
They ask themselves, “Suppose I were to believe that it is besmirched for me to believe 
that p. Would that belief be true?”  
Absolutely! For according to Easy Besmirchment, believing that it’s besmirched 
to believe that p is enough to make believing that p besmirched. Simply having the belief 
makes it so. And since Easy Besmirchment is a necessary truth, it’s impossible that the 
belief could be false. The agent knows that, necessarily, if she herself were to believe <it 
is besmirched for me to believe that p> then she would believe so truly. 
The doctrine of infallibility faces a problem: it insists that we are permitted to 
believe that our beliefs are besmirched just because believing it would make it so. But 
taking this path makes our total epistemic state worse even if we acquire true beliefs in 
the process. We’re not rationally permitted to needlessly downgrade our beliefs in this 
way—not even lightly. 
Let’s summarize where we’ve come so far. Given that the quality of our first-
order beliefs is at least somewhat impacted by our higher-order beliefs about them, it’s 
hard to resist the conclusion that there are some infallible propositions such that (a) we 
can know that they are infallible for us, and yet (b) if we believe them, they will 
needlessly damage our (potential) first-order beliefs in a way that is not epistemically 
permissible.  
One could, however, preserve the reflectivist intuition that the relationship 
between our beliefs and our higher-order assessments of those beliefs matters 
epistemically while denying that the way that it matters affects the quality of our first-
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order beliefs themselves. One could insist that what is impacted by negative, higher-order 
epistemic appraisals is not (necessarily) the corresponding first-order belief but a network 
of beliefs, including at least the first-order belief along with the negative, higher-order 
assessment. 
This is, in many ways, an attractive position. What’s bad about believing both 
<p> and <it’s problematic for me to believe that p>? Part of the answer is that the beliefs 
do not mesh together as well as they might. There’s tension. When the agent has very 
good reason to believe both, the best choice might be to live with that tension, but there’s 
tension just the same. The tension metaphor suggests that the problem is with how beliefs 
(or potential beliefs) fit together and not, in the first instance, with the beliefs themselves. 
This is at least suggestive of the view above that the thing damaged in easy downgrade 
cases is a belief system and not necessarily any particular belief. The damage done is 
wholly holistic.15, 
This seems to make trouble for the recipe for finding infallible propositions. 
Recall: 
Infallibility Recipe: Necessarily, if S believes that it is F for S to believe that p 
then it is F for S to believe that p. 
 
The Infallibility Recipe prompts us to look for negative properties to ascribe to believing 
a single proposition. But if the sort of tension involved in the cases discussed so far is not 
a property of believing any single proposition but a property of a belief network, then the 
Infallibility Recipe has us looking in the wrong place. 
 
15 Matt McGrath and Ernie Sosa both helpfully pressed the importance of this alternative in conversation. 
This option evokes, for instance, the view expressed by Worsnip: “Coherence requirements are widescope, 
and do not speak in favour of individual attitudes simpliciter but rather against particular combinations of 
attitudes” (2018, 36–37). 
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 Before jumping in to plug the hole, let’s take a step back. We’ve already seen that 
we are not permitted to believe infallible propositions if so believing does needless 
doxastic damage to another (potential) belief. We are permitted—required, even—to 
forego the guarantee of truth when doing so protects the quality of our other beliefs in 
certain ways.  
 If the goal of safeguarding the epistemic quality of particular beliefs can require 
us not to believe certain infallible propositions, the goal of safeguarding the epistemic 
quality of our belief networks should serve just as well. Once we see that there are (at 
least) two potentially competitive goals in play—truth and maintaining other qualities 
(rationality, coherence, unproblematicness, etc.) of our beliefs or belief system—the idea 
that we can be automatically licensed to believe in virtue of being guaranteed to attain 
just one of them starts to sound suspicious. 
 But let’s turn to a specific example. Suppose I form the following belief: <it is 
problematic for my belief system to include p>. On the holistic picture, so believing 
would make it so that there would be tension within my belief system if I also believed 
that p. That tension would not necessarily be a problem for my (potential) belief that p 
itself, but it would be problematic for my belief network. But of course, that is exactly 
what I believed in the first place: that it is problematic for my belief system to include p. 
It seems, then, that the following principle is true: 
Easy Systemic Problems: Necessarily, if S believes that it is problematic for S’s 
belief system to include p then it is problematic for S’s belief system to include p. 
 
And, of course, Easy Systemic Besmirchment is at the ready if concerns about 
thresholds rise again. 
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Here, in short, is the problem: If reflectivism is true, then acquiring certain higher-
order beliefs can make either our first-order beliefs or else our belief systems worse in 
some way (without making them false). So, we shouldn’t form such beliefs when doing 
so can be easily avoided. But the doctrine of infallibility only cares about accuracy. It 
wrongly predicts that we are permitted to form certain problematic higher-order beliefs 
anyway, just because we’re guaranteed to be right about them.  
One could be complacent about this result. Beliefs and belief systems are easily 
besmirched. And we’re far from ideal agents. It might turn out that the vast majority of 
our beliefs are already besmirched whether we believe that they are or not. And if so, 
why worry that the doctrine of infallibility permits us to believe that our beliefs are 
stained in precisely the way they already are? 
But such complacency is unmerited. First, if the doctrine of infallibility were true, 
then even perfect knowers—oracles, supercomputers, gods—would be permitted to 
believe (truly, once believed) that their beliefs (or belief systems) were besmirched. But 
surely such powerful agents would not have antecedently besmirched beliefs, even if we 
mere mortals often do. They certainly shouldn’t downgrade their beliefs so needlessly. 
But second, when one believes, e.g., that <it is problematic to believe that p> 
solely because that proposition is infallible, the proposition is not made permissible 
thereby. The doctrine of infallibility is supposed to be an explanatory thesis: S’s knowing 
that <necessarily, if she herself were to believe that p then she would truly believe that p> 
explains why S is permitted to believe p. Guaranteed accuracy explains permissibility. 
But if the doctrine of infallibility only comes out true because we are permitted to believe 
some infallible propositions for reasons unrelated to their guaranteed truth—because we 
   
  
98 
 
epistemically frail creatures have antecedently besmirched beliefs—then infallibility does 
not play the explanatory role that we first thought. The problem is not that we shouldn’t 
believe our beliefs are besmirched (for all I’ve said, epistemic humility nearly always 
demands this of us!) but that we clearly shouldn’t do so just because we’d be guaranteed 
to be right. Either way, the chain linking guaranteed truth with permission is severed. 
5. Direction of Fit Solutions 
The problem of easy downgrade shows that the doctrine of infallibility is flawed. 
Given how unassailable the doctrine appeared at the start, this itself is a significant 
conclusion. But those sympathetic to the doctrine may hope that its flaws can be 
mended—or at least safely ignored—in most contexts. In particular, it’s noteworthy that 
the counterexample involves a reversal of the ordinary direction of fit between mind and 
world. Our aim in believing is (at least in part) to form a representation in our mind that 
appropriately matches the outside world—to tailor our minds to fit the world. Ordinarily, 
the world cares little how our mind represents it. But not always. Sometimes the world 
tailors itself to fit our representation. And indeed, if any of the defeat principles proposed 
are true, the quality of our epistemic states depends in some part on how we represent 
those states to ourselves. Perhaps, then, even though the doctrine of infallibility is false, 
we can treat the doctrine as true when there’s no reversal of the ordinary direction of fit 
between mind and world—when the way that the world is (in the domain of our proposed 
belief) does not depend on our beliefs themselves. We replace the original doctrine with 
this revised principle: 
Doctrine of Infallibility, Dependence Edition: If the truth-value of S’s belief that p 
would (if formed) not depend on S’s belief that p itself, then if S knows that 
<necessarily, if she herself were to believe that p then she would truly believe that 
p>, then it is thereby (rationally) permissible for S now to believe that p. 
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 The ambition behind this strategy is a sensible one. It seems that there is 
something right about Descartes’s appeal to infallibility in the Meditations, and given that 
the doctrine of infallibility is false, epistemologists should be eager to find a more 
restrictive principle that allows the Cartesian inference while avoiding the problem of 
easy downgrade. And since the problematic cases of easy downgrade are ones in which 
the downgrading beliefs explain their own truth, the revised principle is a tempting 
tactical retreat. 
But the problems with the doctrine cannot be excised merely by restricting its 
domain to cases in which beliefs play no role in their own truth. For we seem to need the 
doctrine of infallibility (or something that entails it) when dealing with other cases with a 
reversal of dependence. The revised principle does not neatly divide the good cases from 
the bad.  
Consider again the cogito.16 Before Descartes concludes <I exist>, he concludes 
<I am thinking>. But <I am thinking> is the sort of proposition whose truth is (at least 
partially) grounded in the belief itself. If I believe <I am thinking>, my very belief 
grounds the truth of the believed proposition. Moreover, it is permissible to believe <I am 
thinking> even if <I am thinking> is the only thought one is having at the moment, so the 
belief could even be the full grounds for the truth of the proposition. The belief <I am 
thinking> depends—at least partially and potentially fully—on itself for its truth. But <I 
am thinking> is a paradigmatically good infallible proposition! The dependence edition 
 
16 I’m grateful to Ezra Rubenstein for suggesting that I inquire into whether a restriction on beliefs that 
ground their own truth would solve the problem and to Ernie Sosa for pointing out the relevance of 
Descartes’ <I am thinking>. 
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of the doctrine of infallibility is thus overly restrictive: it does not succeed in neatly 
distinguishing the good infallible propositions from the bad.  
Perhaps, the objector rejoins, this is because we were operating with too wide a 
notion of dependence. After all, in the case of <I am thinking>, the belief <I am 
thinking> grounds (or perhaps constitutes) the truth of the believed content. But 
grounding isn’t the only kind of dependence out there. Perhaps causal dependence is the 
problematic kind:  
Doctrine of Infallibility, Causal Dependence Edition: If the truth-value of S’s 
belief that p would (if formed) not causally depend on S’s belief that p itself, then 
if S knows that <necessarily, if she herself were to believe that p then she would 
truly believe that p>, then it is thereby (rationally) permissible for S now to 
believe that p. 
 
I think, however, that we should be suspicious of moves to restrict the epistemically 
relevant sort of dependence in this way. It’s clear why guaranteeing the truth is 
epistemically relevant. But it’s not clear why I should care, epistemically speaking, about 
whether the source of that guarantee is causal or constitutive. A guarantee is a guarantee. 
Neither kind is less likely to be true than the other. 
 Moreover, some of the cases that motivate the doctrine of infallibility in the first 
place involve causal dependence on a belief. Recall the coin-flip case. In these cases, the 
agent knows that they will be right whether they believe that the coin will land heads or 
that the coin will land tails, and the fact that the agent knows this seems to license belief 
in either proposition. As noted earlier, the most straightforward explanation of this seems 
to be the doctrine of truth, which entails the doctrine of infallibility. But the coin-flip 
cases themselves have a reversed causal dependence! The agent’s belief—through the 
demon’s intervention—causes the world to match the belief. The correct judgment in the 
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coin-flip case is not, of course, uncontestable.17 But giving up the permissibility of 
believing either way in such cases does sap one of the main arguments in behalf of a 
doctrine of infallibility of its strength. 
 And even if one goes in for the version of the Doctrine of Infallibility that 
excludes cases in which the truth of one’s belief causally depends on the belief itself, it’s 
unclear that this avoids the problem. When I believe <it is besmirched for me to believe 
that p>, does this cause it to be besmirched for me to believe that p? Certainly, it’s 
nothing like how the throw of a rock causes the breaking of a window. It’s not a relation 
between events. Nor is it like the coin-flip case, in which a demon causally interferes in 
the world to guarantee a certain outcome. Rather, there is a conceptual link between my 
believing <it is besmirched for me to believe that p> and the belief’s being true: it is a 
consequence of, among other things, the way “besmirched” was defined. 
 I do not take myself to have shown that there is no possible variety of dependence 
that can divide the good infallible propositions from the bad—that can count as licit the 
inferences in the cogito and the coin-flip case while excluding the inferences central to 
the problem of easy defeat. But I hope I have cast doubt on the idea that the doctrine can 
be easily bandaged by invoking a simple distinction between beliefs that do and do not 
explain their own truth.  
The objector hoped to show that there is something odd or deviant about beliefs 
that depend on themselves for their truth. It’s not hard to enter this frame of mind. Since 
Anscombe (1957), philosophers have thought that one of the distinguishing features of 
belief as a mental state is that it has a world-to-mind direction of fit. That there is coffee 
 
17 See, for instance, discussion in Antill (2020) 
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in front of me (in the world) is a reason for me to believe (in my mind) that there is coffee 
in front of me, whereas my desire (in my mind) that there is coffee is a reason for me to 
make it true that there is a cup of coffee in front of me (in the world). Platt would later 
argue that “beliefs should be changed to fit with the world, not vice versa” (1979, 257).18 
Certainly, it’d be very strange to form the belief that there is coffee in front of me and 
then, because I have that belief, to make a cup of coffee so as to make that belief true. 
But I don’t think we should extend our suspicion of this strange behavior to all 
cases in which the relationship between a belief and the truth of its content are entangled. 
Even in the coin-flip case, we can say that, were the result of the coin-flip different than I 
had believed—because, say, the demon had misread my mind—my belief would be 
mistaken. From my perspective at least (things may be different for the demon who 
desires that the world match my beliefs), the mistake is with my belief and not the world 
(cf. Anscombe 1957, 56). Similarly, Humberstone writes that even self-fulfilling 
prophecies “involve beliefs with the same direction of fit as any other beliefs, being 
appraised for correctness ...in terms of how well their content matches how things are 
with their subject matter” (Humberstone 1992, 71). So, although self-fulfilling beliefs 
have a different causal direction of fit than typical beliefs, their metaphysical role as 
representations of how the world is and their normative success conditions that depend on 
how the world is in fact remain unchanged. Once we see that beliefs whose truth-value is 
metaphysically entangled with being held can, nevertheless, bear the ordinary direction of 
fit between mind and world as other beliefs in this sense, the case to restrict the scope of 
the doctrine of infallibility to “ordinary” cases loses some of its urgency. 
 
18 Cf. Williams: “[A] man’s word, and his beliefs, should reflect things as they are” (1966, 20, emphasis 
mine). 
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6. The Disbelief Solution 
Perhaps we’ve been focusing too much on aiming for the good outcome of a true 
belief and not enough on the bad outcome of believing a falsehood. With this thought in 
mind, we recall that the cogito has not just one but two things going for it. First, as we’ve 
noted, if one believes that <I exist> then one is guaranteed to be right. But equally, if one 
believes its negation, <I don’t exist>, then one is guaranteed to be wrong (Sosa 2007, 18; 
Shah 2009, 189). 
 Moreover, this distinguishes the cogito from the easy downgrade propositions of 
this paper. Notice that <it is besmirched for me to believe that p> is not such that if I 
disbelieve it, I am guaranteed to be wrong.  
This suggests a new doctrine: 
Doctrine of Infallibility, Disbelief Edition: If S knows that <necessarily, if she 
herself were to believe that p then she would truly believe that p> and S knows 
that <necessarily, if she herself were to believe that ¬p, then she would falsely 
believe that ¬p, then it is thereby (rationally) permissible for S now to believe that 
p. 
 
This successfully saves the cogito without endorsing besmirching propositions. But much 
like the attempted fix by fit, it leaves unexplained why it’s permissible to believe in cases 
when one knows one would be right either way. In Dahlback’s case, I can believe that the 
coin will land heads—seemingly, just on the basis that I know I will be right—even 
though I will also be right if I disbelieve that the coin will land heads. Once again, this 
revised principle cannot neatly divide all cases of good infallible propositions from the 
bad.19 
7. Concluding Thoughts 
 
19 I’m grateful to Ernie Sosa for conversation on this and related points. 
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We’ve encountered a puzzle. The doctrine of infallibility seems overwhelmingly 
plausible. It is the basis for the cogito, it makes sense of certain self-fulfilling prophecies, 
and it gives voice to the enticingly straightforward thought that accuracy is what matters 
most (epistemically) when deciding what to believe.  
But the problem of easy defeat shows that the doctrine of infallibility is false. If 
reflectivism is true—if reflective attitudes about one’s first-order beliefs make at least 
some difference to the epistemic quality of those first-order beliefs or one’s belief 
system—then there are some guaranteed truths one should refrain from believing.  
Does the falsity of the doctrine of infallibility lead to skepticism? Perhaps if one 
comes into the problem in a Cartesian mood. If one can’t automatically trust even 
infallible propositions (the disillusioned Cartesian asks), what can we trust? But most 
epistemologists have (wisely) not demanded that some of our beliefs must be infallible to 
count as knowledge.  
No, the primary puzzle is not, “How can we really know that we exist or know 
that the coin will land heads if the doctrine of infallibility is false?” We were (rightly) 
pre-theoretically confident that these were good judgments, and we need not abandon 
them just because the principle that we thought explained their permissibility turned out 
to be false. Rather, the puzzle is how to separate the good infallible propositions from the 
bad. We’re left to wonder: why wasn’t the guarantee of truth good enough to license 
belief? What was so valuable, epistemically, that it was worth foregoing a guaranteed 
true belief? 
I see no easy answer to this question. 
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If this paper is right, we are left with a broken, false doctrine that had seemed 
foundational to Cartesian epistemology and left without an obvious way to repair it. Is 
there anything positive we have learned? 
I conclude by suggesting two modest lessons. First, we learn that there’s tension 
between veritism and reflectivism. Perhaps this shouldn’t surprise us so much in the end. 
Veritism (as we are using the term) says that what matters most at bottom is accuracy. 
Reflectivism says that something else matters too: namely, how our first-order beliefs and 
higher-order beliefs fit together. Nevertheless, one might have thought that the reason it 
matters how our different levels of beliefs fit together is because such relationships can 
help us to become more accurate. But although this might be part of the story, it can’t be 
the whole story. For believing easy-downgrade propositions on the basis of their 
infallibility guarantees accuracy while damaging reflective fit.  
Second, we have found a surprising argument against Cartesian infallibilism. 
Cartesian infallibility (and the certainty it engenders) is often taken to be too stringent a 
requirement for either knowledge or proper belief. But if Cartesian infallibility seemed 
extreme, it at least also seemed like a natural stopping point. What more could one hope 
once infallibility had been achieved? What greater epistemic assurance? If infallibility 
seemed too stringent to be necessary for permissible belief, it at least seemed obviously 
sufficient for it. 
But we’ve learned that infallibility isn’t sufficient for permissible belief: 
sometimes, one shouldn’t believe even when one knows one would be right. Fallibilists—
who already believed that infallibility was not necessary for right belief—may feel justly 
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emboldened knowing that it isn’t sufficient for permissible belief either. It isn’t the 
natural cut-off point in epistemic normativity that we’ve been led to believe.  
Infallibility isn’t always worth having even in those rare cases when it is there to 
be had.20
 
20 My thanks go to Charity Anderson, Robert Audi, D Black, Laura Callahan, Adam Carter, Charles Côté-
Bourchard, Andy Egan, Megan Feeney, Will Fleisher, Carolina Flores, Danny Forman, Christopher Frugé, 
Adam Gibbons, Caley Howland, Chris Kelp, John Komdat, Ting-An Lin, Neil McDonnell, Matt McGrath, 
Ram Neta, Dee Payton, Julian Perlmutter, Pamela Robinson, Ezra Rubenstein, Susanna Schellenberg, 
Mona Simion, Kurt Sylvan, and Isaac Wilhelm for feedback on drafts of this paper. Finally, I cannot be 
wrong in giving special thanks to Ernie Sosa, conversation with whom has shaped each layer of this 
project. 
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BEING IN A POSITION TO KNOW IS THE NORM OF ASSERTION 
 
Abstract: This paper defends a new norm of assertion: Assert that p only if you are in a 
position to know that p. We test the norm by judging its performance in explaining three 
phenomena that appear jointly inexplicable at first: Moorean paradoxes, lottery 
propositions, and selfless assertions. The norm succeeds by tethering unassertability to 
unknowability while simultaneously untethering belief from assertion. The PtK-Norm 
foregrounds the public nature of assertion as a practice that can be other-regarding, 
allowing asserters to act in the best interests of their audience when psychological pressures 
would otherwise prevent them from communicating the knowable truth. 
 
1. Introduction 
What is the norm of assertion? Many have thought that, whatever it is, it is 
something epistemic.1 We assert, at least in part, to communicate information about the 
world: we add a proposition to the common ground (Stalnaker 1978) or produce an 
attitude or reaction toward a proposition in an audience (Grice 1969). Plausibly, in order 
for the speaker to be licensed in offering a proposition externally, they must stand in the 
right relation to the proposition internally. That is, the speaker must meet certain 
epistemic conditions with respect to the publicly asserted content. I argue that the 
relevant condition is being in a position to know:  
 
1 For a defense of the view that knowledge has a norm and that it is something epistemic, see Goldberg 
(2015a), especially chapters 1–3. This is not entirely uncontroversial, as this already rules out some 
proposals, notably Weiner’s (2015) defense of the (semantic) truth norm. I take the epistemic character of 
the norm of assertion as a given, but see §3.6 for an argument that bears on Weiner’s Gricean explanation 
of lottery propositions.  
   
  
108 
 
PtK-Norm: One should assert that p only if one is in a position to know that p.2,3 
 
The Position to Know Norm faces competition from two accounts that have shaped the 
contemporary debate: Timothy Williamson’s knowledge norm and Jennifer Lackey’s 
reasonable to believe norm. 
K-Norm: One must: assert p only if one knows p. (Williamson 2000, 243)4 
 
RTB-Norm: One should assert that p only if it is reasonable for one to believe 
that p. (Lackey 2007, 608)5 
 
Williamson and Lackey offer different answers to two, distinguishable questions. 
Question (1): What epistemic property normatively guides our assertions? Williamson 
answers knowledge; Lackey reasonability. Question (2): Must the doxastic state of the 
asserter exemplify this property in order to assert properly? Williamson answers yes; 
Lackey no. Whereas Williamson claims that an agent ought to actually know the asserted 
proposition, Lackey claims that an agent may assert a proposition though she does not 
reasonably believe it, so long as it is reasonable for her to believe it. 
 
2 Some philosophers argue that the norm of assertion is a constitutive norm—the sort of norm that makes 
assertion the thing that it is. Certainly, this is Williamson’s (2000) thesis. But this constitutive claim is 
separable from the claim that proper assertions ought to meet an epistemic requirement. In arguing for a 
norm of assertion, I do not take myself to be committed to the view that the norm is constitutive, only that it 
is binding. Of course, those who endorse the K-Norm will think that the PtK-Norm is trivially binding, 
since knowledge entails being in a position to know. So, properly understood, the thesis of this paper is 
really that the PtK-Norm is binding and that it is the most foundational epistemic requirement on proper 
assertion. I’m indebted to John Phillips for helping me clarify this point.  
3 Some theorists argue that there is a default norm of assertion that can, nevertheless, be modified across 
different contexts, as in “conditions of epistemically diminished hope” (Goldberg 2015a, 285) or when 
hedged (Benton and van Elswyk 2020). My thesis should be understood as the claim that being in a 
position to know is the default norm of assertion. 
4 Cf. Unger (1975), DeRose (2002), Benton (2011, 2012, 2013, 2016), Sosa (2011). Turri’s (2011) express 
knowledge norm and Goldberg’s (2015a) nuanced thesis that knowledge is the default norm of assertion are 
important variants. 
5 Lackey’s full formulation of the RTB-norm includes this second condition: “if one asserted that p, one 
would assert that p at least in part because it is reasonable for one to believe that p” (Lackey 2007, 608). 
But we’ll return to this second condition in §5. Her official account is also augmented by a Not Misleading 
Norm that will be discussed in §3.  
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I contend that the position to know norm preserves the best features of both 
proposals. It gets the correct verdict in Lackey’s cases of selfless assertion. But it also 
gets the correct verdict in the lottery case and the Moorean paradoxes that are favorable 
to Williamson. The PtK-Norm gets the cases right by siding with Williamson on our first 
question and with Lackey on our second. First, knowledge is the property that 
normatively guides our assertions. But second, the doxastic state of the asserter need not 
exemplify this property (knowledge) for the agent to assert properly. It preserves 
Williamson’s insight that knowledge is central to assertion while accommodating 
Lackey’s insight that “it is a mistake to require proper assertion to pass through the 
doxastic states of the asserter” (2007, 600).6 
2. A Provisional Account of the Position to Know 
The position to know is something like knowledge minus belief. Beyond this 
slogan, can we say more precisely what being in a position to know is? Here I offer a 
provisional account, intended to tell us enough to evaluate the PtK-Norm. 
2.1 General Features of a Position to Know 
Unlike knowledge and reasonability, the concept of being in a position to know is 
predominantly an epistemologist’s term of art, finding scarce expression in ordinary 
parlance. We do sometimes say that someone “could have known” or “should have 
known,” but it’s unclear how closely these expressions line up with the epistemologist’s 
usage. A parent could and should have known how their child’s day was because they 
could and should have asked (at least if the child would answer!)—but not having asked, 
 
6 In personal conversation, Lackey confirms that—at least on the right interpretation of epistemic 
position—her norm could be read as “Assert that p only if you are in a position to reasonably believe that 
p.” This formulation makes especially salient the structural similarities between our accounts.  
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it’s doubtful they are in an epistemic position to know. This does not mean that we have 
no independent grip on what it takes to be in a position to know or that the concept is 
philosophically unimportant: it does mean the concept requires explication. 
Being in a position to know is a modal notion. One is in a position to know p if 
one could know it under the right circumstances. One need not actually know to be in a 
position to know. So, in order to determine whether someone is in a position to know p, 
we look across modal space to see if there is a world in which someone knows p under 
the right circumstances. What circumstances are those? Those circumstances in which 
someone shares the agent’s epistemic position. 
This brings us to our second observation: When discussing what one is in a 
position to know, we are interested in the epistemic vantage point itself, not what use the 
agent has or is in fact psychologically capable of seeing from it. This is what it means to 
say that being in a position to know is knowledge minus belief—yet not just belief, but a 
broad range of facts about the agent’s psychology. As a first pass (although important 
qualifications will be required), let us say that the position to know depsychologizes away 
from facts about the agent’s particular mental states.  
Suppose, for instance, that a hypochondriac is psychologically incapable of 
believing that he does not have the flu. Multiple tests indicate that he has no symptoms, 
and his doctor testifies that he is in full health. In addition to having perfectly good 
evidence that he does not have the flu, it is true that he does not have the flu, and his 
epistemic situation is free from chancy or Gettierizing factors that might obstruct 
knowledge. The agent—because of his pathology—is unable to know that he does not 
have the flu. He is, nevertheless, in a position to know since the locus of the concept’s 
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evaluation is not the agent himself but the epistemic situation in which the agent finds 
himself. The epistemic position is what we are holding fixed in our evaluation. Someone 
in the agent’s epistemic situation could know even if the agent himself could not: 
someone with a different psychological profile. 
With these observations in place, we are now prepared to attempt a first pass at a 
definition of being in a position to know: 
PtK: S is in a position to know that p iff S could know that p given their actual 
epistemic position. 
 
We hold fixed the epistemic position of the agent, but what we don’t hold fixed is just as 
important: we are free to vary other facts about the agent’s beliefs and psychology. Of 
course, we’re often (physically, psychologically) capable of changing our epistemic 
position, e.g., by asking someone a question. But one isn’t in a position to know by being 
able to ask a question. Rather, by asking a question, one can try to move from a state of 
not being in an epistemic position to know the answer to being in an epistemic position to 
know it. 
The proposed definition is useful as far as it goes. It captures the modal (could 
know) and depsychologizing (allowing psychological variation) structure of the concept. 
But it leaves some central questions unanswered: What is an epistemic position? And 
what epistemic position does an agent have to be in to be able to know that p? 
2.2 Constraints on Epistemic Position 
Whatever answer we give must satisfy some basic constraints on an adequate 
theory of epistemic position. At least, any such theory must respect the following four 
principles: 
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PtK to Truth: If S is in a position to know that p then p is true.7 
 
Knows to PtK: If S knows that p then S is in a position to know that p. 
 
PtK to No Further Inquiry: If S is in a position to know that p then S does not 
require further inquiry to come to know that p.8 
 
Anti-Collapse: For some S and for some p, it is possible that S is in a position to 
know that p but does not know that p.  
 
The first constraint says that being in a position to know is factive.9 The second says that 
knowing that p is sufficient for being in a position to know that p. Knowledge, like most 
properties, can manifest without being disposed to manifest: a vase must be breakable in 
order to break, but it need not be fragile (disposed to break). This rules out certain 
dispositionalist accounts of the position to know, whereby to be in a position to know one 
must be (robustly enough) disposed to know under certain circumstances.10 
What exactly counts as inquiry can be, for our purposes, left open. But our third 
condition encodes the idea that agents who are in a position to know already have at their 
disposal the means to know the target proposition. I’m not in a position to know what the 
capital of Estonia is merely in virtue of the fact that I could easily inquire by consulting 
an encyclopedia (or Google).  
The final principle says, in effect, that there is no general inference from an 
agent’s not knowing p to the agent’s not being in a position to know that p: it’s possible 
(and almost always true) that what an agent is in a position to know extends beyond what 
she actually knows.  
 
7 Cf. Williamson: “Thus being in a position to know, like knowing and unlike being physically and 
psychologically capable of knowing, is factive” (2000, 95). 
8 Thanks to Ernie Sosa and Susanna Schellenberg for suggesting such a principle. 
9 Its factivity guarantees that the PtK-Norm satisfies what Ronald Jager calls the initial datum: “to assert 
something is somehow to incorporate the claim that what is asserted is true” (Jager 1970, 161). 
10 E.g. “Being in a position to know a proposition is to be disposed to acquire the knowledge that the 
proposition is true, when one entertains it on the right evidential basis” (Stanley 2008, 49).  
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There might be occasions in which one can infer from this particular agent’s not 
knowing this particular proposition that the agent is not in a position to know it. A super-
knower might know everything she is in a position to know. Propositions that are both 
self-evident (or near-enough) and attention-demanding (or what Chisholm 1982 called 
“self-presenting”) may always be known when their subjects are in a position to know 
them. For instance, “I have a sharp headache” or “I have an experience like this” might 
always be known by those in a position to know them.11 All our second principle says is 
that there is no general rule licensing this inference for all agents and all propositions. 
What we are in a position to know outstrips what we actually know. 
A rough picture of the view we’ve sketched so far is that, when evaluating 
whether an agent is in a position to know that p, we hold fixed facts about the world 
beyond the agent’s mind (the truth of the target proposition, whether the knower’s 
context is free of Gettier traps) and vary facts about the agent’s psychology (what beliefs 
they actually hold, any idiosyncratic psychological limitations they are subject to). We 
give the modal landscape a good shake and see if any worlds in which the agent knows 
that p pop out. 
This picture is missing one key ingredient—and it is here that we must qualify our 
characterization of the position to know as depsychologizing. Although epistemic 
position largely abstracts away from an agent’s psychology, there must be something 
about the agent’s mental life that we hold fixed: we must hold fixed whatever it is that 
fixes the agent’s rational access to the world. 
 
11 And then again, maybe not. Williamson’s (2000) arguments for anti-luminosity are certainly relevant 
here. 
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What does that mean? Answering that question puts us squarely in substantive 
epistemological territory. Plausible answers include an agent’s evidence, an agent’s 
evidence plus her priors or epistemic values, an agent’s (epistemic) competencies, or an 
agent’s way of looking at the world. Fortunately, the cases considered in the next section 
do not require that we take a stand on this substantive question.12 It’s enough to note that 
a significant change of new, non-inferred evidence bearing on a proposition tends to put 
an agent in a new epistemic position toward it. 
A full theory of the position to know would say more about what exactly grounds 
our rational access to the world and exactly how and when an agent’s psychological state 
can affect her position to know. Indeed, I take one of the main upshots of this paper to be 
that epistemologists ought to devote significantly more resources to understanding the 
position to know. Nevertheless, even without a full theory, we’re capable of recognizing 
clear cases and of articulating some general conditions on the concept. “Reasonability” 
 
12 This is, perhaps, a little quick. In particular, it’s difficult to see how Williamson’s E=K thesis, combined 
with an evidentialist interpretation of the position to know, fits this model. Suppose that the facts that make 
up an agent’s epistemic position are exhausted by facts about the agent’s evidence. For Williamson, your 
evidence is all and only what you know. Suppose that I am in a position to learn that p at t1 and then come 
to believe p and thereby know that p at t2. For Williamson, at t2 I have special evidence for p that I did not 
have at t1, namely the fact that p. At t2, my epistemic probability for p conditional on my evidence is 1 
though it may not have been 1 before.  
The crucial thing for our purposes is that, on the E=K thesis, coming to know something changes one’s 
evidence (and so, plausibly, one’s epistemic position) in an important way. On this picture, it is backward 
to try to evaluate whether an agent is in a position to know by assessing whether they could know holding 
fixed their prior epistemic position: coming to know that p is always (or at least usually) to enter a new 
epistemic position with respect to p.  
Here, I am forced to show my hand: I don’t think the E=K thesis is true. And part of the reason I think it 
isn’t true is that I think evidence is a kind of support relation that is anti-reflexive (or at least, behaves anti-
reflexively in typical cases). (See Brown 2013.) P can’t be evidence for itself, and so, even if only 
knowledge is evidence, it can’t be that all knowledge is evidence bearing on any proposition: my 
knowledge that p doesn’t count as evidence for p, even if it counts as evidence for something else. 
Still, we may be able to recover something like my account, even assuming a Williamsonian model. 
Perhaps we could introduce a notion of epistemically accessible transitions between epistemic positions. If 
I am in a position to know that p, then there is an epistemically accessible transition from my current 
epistemic position to an epistemic position that includes my knowledge that p. I’m grateful to an 
anonymous reviewer for encouraging greater clarity on this point. 
   
  
115 
 
and “knowledge” are similarly contested terms, and so, it’s no dialectical disadvantage 
that there is no generally agreed upon theory. We’ve now said enough about the general 
structure of the position to know—that it depsychologizes and modalizes—to begin our 
assessment of the PtK-Norm of assertion.  
3. Three Cases 
How should we evaluate the norm of assertion? That depends on the theoretical 
work we want the norm of assertion to play. Why should we hope that there is a unified, 
simple, and epistemic norm of assertion in the first place? 
There are two main reasons. First, assertions are a kind of affirmation, and as such 
it bears a close relationship to beliefs or judgments.13 Insofar as there are epistemic rules 
that govern our beliefs, we should expect that there are analogous bounds on assertion. 
I’ll say more about the extent and limits of such similarities and why the PtK-Norm is the 
right sort of analogue in §4. Second, there’s a coordination problem for assertion that 
would be significantly resolved by a simple norm that operates, at least, as a default. 
There are several valuable epistemic goals that make plausible aims for assertion—
truth,14 likely truth, reasonability,15 justification,16 supportive reasons,17 rational 
credibility,18 knowledge,19 and certainty20 among others. But if one person asserts with 
the aim of saying what is probable and another with the aim of saying what is certain, it 
will be hard to know how to update our opinions upon receiving testimony.  
 
13 Here I draw on Williamson (2000, 255–56) and Sosa (2011, 48).  
14 Weiner (2005) 
15 Lackey (2007) 
16 Kvanvig (2011) 
17 McKinnon (2015) 
18 Douven (2006) 
19 Unger (1975), Williamson (2000), DeRose (2002), Benton (2011), Sosa (2011), a near-variant in Turri 
(2011) and a sympathetic (though nuanced) account in Goldberg (2015a). 
20 Stanley (2008) 
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For this coordination problem, it matters very much what actual conventions are 
already in place, even if those conventions are robustly contingent. If everyone already 
drives on the right side of the road, then that very practice makes it sensible for there to 
be a norm to drive on the right side of the road, even if it would have been no worse for 
the practice to have developed in such a way that the sensible norm was to drive on the 
left. It is appropriate, therefore, for us to look at the actual linguistic practice of 
contemporary English speakers in order to determine what the norm is. By doing so, we 
freely confess that the norm of assertion we develop is only binding for contemporary 
English speakers: it’s possible that other linguistic communities have solved the 
coordination problem for assertion in a different way. 
I propose, therefore, that we test the PtK-Norm by seeing whether it gets the 
correct verdict in three cases: selfless assertions, Moorean paradoxes, and lotteries. These 
cases are not chosen at random, for these cases jointly pose a difficult puzzle. Moorean 
paradoxes and lotteries seem to show that nothing weaker than knowledge could be the 
norm of assertion.21 In the lottery case, for instance, one’s epistemic position could be 
arbitrarily good short of knowledge and still fail to license the assertion that one’s ticket 
lost. In contrast, selfless assertions seem to show that nothing as strong as knowledge 
could be the norm of assertion: any norm that entails even belief will be too strong. But 
this leaves no conceptual space for any norm of assertion to succeed: any norm will be 
too weak or too strong. Perhaps we need to give up our intuitions about one set of cases 
or the other. 
 
21 Sanford Goldberg summarizes part of Williamson’s contribution this way: the “KNA appears to be better 
positioned than any epistemically weaker standard to explain why lottery propositions...are not properly 
assertable even when the odds of one’s winning are arbitrarily small” (Goldberg 2015b). 
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Enter the PtK-Norm of assertion, which seamlessly delivers the correct verdict in 
all three cases. There is something weaker than knowledge that can play the role of the 
norm of assertion after all.  
I won’t say much to defend the intuitions that Lackey is right about selfless 
assertions and the knowledge camp are right about Moorean paradoxes and lotteries. I’ll 
assume each side is correct about their favored cases (as I believe they are) and show why 
the PtK-Norm gets all three cases right. (As always, those who disagree with the starting 
intuitions can read the paper as defending a conditional claim.) But enough 
introduction—onto the cases. 
3.1 Selfless Assertions 
Lackey (2007) develops several cases of selfless assertion in which agents can 
properly assert p despite not knowing p. In each case, the agent fails to know p by failing 
to believe p. Here’s one of her examples:22 
DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR: Sebastian is [a] ...pediatrician [who] recognizes 
...that all of the scientific evidence shows that there is absolutely no 
connection between vaccines and autism. However, shortly after his 
...daughter received one of her vaccines, ...she was soon diagnosed with 
autism. …[T]he grief and exhaustion brought on by his daughter’s recent 
diagnosis cause him to abandon his previously deeply-held beliefs regarding 
vaccines. …[W]hile performing a well-baby checkup..., the child’s parents 
ask him about ...the rumors surrounding vaccines and autism. Recognizing 
both that the current doubt he has towards vaccines was probably brought 
about through [his] emotional trauma ...and that he has an obligation to his 
patients to present what is most likely to be true, Sebastian asserts, “There is 
no connection between vaccines and autism” …[although it’s false that] 
Sebastian himself believes or knows this proposition. (Lackey 2007, 598-
99)23 
 
22 The distraught doctor case is not chosen from among Lackey’s examples at random. I think the distraught 
doctor and racist juror case are more compelling than the creationist teacher case, in part (I contend) 
because it’s unclear that the creationist teacher really is in a position to know (given their network of 
background beliefs) that evolution is true.  
23 Requiring that testifiers know in order to transmit knowledge “conflates reliable knowers with reliable 
testifiers” (Lackey 1999, 481). 
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Cases of selfless assertion are problematic for the knowledge norm of assertion, for they 
are cases in which agents properly assert what they do not know. Sebastian doesn’t know 
that vaccines don’t cause autism because he doesn’t believe that vaccines don’t cause 
autism.24 So, how can he properly assert it? 
The position to know norm, however, does not encounter the same difficulty. It 
isn’t just rational for Sebastian to believe that vaccines cause autism: Sebastian is in a 
position to know it! The only thing he’s missing is belief: if he were to believe it, he 
would thereby come to know it. The PTK-Norm thus accurately predicts that Sebastian 
can felicitously assert that vaccines do not cause autism.  
There’s a natural worry concerning Lackey’s distraught doctor case: Given the 
high moral stakes, isn’t it possible that moral intuitions are interfering with our more 
narrowly assertoric judgments?25 
We can assuage this worry by developing a parallel case in which the moral 
stakes are not so high. Consider the following story: 
Santa Claus: Jimmy has recently reached the age when he’s too old to believe in 
Santa Claus. He has good evidence that Santa doesn’t exist, and he is in a position 
to reasonably believe and even know that Santa doesn’t exist. But for reasons 
having entirely to do with Jimmy’s particular psychology, doubt persists—he 
can’t fully believe (or thereby know) that there is no Santa. Perhaps he’s afraid 
that if he doesn’t believe in Santa, he won’t get any presents. His brother, a year 
 
24 It’s worth flagging that there is a minority report in epistemology that knowledge does not entail belief 
(see, for instance, Black 1971). In this paper, I’ll simply assume the orthodox position that knowledge 
entails belief, but the combination of views that includes the K-Norm of assertion and the thesis that 
knowledge does not entail belief is worthy of exploration.  
25 Thus, Jonathan Kvanvig writes that though Lackey’s selfless assertions “are clearly appropriate, that 
intuition is fairly clearly an intuition about what is, all-things-considered, appropriate” (Kvanvig 2011, 235) 
and do “not survive scrutiny from an epistemic point of view” (Kvanvig 2011, 235). But the locus of 
evaluation should not be purely epistemic but assertoric. Cases of selfless assertions just are ones in which 
the asserter fails as an epistemic agent by not having beliefs that are well-supported for them. The question 
is not whether selfless asserters perform well epistemically but whether they perform well assertorically 
despite their epistemic failings. 
   
  
119 
 
younger than Jimmy, asks him whether Santa exists. Jimmy replies: “There is no 
Santa.” 
 
The moral stakes are much lower in this story. In fact, to the extent that there are moral 
stakes, we are as likely as not to think that Jimmy was in the wrong—he oughtn’t to have 
spoiled Santa for his brother! But even if Jimmy’s assertion was morally wrong, it was 
assertorically felicitous (just as it can be felicitous but morally wrong to be rudely 
candid). Jimmy did nothing wrong in his duties as an asserter even if he failed his duties 
as a brother. And once again, Jimmy does not know the asserted proposition, though he is 
both in a position to know and to reasonably believe it. 
Our intuitions in cases of selfless assertion remain consistent even when there is 
no moral weight in favor of (and perhaps even some against) asserting a proposition. 
Lackey’s cases illustrate how selfless assertions may be especially important in morally 
loaded situations. But our judgments are not thereby captive to the purely moral elements 
of the cases. 
3.2 Roles to the Rescue? 
Prominent in Lackey’s stories are the social roles (doctor, juror, teacher) of the 
selfless asserters. Thus, Ernest Sosa suggests this strategy for the K-Norm to explain 
Lackey’s cases: 
I propose to accommodate [Lackey’s cases] by means of a distinction between 
assertion in one’s own person, as a human being who communicates with other 
human beings, and assertion as occupier of a role. ...One may still proceed with 
epistemic propriety if one is playing one’s epistemic role properly. To play one’s 
epistemic role in such contexts... one serves as a mouthpiece for a deeper 
institutional source of the information conveyed... (Sosa 2011, 47).26 
 
 
26 Likewise, Kvanvig observes of a similar case that the asserter “is being paid to fill a particular social 
role” (Kvanvig 2011, 235).  
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As applied to the case of the distraught doctor, this is to say that although Sebastian does 
not know that there is no connection between vaccines and autism in his own person, 
Sebastian does know it in his role as a doctor. The medical profession is the “deeper 
institutional source of the information conveyed.” 
Focusing on the role that an agent is in rather than the agent herself 
depsychologizes away from facts about the particular mental life of the agent. In this 
way, Sosa’s response shares a core feature of the position to know hypothesis and 
respects Lackey’s insight that proper assertions need not pass through the doxastic state 
of the asserter: proper assertion can go through a role-enabling social source instead. The 
central difference between Sosa’s proposal and mine (along with Lackey’s) is this: Sosa’s 
account requires a deeper institutional source—or at any rate an established and 
recognizable social structure—within which the asserter occupies a role. The PtK-Norm 
(and the RTB-Norm) requires no such social source or role. Ostensibly in Sosa’s favor is 
the fact that each of Lackey’s cases does employ agents whose social role (e.g. doctor) is 
in focus. Nevertheless, we can develop compelling cases of selfless assertion that are not 
role- or institution-dependent. 
Imagine, for instance, that Sebastian is not at work, but simply walking down the 
street when he overhears two parents discussing whether it is safe to vaccinate their child. 
Sebastian, ever eager to be helpful if not also a bit of a busybody, leans over and says, 
“There is no connection between vaccines and autism,” before continuing on his way. 
Sebastian’s assertion is still acceptable, even though (1) he does not know (because he 
does not believe) that there is no connection between vaccines and autism and (2) he at 
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no point invokes—explicitly or implicitly—the social role of being a doctor. We might 
doubt the efficacy of Sebastian’s assertion but not its felicity. 
Or better yet, imagine that in the story above Sebastian is not a doctor at all, but 
simply someone who has happened to study the relevant evidence and recognizes its 
significance. Perhaps there aren’t even doctors in Sebastian’s community at all—he’s just 
some bloke who has looked at the evidence on the issue carefully. It is still felicitous for 
Sebastian to assert, “There is no connection between vaccines and autism,” even though 
the role of doctor is entirely absent from the case. 
It might be argued that just in virtue of asserting without knowledge, Sebastian 
creates a role for himself to speak from. He takes up the role of public informant about 
vaccinations and autism. By asserting something he does not know, he stops playing 
himself and plays the role of someone who knows what he is in a position to know. But if 
this is all that playing a role requires, then all assertions (or all public assertions, which 
are the dominant mode of assertions) involve taking on a certain social role (e.g. testifier, 
questioner, participant in an inquiry) so that it’s inadequate to try to handle Lackey’s 
cases of selfless assertion by bracketing them as a kind of special case. Assertion in a 
role—in this thin sense of role—is normal not exceptional, and the norm for assertion 
should reflect that. If one can always assert from the role of “informant on proposition p,” 
one need not know that p at all. It’s sufficient to be in a position to know that p. 
Merely appealing to roles cannot handle revised versions of Lackey’s cases unless 
the concept of role is so thin as to make virtually any assertion an instance of assertion 
from a role: Either roles cannot explain all cases of felicitous, selfless assertion or else 
roles cannot distinguish cases of selfless assertion from normal assertions. Moreover, it’s 
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a virtue of the PtK-Norm that it can explain cases of selfless assertion without 
complicating the account by appealing to special roles.27 
3.3 Moorean Paradoxes 
Whereas the knowledge norm had trouble explaining the felicity of selfless 
assertions, the reasonable to believe norm has trouble explaining the infelicity of 
Moorean paradoxes. Moorean paradoxes are expressed when an agent makes the 
infelicitous assertion, “p, but I don’t know [or believe] that p.” Lackey explains why 
the RTB-Norm cannot get the right verdict on its own: 
[I]t is reasonable for Sebastian in DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR to believe both that 
there is no connection between vaccines and autism and that he neither believes 
nor knows that this is the case. Accordingly, his asserting… “There is no 
connection between vaccines and autism, but I don’t know that this is the case” 
...satisf[ies] the RTBNA (Lackey 2007, 613). 
 
But can’t the exact same thing be said about the PtK-Norm? Consider the following 
argument: 
Sebastian is in a position to know in DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR both that there is 
no connection between vaccines and autism and that he neither believes nor 
knows that this is the case. Accordingly, his asserting “There is no connection 
between vaccines and autism, but I don’t know that this is the case” satisfies the 
PTK-Norm (adapted from Lackey 2007, 613). 
 
Isn’t this a knock-down argument against the PtK-Norm? Or at least that the PtK-Norm, 
like Lackey’s, needs to be supplemented? Consider, in contrast, how easily the K-Norm 
handles such cases. 
If an agent knows that “p, but I don’t know that p,” then they know both that p 
and that “I don’t know that p.” But they can only know that “I don’t know that p” if it’s 
 
27 Likewise, McKinnon objects that Sosa’s view “seems to require all sorts of specialized norms of 
assertion, depending on one’s institutional role” (McKinnon 2015, 175). For a helpful, critical discussion of 
Sosa’s defense of the K-Norm, see Kelp (2015). 
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true that they don’t know that p. So, they both know and do not know that p—a 
contradiction! Since such propositions can’t be known, the K-Norm elegantly explains 
why they also cannot be properly asserted.28 
But note that the argument shows not just that Moorean propositions are unknown 
but that they are unknowable. This is good news for the PtK-Norm. For the fact that 
Moorean propositions are unknowable (for the speaker) rather than simply unknown 
explains why no one is in a position to know them. Consider the following argument: 
 (7) It is impossible for anyone to know a Moorean proposition.29 
(8) If it is impossible for anyone to know a proposition, then no one is in a 
position to know it. 
(9) Therefore, no one is in a position to know a Moorean proposition. 
If this argument is sound, then the PtK-Norm can explain why Moorean propositions are 
not properly assertable just as easily as the K-Norm: One cannot properly assert Moorean 
propositions because one is never in a position to know them. The argument is valid. 
Premise (7) is just a consequence of Williamson’s argument for the unknowability of 
Moorean propositions. The crucial premise, then, is (8). Is (8) true? 
Premise (8) falls straight out of the definition of position to know that we 
considered earlier: 
PtK: S is in a position to know that p iff S could know that p given their actual 
epistemic position. 
 
 
28 Cf. Williamson (2000, 253). DeRose notes that this is “one of the most important” arguments for the K-
Norm (2002, 180). 
29 Of course, here and in the following lines of the argument, I mean any Moorean proposition of which one 
is the subject. It’s impossible for me to know “p, but I don’t know that p,” even if it is possible for you to 
know what is arguably the very same proposition (when addressed to me): “p, but you don’t know that p.” 
But for me to be in a position to know a proposition, it must be possible for me to know it. For more on 
second-person variants of Moorean paradoxes, see the next chapter. 
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If a proposition is impossible for a speaker to know, then the speaker could not know it 
from any epistemic position, much less from the epistemic position they are actually in. 
Therefore, the PtK-norm can indeed explain why Moorean paradoxes are improper to 
assert. 
But what of the argument we adapted from Lackey? Where did it go wrong? The 
mistake is the apparently innocuous move from being in a position to know each conjunct 
to being in a position to know the whole conjunction. Sebastian is in a position to know 
both “that there is no connection between vaccines and autism,” and “I [Sebastian] 
neither believe nor know that this is the case.” But this doesn’t entail that Sebastian is in a 
position to know the conjunction “that there is no connection between vaccines and 
autism and I [Sebastian] neither believe nor know that this is the case.” Indeed, as we just 
saw, it is impossible for Sebastian to be in a position to know a proposition of this form. 
Being in a position to know is not closed under conjunction.30 
 
30 In his (2015a) Assertion, Goldberg considers (although he does not endorse) the PtK-Norm of assertion 
and even goes so far as to offer a friendly argument that the PtK-Norm can explain the infelicity of 
Moorean paradoxes. I believe, however, that his account is mistaken. His argument relies on the claim that 
“being in a position to know… can be… defeated by being in a position to know that one does not know” 
(160). So, then if one really were in a position to know <I don’t know that p> one wouldn't be in a position 
to know that p. According to Goldberg, the agent who is in a position to know <I don’t know that p> is 
neither in a position to know that p nor the conjunction <p, but I don’t know that p> whereas on my view 
the agent can be in a position to know each conjunct of the Moorean proposition but not the conjunction. 
It’s easy to see the attraction of the principle that Goldberg proposes. If my total evidence is such that, if I 
reflected on it, I would not be doxastically justified (and so would not know) that p, plausibly I’m not in a 
position to know that p now, even before I’ve reflected on the relevant evidence. So, perhaps any time I’m 
in a position to know that I don’t know that p, I’m not in a position to know p. 
But the principle loses plausibility when we focus on cases in which the reason one knows that one doesn’t 
know have nothing to do with the epistemic quality of the belief in question. If I am in a position to 
know—or even know outright—that I do not know that p but only because I know I can’t psychologically 
get myself to believe p, this doesn’t exclude me from being in a position to know that p. Lackey’s case of 
Sebastian the doctor is useful here. Sebastian might be well aware that he can’t get himself to outright 
believe <there is no connection between vaccines and autism>. So, he knows (and a fortiori is in a position 
to know) that he does not know <there is no connection between vaccines and autism>, since knowledge 
entails belief. But this in no way prevents Sebastian from being in a position to know <there is no 
connection between vaccines and autism>. What’s so frustrating about Sebastian’s psychological position 
is (among other things) that he can’t get himself to believe what he is in a position to know. 
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But isn’t it strange that the proper assertability isn’t closed under conjunction? 
According to the K-Norm, Moorean paradoxes are not properly assertable because one of 
the two conjuncts is not properly assertable. Either the agent doesn’t really know that p or 
doesn’t really know that “I don’t know that p.” But according to the PtK-Norm, the agent 
is in a position to know both p and “I don’t know that p” but not the conjunction of the 
two. The knowledge norm, unlike the position to know norm, seemingly maintains that a 
conjunction is properly assertable iff its conjuncts are each properly assertable. 
Indeed, it is intuitive that the proper assertability of conjunctions supervenes on 
the proper assertability of their conjuncts. The truth of conjunctions supervenes on the 
truth of their conjuncts, and knowledge—as a truth-seeking state—often follows suit. 
Intuitive, but false. Consider the preface paradox. An author believes—and we 
might add, asserts—each individual proposition in a book she publishes. But in the 
preface, she humbly adds, “Despite the tremendous help I have received from my 
colleagues in writing this book, I have surely made some mistakes here and there. All 
errors are, of course, my own.” She believes, on the basis of good meta-inductive 
evidence, that one of the propositions she believes (and asserts) in the book is false. For 
each proposition in the book, she believes it. But she does not believe the conjunction of 
all her beliefs.  
Little changes if we add that—miraculously—she in fact knows (and, a fortiori, is 
in a position to know) every individual proposition in the book. It is still not rational for 
her to believe the conjunction of every proposition: the meta-inductive evidence that 
she’s made a mistake somewhere is too strong. And if it isn’t rational for her to believe 
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the entire conjunction, she neither knows nor is in a position to know the conjunction. So, 
even on the knowledge norm, proper assertability is not closed under conjunction. 
Thus, the PtK-Norm and the preface paradox share a common consequence. In 
both cases, to determine whether an agent is in a position to know a conjunction of 
propositions, we must look at more than just whether the agent knows each proposition 
individually but at how the agent’s epistemic access to each proposition reacts when 
combined with others. In the preface paradox, the chance of error of the whole 
compounds when each conjunct is asserted not independently but as a part of a 
conjunction. In the case of the Moorean paradox, none of the accessible worlds that 
explain the agent’s being in a position to know p overlap with the worlds that explain the 
agent’s being in a position to know that “I don’t know that p.” Although there are worlds 
in which an agent in the speaker’s epistemic position knows that p and worlds in which 
an agent in the speaker’s epistemic position knows that “I don’t know that p,” there are 
no worlds in which an agent knows both propositions. In both cases, confusion is avoided 
by refusing to reduce the assertability of a conjunction down to the assertability of its 
conjuncts. 
Here’s a different worry: Sometimes it’s not clear when someone has asserted a 
conjunction instead of merely the separate conjuncts. The mere presence of a conjunction 
such as “and” or “but” can’t be the only factor. It would be just as bad for Sebastian to 
tell his patient, “There is no connection between vaccines and autism: I don’t know that 
this is the case,” although, when spoken instead of written, nothing overtly signifies that 
the propositions are conjoined. So, in borderline cases, how are we to tell whether 
Sebastian has asserted a conjunction or merely two discrete propositions? 
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Plausibly, there are clear cases on either side. Suppose Sebastian says to his 
patient, “There is no connection between vaccines and autism,” and adds in a hushed 
tone, “but I don’t know that this is the case.” Merely hushing the second clause is not 
enough to absolve him of having asserted the whole conjunction rather than two simple 
propositions. On the other hand, if Sebastian says to his patient, “There is no connection 
between vaccines and autism,” and then rushes across the hall to his therapist’s office to 
lament, “I don’t even know that what I said is true!” Sebastian has not asserted the whole 
conjunction but only two simple propositions in close temporal proximity. But there will 
be cases in which it’s not obvious whether Sebastian has asserted the whole conjunction 
or just each would-be conjunct. If both his patient and his therapist are in the room and 
Sebastian says, “There is no connection between vaccines and autism,” before sharply 
turning to his therapist and adding, “I don’t know that what I just said is true,” has he 
asserted the whole conjunction or merely two disjoint propositions in near temporal 
succession? It’s not clear, and so it’s not clear what the position to know hypothesis 
predicts is properly assertable. It’s also unclear whether or not this assertion (or 
assertions) is (or are) felicitous.  
I answer: It is no knock on a theory that it predicts confusion where confusion is. 
We feel genuinely confused about whether Sebastian has asserted properly when it’s 
unclear whether his assertion is a conjunction or two discrete statements in close 
proximity. It’s evidence for the PtK-Norm and not against it that the cases in which our 
intuitions are muddled covary with cases in which it’s unclear what the PtK-Norm 
predicts. This is precisely where we should expect to be confused if the PtK-Norm is true: 
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it’s further evidence that we implicitly appeal to the PtK-Norm to determine whether an 
assertion is felicitous.  
3.4 Lotteries 
In addition to Moorean paradoxes, the RTB-Norm struggles to explain 
assertions about lotteries. Williamson writes: 
Suppose that you have bought a ticket in a ...lottery. …[Y]our ticket did not 
win, but I have no inside information to that effect. On the merely 
probabilistic grounds that your ticket was only one of very many, I assert to 
you flat-out “Your ticket did not win” ...[M]y grounds are quite inadequate 
for that outright unqualified assertion. ...I was representing myself to you as 
having a kind of authority to make the flat-out assertion which in reality I 
lacked (Williamson 2000, 246).31 
 
The knowledge norm explains why it’s impermissible to assert “Your ticket lost” 
even when the odds are arbitrarily high. Exactly why we cannot know lottery 
propositions without special evidence is a matter of debate, but plausibly it’s 
something like this: Knowledge requires the elimination of (salient) chance. And it’s 
very salient in lottery cases that there is a chance—however small—that your ticket 
will win.32  
Lottery cases show that one’s evidence could make a proposition as probable 
as one likes (shy of 1) and still fail to warrant assertion. This puts pressure on the 
reasonable to believe norm. Lackey concurs: 
[T]he very good probabilistic grounds for lottery propositions presumably 
render it reasonable to believe in their truth. Hence, so long as a speaker 
asserts a lottery proposition ...because of this reasonableness, these assertions 
are taken to satisfy the RTBNA (Lackey 2007, 613). 
 
31 Williamson later clarifies: “There is a special jocular tone in which it is quite acceptable to say ‘[Come 
off it—] Your ticket didn’t win’, but the tone signals that the speaker intends not to make a flat-out 
assertion. In the imagined example, I do not use that tone” (Williamson 2000, 246). 
32 As Lackey reminds us, “it is not universally accepted that subjects do in fact lack knowledge in lottery 
propositions” (Lackey 2007, 617). Nevertheless, for the purposes of this paper, I take as given the orthodox 
position that we do not know lottery propositions. 
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But unlike the RTB-Norm, the PtK-Norm gets the intuitively correct verdict. It isn’t just 
that agents don’t know lottery propositions without special evidence: they can’t know 
them. Lotteries aren’t the right places to go looking for knowledge: the terrain is too full 
of luck and salient chances for knowledge to survive without special evidence.  
(10) It is impossible for anyone to know <this ticket lost the lottery> without 
special evidence (e.g. inside information on the result of the draw). 
(11) If it is impossible for anyone to know <this ticket lost the lottery> without 
special evidence, then no one without special evidence is in a position to know it. 
(12) Therefore, no one without special evidence is in a position to know <this 
ticket lost the lottery>. 
This argument closely resembles our argument that no one is in a position to know 
Moorean paradoxes. A notable difference is that lottery propositions are not absolutely 
impossible to know but only impossible to know without special evidence. Consider 
again PtK: 
PtK: S is in a position to know that p iff S could know that p given their actual 
epistemic position. 
 
Premise (11) is true if obtaining (new) special evidence changes one’s epistemic position. 
Clearly, obtaining special evidence quite dramatically changes one’s epistemic position. 
Therefore, premise (11) is true. If one can’t know lottery propositions in normal 
evidential circumstances, then one isn’t in a position to know either. Thus, the PtK-Norm, 
unlike the RTB-Norm, correctly predicts that lottery propositions are not properly 
assertable in ordinary evidential contexts. 
3.5 Why the Not Misleading Norm is not Enough 
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Lackey is well aware of the challenges Lottery cases and Moorean paradoxes pose 
for the RTB Norm. To resolve this tension, Lackey augments the RTB norm with the Not 
Misleading Norm of Assertion. The final version of this principle reads thus: 
NMNA**: S should assert that p in context C only if it is not reasonable for S to 
believe that the assertion that p will be misleading in C relative to the purposes of 
the exchange in question (Lackey 2007, 615). 
 
One source of discomfort for NMNA** is the ease with which we as reasoners can be 
misled by making irrational yet predictably human inferences. I find that when I focus on 
how easy it is for an assertion to be misleading, and how onerous such misdirection can 
be to contain, I lose the intuition that a speaker can never assert that p if they reasonably 
believe that it will be relevantly misleading in some way. Because humans are subject to 
widespread and deeply ingrained biases, it’s often very hard not to be misleading in some 
way or another. And especially if the reason it’s hard not to be misleading is that the 
auditor is being unfair or irrational, it seems overly demanding to require that the speaker 
eliminate all reasonably anticipated sources of relevant misdirection before asserting. 
Suppose, for instance, that when her education is being discussed in a certain society, 
men are disposed to believe that the speaker has gone to secretarial school even if she in 
fact studied philosophy. It seems overly cumbersome for the norm of assertion to demand 
that she always add “but I didn’t attend secretarial school!” when mentioning her 
education, even if her education is contextually relevant and the speaker knows full well 
that her audience is drawing a false conclusion. Her assertion is, through no fault of her 
own, misleading in a contextually relevant way, but it’s not the assertoric responsibility33 
 
33 Of course, there may be cases in which we have moral reasons to contain misdirection even when it isn’t 
our narrowly assertoric duty to do so.  
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of the speaker to correct this particular kind of misdirection.34 Rather, it’s the 
responsibility of the audience to manage the influence of background cultural 
assumptions that make the assertion misleading. 
But there is an even deeper reason to be dissatisfied with the attempt to save the 
RTB-Norm by tacking on NMNA**. Lackey owes us an answer to this question: Why is 
it that Moorean paradoxes and lottery propositions are misleading? We should want, in 
our theory of assertion, not just a norm that prohibits being misleading but an explanation 
whence the misdirection comes. 
If knowledge is the guiding normative property for assertion (as both the K-norm 
and PtK-norm maintain), there is a natural answer to the question of why lottery 
propositions and Moorean paradoxes are misleading: assertions present their speakers as 
(at least) in a position to know the asserted proposition, and lottery propositions (in 
normal evidential circumstances) and Moorean paradoxes are unknowable. But if we 
don’t normally assume that people are in a position to know what they assert, why are we 
confused when confronted with lottery propositions and Moorean paradoxes? 
At this point, proponents of the RTB-norm might return to the Gricean injunction 
to make one’s assertions as informative as one can: Don’t say things everyone already 
believes (cf. Weiner 2005). And everyone already reasonably believes (on Lackey’s 
 
34 Another way to interpret this case is as one in which the speaker is not misleading (the speaker is just 
telling the truth!) but the audience is being misled by their own preconceptions (or by the systemic injustice 
of the society). The speaker isn’t misleading her audience, rather she is letting her audience be misled by 
their own biases. The misdirection is occasioned but not caused by her speech. But introducing this 
distinction raises a challenging question for the NMAA**. For suppose I say that you have lost the lottery 
(which it turns out, unsurprisingly, that you have). I am telling you something true. Why is it that I count as 
misleading you in this case rather than simply letting you be misled by your preconception that I would 
only tell you that you had lost if I had insider information? It is, at least, not obvious how to draw the line 
between misdirecting and allowing to be misled in such a way that the lottery case and Moorean paradoxes 
come out on one side and the mistaken-for-a-secretary case comes out on the other. Thanks to an 
anonymous reviewer for conversation on this point.  
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account) that you’ve lost the lottery. So, when someone says, “you lost the lottery,” for 
instance, they violate the mandate of informativeness. We naturally resolve this violation 
by charitably assuming that the speaker be in an even better epistemic situation than the 
rest of us. That would explain why they flouted the conversational maxim of 
informativeness. But this response falls short. For it’s still improper to flat-out assert 
“you lost the lottery,” even when explaining lotteries to a lottery-novice who doesn’t 
have any idea what will happen to their ticket.35 
3.6 Knowledge-Oriented Varieties of Reasonability 
Perhaps Lackey was too quick to concede that the relevant kind of reasonability 
did not secure the right judgment all by itself. Douven (2006, 2009) and Kvanvig (2009) 
propose broadly reasonability-based norms of assertion (rational credibility and 
justification respectively) that, they argue, secure the intuitive verdict in Moorean 
paradoxes and lottery propositions without any additional norms.  
Thus Kvanvig says that assertion requires justification of “the kind that puts one 
in a position to know” (Kvanvig 2009, 149).36 And Douven builds this principle into his 
account of rational belief: RBi(ᵠ) ⇒ Cri(Ki(ᵠ)) ≽ Cri(¬Ki(ᵠ)) (2009, 371). Roughly, if an 
agent rationally believes a proposition, then their credence that they know it is higher 
than their credence that they don’t. On this account, one can’t rationally believe that “p, 
but I don’t know that p” because that would require believing that it’s both more and less 
probable than not that I know that p. 
 
35 Note, too, that the assertion is not helped by adding more information: “Your ticket lost because there are 
so many tickets that it is exceedingly unlikely that you won,” is just as bad if not worse than the less 
informative “your ticket lost.”  
36 For Kvanvig, the justification need not actually put the speaker in a position to know since the content of 
the assertion could be false or Gettiered. But it can’t be a defect in the speaker’s justification that they are 
not in a position to know.  
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But Douven’s principle is contentious. Plausibly, it is possible to rationally 
believe (or even know) a proposition while simultaneously having a higher credence that 
one does not know that proposition than that one knows it.  
This is most compelling when an agent has misleading evidence that they do not 
know. Imagine, for instance, someone living in a community of Ungerian (1975) 
skeptics. Such skeptics maintain their ordinary beliefs, but because they think the 
demands of knowledge are very high, they think that (almost) none of their beliefs 
constitute knowledge. In such a community, agents might have very good testimonial 
evidence that they do not know what they believe—after all, everyone in that community 
says that Ungerian skepticism is true. But if they continued to form beliefs in the normal 
way (despite a commitment to an epistemological theory that these beliefs, however well-
supported, never constituted knowledge) by perception, valid reasoning, etc., I’d be 
inclined to say that their ordinary, first-order beliefs were still rationally believed (and 
known!) even if their credence that those beliefs were knowledgeable was near 0.37 
But there’s a deeper dissatisfaction that affects both Douven’s and Kvanvig’s 
accounts. Why is it that justification requires being of the sort that puts one in a position 
to know? Or why does rational belief require thinking it more likely than not that one 
knows what one believes? Presumably because beliefs are aimed, in some sense, at 
knowledge. Otherwise, why care that one’s beliefs fall short of knowledge rather than, 
e.g., truth or probable truth? For the varieties of reasonability that Douven and Kvanvig 
 
37 Admittedly, such a community would plausibly have a different norm of assertion than the one the 
community of contemporary, English speakers have developed. The restricted point here is that Douven’s 
epistemic principle is contentious. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging further clarity on this 
point. 
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care about (rational credibility and justification), one has only really been reasonable if 
one has done well enough with respect to knowledge. 
This gives knowledge uncomfortable pride of place in apparent competitors to the 
thesis that knowledge is the epistemic property central to assertion. There’s a principled 
reason Lackey appeals to an accuracy-based account of reasonability as she engages 
Williamson’s arguments. For suppose that in order to be reasonable (or justified or 
rational) one aims not just to be accurate but to know, and that in order to properly assert 
one aims to be reasonable. Then in aiming to properly assert one would also aim to know, 
since it is by aiming at knowledge that one achieves the aim or reasonability. But once 
it’s admitted that we aim to know in order to properly assert, it’s hard to resist the pull of 
the knowledge norm. If knowledge is the ultimate aim of reasonability, then why should 
assertion aim at a merely derivative goal? Better to say that knowledge is the normatively 
guiding property for both belief and assertion.38 
3.7 Putting the Audience in a Position to Know 
Now that we’ve examined the importance of Moorean paradoxes, we’re able to 
consider one more attempt to explain selfless assertions. Like Lackey, I have explained 
selfless assertions by dropping a belief requirement on assertion. But we both maintain 
that it is the epistemic position of the speaker that enables proper assertion. A more 
radical solution would be to deny that the speaker must be in any particular epistemic 
position to properly assert. García-Carpintero and Pelling have each proposed norms that 
focus not on the originating epistemic position of the speaker but on the resulting 
epistemic position of the audience: 
 
38 See §4 for more on the relationship between the norms of belief and assertion. 
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TKR: One must ((assert p) only if one’s audience comes thereby to be in a 
position to know p) (García-Carpintero 2004, 134). 
 
PKA: One's assertion that p is proper only if it is fit to give a hearer knowledge 
that p (Pelling 2013, 297).39 
 
As I argue in more detail in the next chapter, such assertions cannot explain the felicity of 
certain second-person variants of Moorean paradoxes. For instance, it would be felicitous 
for Jean Valjean to tell Inspector Javert, “You’ll never believe that I’ve changed even 
though I have!” This is something the speaker, Jean Valjean, is in a position to know. But 
Javert, the intended audience, couldn’t possibly know that Javert has changed and that 
he’ll never believe it: that would commit Javert (but not Valjean) to a Moorean 
paradox!40 
If it’s impossible for one’s audience to know a proposition, it is neither fit nor 
possible to put the audience in a position to know that proposition. The PtK-Norm rightly 
maintains that it is the epistemic position of the speaker rather than the audience that 
licenses proper assertion, while still allowing speakers the flexibility to make selfless 
assertions in the best interests of their audience.41 
4. Assertion and Belief 
There’s another important argument against the PtK-Norm—especially favored 
by the knowledge camp—from the apparent similarities between assertion and belief. 
Williamson and Sosa both argue that the knowledge norm of assertion illuminates a deep 
parallel between assertion and belief. Williamson writes: 
 
39 In later work, Pelling modifies this view, claiming that that an interpersonal norm such as knowledge 
provision is better understood as a norm for the speech act of telling than the speech act of asserting, a 
distinction he makes in Pelling (2014). (He notes his change of view in 2013, 348, fn. 9.) 
40 Note that since the claim includes that Javert will never believe that Valjean has changed, Javert cannot 
come to know this proposition in the future as well as at the time of utterance. 
41 For more on what we can learn from second-person variants of Moorean Paradoxes, see Whitcomb 
(2013) and my discussion in chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
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[O]ccurently believing p stands to asserting p as the inner stands to the outer. If 
so, the knowledge rule for assertion corresponds to the norm that one should 
believe p only if one knows p (Williamson 2000, 255-56). 
 
Likewise, Sosa says: 
If knowledge is the norm of assertion, it is plausibly also the norm of affirmation, 
whether the affirming be private or public (Sosa 2011, 48).42 
 
It is a negotiable feature of a theory of assertion that the norms of belief and assertion 
thus align. But suppose that Williamson and Sosa are right: the parallels between belief 
and assertion run deep. Insofar as knowledge is the norm of belief, austerity in our 
theorizing favors the knowledge norm of assertion. 
The problem can be cast in a broader way. The norms governing belief do pass 
through the doxastic state of the asserter—the doxastic state of the asserter is what we are 
evaluating when we evaluate belief. We need an answer to the question of how best to 
evaluate an agent’s beliefs. Perhaps an agent should believe p only if her belief 
constitutes knowledge; perhaps an agent should believe p only if her belief is rational or 
supported by good reasons. At any rate, once we’ve decided on an answer to that 
question, why not simply cross-apply that norm to assertion?  
The first answer to this question is the principal retort to every objection from 
parsimony: the PtK-Norm gets more cases right, and this is what justifies a distinct norm 
for assertion. This is the conclusion for which the paper has argued so far. But I think we 
can do better than this. There are reasons to expect the norms of assertion and belief to 
separate and to separate in precisely the way the PtK-norm predicts.  
 
42 As Goldberg notes, these insights from Williamson and Sosa are anticipated by Dummett: “Judgment . . . 
is the interiorization of the external act of assertion” (Dummett 1973, 362; cited in Goldberg 2015b, 376). 
   
  
137 
 
Williamson and Sosa hold that belief and assertion share an important similarity 
(the same norm), but they also hold that there’s an important difference: the difference 
between inner and outer, or private and public. It is this very difference that explains why 
the norms, too, diverge. There’s a good reason that the norms for belief may require 
something (knowledge or rational belief) that passes through the doxastic state of the 
asserter—the inner, doxastic state itself is what is under evaluation. In contrast, the norm 
of assertion is not an evaluation of a doxastic state, but of an outer utterance.43 
Closely related to this distinction between inner and outer is the distinction 
between other-affecting and non-other-affecting aims. Indeed, it is the other-affecting aim 
of assertions that requires that assertions be outer acts in a way that beliefs are not. 
Typically, when a speaker decides to assert, she thereby decides to try to bring about a 
certain attitude in her audience. In contrast, when an agent decides to believe, she thereby 
decides to bring about a certain attitude in herself. There may be exceptions, as when a 
cleverly framed defendant asserts their innocence against all hope of persuasion or of 
shifting the common ground. But even in these cases, the other-affecting quality of 
assertion is invoked to explain why such assertions feel helpless. To assert when no one 
will believe what you assert is typically to have one’s act frustrated: to believe when no 
one will share your belief may be lonely, but it is not to have one’s act frustrated in the 
same way.  
Once we have it fixedly in mind that assertion is an outer and typically other-
affecting act, it becomes puzzling why assertion should require the asserter to be in any 
particular doxastic state. And although we’ll see some important exceptions to this 
 
43 Cf. Goldberg: “Assertion is a public act, whereas belief is neither an act nor a public matter, and there are 
reasons to think that both of these differences bear on the respective standards of each” (2015a, 167). 
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general rule in the next chapter, it’s often the goal of an assertion to change the doxastic 
state of the audience. The doxastic state of the speaker is of secondary concern, if of any. 
This is why it makes sense to focus, as Lackey does, on assertions that are selfless. What 
Lackey identifies as the selfless quality of assertion is the consequence of its other-
regarding character. Assertions can be selfless precisely because assertions are other 
regarding. 
Consider: the hearer is at no disadvantage if she receives testimony from those 
who are merely in a position to know rather than those who actually know. The quality of 
information received is just as high. Propositions one is in a position to know have the 
quality Goldberg calls “aptness for communicating knowledge” (Goldberg 2015a, 6). 
And since the set of things a speaker knows is a subset of the things she is in a position to 
know, audiences do better with respect to the quantity of propositions from asserters who 
assert what they are in a position to know rather than merely what they know. Since the 
quantity of asserted propositions is larger and the quality of asserted propositions no 
worse, the PtK-Norm is an intuitively better policy for transmitting information. 
It seems, therefore, that we do have good reason for having distinct norms for 
assertion and belief: assertion is immediately other-regarding in a way that belief is not. 
Indeed, we had to look little further than Williamson’s and Sosa’s own characterizations 
of the chief difference between belief and assertion—that of private and public—to find 
such a reason. 
5. Are We in a Position to Know Too Much? 
Someone might object: What we are in a position to know far outstrips what we 
know. This makes it too easy for someone to accidentally follow the norm. Suppose that 
   
  
139 
 
you are asked where Tom is and that you don’t know the answer—you don’t have any 
belief about where Tom is right now. But instead of confessing your ignorance, you pick 
a place at random: “Tom’s at the bar.” You brush off your inquisitor and give Tom’s 
location not a second thought. As it turns out, Tom is at the bar. More than that, you 
remember that he told you yesterday that he would be at the bar at seven, and you know 
perfectly well that it’s seven now. If you’d bothered to think about the question at all, if 
you’d bothered to put your evidence of Tom’s testimony together with your evidence 
about the current time, you would have known that Tom is at the bar. So, you’re in a 
position to know that Tom is at the bar. But the assertion seems awful! The PtK-Norm, it 
seems, cannot explain this. 
This problem of random assertions that happen to conform to the norm is not, 
however, unique to the PtK-Norm. It’s a general feature of all norms, as Kant taught us, 
that norms give rise to at least two species of criticisms: (1) not acting in accordance with 
the norm, and (2) not acting out of respect for the norm. In the story above, Tom is 
criticizable for not acting out of respect for the norm even though he (by accident) acts in 
accordance with the norm.  
Note that the primary competitors we have considered also face the same sort of 
objection. If you’re in a position to know that Tom is at the bar, it’s also reasonable for 
you to believe that Tom is at the bar, so the case above is equally a problem for the RtB-
Norm. A slightly modified version of the case shows that it is also a problem for the K-
Norm. Suppose that the speaker knew (perhaps non-occurrently) that Tom was at the bar 
but said so for reasons entirely unconnected to that knowledge. Irritated by the question 
about Tom’s whereabouts, the speaker picks the location in town furthest from their 
   
  
140 
 
current location. It is only afterward—and with some regret—that the speaker later 
consciously realizes that his answer helped rather than hindered the inquiry.44 
Lackey proposes a strategy for handling such cases. She builds a second condition 
into her norm: “if one asserted that p, one would assert that p at least in part because it is 
reasonable for one to believe that p” (Lackey 2007, 608).45 Analogous clauses could be 
built for the PtK- and K-Norms, e.g., we could add the second condition that “if one 
asserted that p, one would assert that p at least in part because one is in a position to 
know that p.” Adding such a clause seems to solve the problem. Asserting a proposition 
at random is wrong since it is not asserted because of its epistemic standing, even if the 
proper epistemic standing is (as it so happens) possessed by the asserter. 
Despite the obvious appeal of Lackey’s suggestion, I am hesitant to adopt it. Do 
norms in general tend to have the form, “one ought to do the right thing” or “one ought to 
do the right thing (at least in part) because it is the right thing?” Surely it is better to do 
the right thing for the right reason, but is such a condition baked into the norm itself? At 
least not obviously. For one thing, it makes sense to talk of someone doing the right thing 
for the wrong reason—and even doing the right thing only for wrong reasons, so that their 
right action is in no way caused or explained by its being the right thing to do. In Kantian 
terms, one can act in accordance with duty without acting from duty. But building the 
right causes, reasons, or expression46 into the norm itself threatens to obfuscate this 
distinction.47 
 
44 Cf. Turri (2011, 41) for a similar case. 
45 McKinnon follows Lackey’s lead and builds a similar condition into her supportive reasons norm 
(McKinnon 2015, 52). 
46 As in Turri (2011). 
47 I’m grateful to Tom Kelly for conversation on this point. 
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Moreover, once we have this Kantian distinction in mind, it’s no longer a mystery 
why we should say that asserting things at random is bad even if it should happen to 
satisfy the norm of assertion (whatever that norm may be). Agents can be criticized not 
only for violating the norm but for being insensitive to the guidance of the norm in 
asserting. It’s a general feature of norms that there are these two levels of criticism, and 
all norms of assertion will need to invoke this distinction (or one like it) to handle the 
general problem of random assertions.  
6. Conclusion 
We began by sketching an account of an often employed but rarely fully 
characterized concept: the position to know. The position to know depsychologizes away 
from the agent so that it is possible for an agent to be in a position to know what they do 
not believe. But the position to know shares many important features with knowledge: 
importantly, being in a position to know that p entails that p is both true and knowable.  
This unique combination suggests a promising norm of assertion: Agents should 
assert that p only if they are in a position to know it. This norm gets the right verdict in 
selfless assertions, lotteries, and Moorean paradoxes by balancing Williamson’s (etc.) 
insight that knowledge is central to assertion with Lackey’s insight that assertion is other 
regarding. The PtK-Norm thus foregrounds the public nature of assertion that allows 
asserters the flexibility to act in the best interests of their audience when internal 
psychological pressures would otherwise prevent them from communicating the 
knowable truth.48 
 
48 I owe thanks to a large community of people for criticism, helpful suggestions for improvement, and 
insistence on clarity. In particular, I’m grateful to Matt Benton, D Black, Laura Callahan, Sam Carter, Chris 
Copan, Charles Côté-Bouchard, Andy Egan, Megan Feeney, Danny Forman, Chris Frugé, Adam Gibbons, 
Sandy Goldberg, Chris Hauser, Caley Howland, Matt McGrath, Tom Kelly, Savannah Kinkaid, Nico Kirk-
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Giannini, Jennifer Lackey, Ting-An Lin, Dee Payton, John Phillips, Pamela Robinson, Ezra Rubenstein, 
Susanna Schellenberg, Ernie Sosa, and anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback on versions of this 
paper. Special thanks to Carolina Flores and Elisabeth Camp who each read the paper several times and 
always told me many things that they were in a position to know would improve the paper. 
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P, BUT YOU DON’T KNOW THAT P 
 
Abstract: It’s sometimes assertorically acceptable to tell an audience, “P, but you don’t 
know that p.” This can seem puzzling: after all, one can never inform an audience of the 
asserted content by speaking thus. Nevertheless, such assertions can be conversationally 
useful, making it apparent where there are unbridgeable gaps in the perspectives of the 
speaker and audience. Such assertions also make trouble for the growing family of views 
about the norm of assertion that what licenses proper assertion is not the initiating epistemic 
position of the speaker but the (potential) resulting epistemic position of the audience. They 
also allow us to draw a distinction between the aims of assertion and its norm. 
 
 
“There’s something you must remember: You’re braver than you believe,  
and stronger than you seem, and smarter than you think.” 
 
—Christopher Robin, to Winnie the Pooh 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Assertion is our most straightforward practice for informing others about the 
world. To assert that p is (at least) to say a sentence that expresses p (in the given 
context) in the right sort of way. As so often in philosophy, “the right sort of way” turns 
out to be terribly difficult to characterize. But since Williamson (2000), some 
philosophers have thought that part of the story involves assertion being subject to a 
special, epistemic norm—at least a norm that applies to assertions that are straight-faced 
and unhedged, spoken in ordinary contexts.1 This paper, which belongs to that tradition, 
 
1 Qualifications of this sort appear as early as Williamson (2000) who excludes from his argument 
assertions with “a special jocular tone” (2000, 246). Goldberg (2015) argues that the default knowledge 
norm doesn’t apply in conditions of diminished epistemic hope, and Fleisher (forthcoming) argues that 
assertion in the realm of certain research projects parallel norms for endorsement rather than belief. Benton 
and van Elswyk (2020) argue compellingly that we can weaken the obligation to follow a strong norm of 
assertion by hedging. It’s consistent with all this that there is a default norm of assertion that applies unless 
there is some special explanation for why it does not in a given case or domain. This default interpretation 
of the norm of assertion will be the working hypothesis of this paper. This differs from some theorists, e.g., 
Kemp (2007) who suggests that the norms of assertion may vary across contexts according to a patchwork 
of conversational practices. I will make no assumptions about whether the norm of assertion should be 
understood as constitutive or merely regulative. 
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argues that second-person Moorean assertions make trouble for the growing family of 
views about the norm of assertion: that what licenses proper assertion is not the epistemic 
position of the speaker but of the audience. 
But first, why think that the norms of assertion reference audiences in the first 
place? In direct challenge to the knowledge norm, and other norms requiring the speaker 
to believe what they assert, Jennifer Lackey proposes that in cases of selfless assertion, 
the asserter can help their audience come to believe what they themselves cannot. 
Consider Sebastian, the distraught doctor: 
DISTRAUGHT DOCTOR: Sebastian is [a] ...pediatrician [who] recognizes 
...that all of the scientific evidence shows that there is absolutely no 
connection between vaccines and autism. However, shortly after his 
...daughter received one of her vaccines, ...she was soon diagnosed with 
autism. …[T]he grief and exhaustion brought on by his daughter’s recent 
diagnosis cause him to abandon his previously deeply-held beliefs regarding 
vaccines. …[W]hile performing a well-baby checkup..., the child’s parents 
ask him about ...the rumors surrounding vaccines and autism. Recognizing 
both that the current doubt he has towards vaccines was probably brought 
about through [his] emotional trauma ...and that he has an obligation to his 
patients, ...Sebastian asserts, “There is no connection between vaccines and 
autism” …[although it’s false that] Sebastian himself believes or knows this 
proposition. (Lackey 2007, 598–99) 
 
Lackey concludes that “it is a mistake to require proper assertion to pass through the 
doxastic states of the asserter” (Lackey 2007, 600). Doffing the belief requirement 
on assertion allows speakers like Sebastian to help their audiences learn despite the 
epistemic limitations of the speaker. What Lackey recognizes is that assertion is, to 
some extent, for audiences—at least in the normal case.2 Lackey thus proposes a 
norm of assertion that is audience-accommodating. It allows speakers to assert what 
 
2 This isn’t to deny that some assertions are spoken out of a need to express oneself, regardless of whether 
any audience is present. Or that one’s audience may be oneself, as, perhaps, when one writes in a diary. But 
paradigmatic cases of assertion involve an external audience. (Thanks to conversation with Matt McGrath 
here.) 
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they don’t believe (in certain cases) if doing so promotes the epistemic well-being of 
the audience: 
RTB-Norm: One should assert that p only if it is reasonable for one to believe that 
p. (Lackey 2007, 608)3 
 
Since Lackey, several authors have crafted norms with the intent to capture her audience-
accommodating insight: 
SRN-Norm: One may assert that p only if one has supportive reasons for p. 
(McKinnon 2015, 4)4 
 
PtK-Norm: One should assert that p only if one is in a position to know that p. 
(Willard-Kyle 2020, 328)5 
 
Unsurprisingly, disagreement persists: some philosophers think that our judgments about 
Lackey’s selfless assertions are misleading (e.g. Kvanvig 2011, 235) or that her cases can 
be explained without giving up on belief-entailing norms (Sosa 2011, 47; Turri 2015).6 
But in this paper, we’ll be interested not in the objection that Lackey’s audience-
accommodation goes too far but that it doesn’t go far enough. Note that all three of the 
audience-accommodating norms just considered still maintain that proper assertion 
depends on the epistemic position of the speaker. One should assert only if it is 
reasonable for the speaker to believe, if the speaker has supportive reasons, if the speaker 
 
3 Lackey’s full formulation of the RTB-norm includes this second condition: “if one asserted that p, one 
would assert that p at least in part because it is reasonable for one to believe that p” (Lackey 2007, 608). 
She also complements this norm with a Not Misleading Norm of assertion. But what matters here is that the 
epistemic requirement only obliges speakers to say what it is reasonable for them to believe, not what they, 
in fact, reasonably believe. 
4 Again, McKinnon’s full formulation includes two additional clauses:  
ii. The relevant conventional and pragmatic elements of the context are present, and 
iii. One asserts that p at least in part because the assertion that p satisfies (i) [that is, the supportive reasons 
condition] and (ii). (McKinnon 2015, 4) 
But what matters here is that the epistemic requirement only obliges speakers to have supportive reasons, 
not to believe on that basis. 
5 I define the position to know this way: “S is in a position to know that p iff S could know that p given 
their actual epistemic position,” (Willard-Kyle 2020, 330). Importantly, this conception of the position to 
know is factive (2020, 331). Cf. Williamson (2000, 95). 
6 I tackle these objections directly in Willard-Kyle (2020, 334–46). 
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is in a position to know. But once we’ve reoriented ourselves around the idea that 
assertion is (typically) aimed at an audience, we may start to wonder whether it isn’t the 
epistemic position of the audience that really licenses proper assertion.7,8  
This general strategy has been recently advanced by Manuel García-Carpintero, 
Charlie Pelling, and Edward Hinchman. Their norms are not just audience-
accommodating but audience-centric: 
TKR: One must ((assert p) only if one’s audience comes thereby to be in a 
position to know p) (García-Carpintero 2004, 134). 
 
PKA: One’s assertion that p is proper only if it is fit to give a hearer knowledge 
that p (Pelling 2013, 297).9 
 
PTW: Assert [that p] only when you could provide testimonial warrant [that p] to 
a potential addressee (Hinchman 2020, 556). 
 
Broadly speaking, these suggestive alternatives to a speaker-oriented literature echo the 
Gricean theme that assertions aim to produce a doxastic attitude in the hearer.10,11 
Moreover, they perform surprisingly well on test cases forged in a speaker-centered 
 
7 Thanks to D Black and Sandy Goldberg for helping me to appreciate the force of this question for 
audience-accommodating norms. 
8 Although speaker-centric and audience-centric norms are those most widely represented in the literature, 
they are not exhaustive. For instance, one could hold that it is the epistemic credentials of relevant 
communities (potentially including both the speaker and audience) that matters for assertion. Thanks to 
Jennifer Lackey for pointing out the breadth of the space of options. 
9 In later work, Pelling modifies this view, claiming that an interpersonal norm such as knowledge 
provision is better understood as a norm for the speech act of telling than the speech act of asserting, a 
distinction he makes in Pelling (2014). (He notes his change of view in 2013, 348, fn. 9.) The distinction 
between telling and asserting will be addressed in §3. 
10 Grice describes proper assertion as essentially aiming at producing a mental state in the audience: 
“A meantNN something by x” is roughly equivalent to “A uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by 
means of the recognition of this intention” (Grice 1957, 384). 
There are differences, to be sure, between Grice’s view and the norm-oriented approach favored by 
Hinchman, Pelling, and García-Carpintero, and I don’t mean to claim that any of these three must be 
interpreted as Griceans. Grice focuses on belief not knowledge; none of the norms under consideration is 
committed to the view that meaningful utterances are accompanied by intentions-recognizing intentions; 
however, all three share a commitment to the idea that assertion (meaningful utterance) is aimed, in some 
sense, at producing a doxastic state in the audience.  
11 See Benton (2016), however, for a defense of the claim that, properly read, Grice is an ally of the 
knowledge norm. 
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context. Note, for instance, that one cannot put someone in a position to know that 
they’ve lost the lottery on merely probabilistic grounds.12 And they get the right verdict 
in Lackey’s selfless assertion cases, since none of the norms requires any particular 
doxastic attitude in the speaker.  
It’s a little trickier to determine whether or not audience-centric norms can 
explain the infelicity of Moorean paradoxes—utterances of the form, “p, but I don’t know 
that p.”13 But there’s at least a case to be made on their behalf. Suppose that the 
knowledge one would gain from testimony is defeated if the audience learns that the 
speaker doesn’t know what they’ve asserted.14 Then asserting, “p, but I don’t know that 
p” would never generate knowledge that p in one’s audience, since one would always be 
giving them a defeater for p along with the testimony that p.15,16 Arguably, then, these 
audience-centric norms get the right verdicts in the cases that have most vexed the 
speaker-centric literature. And so, there’s reason to think that switching the focus of 
assertions from speakers to audiences is exactly what the literature needs. 
Nevertheless, making this switch gets us into trouble. In particular, it falsely 
predicts (I will argue) that second-person variants of Moorean paradoxes are always 
 
12 See Williamson (2000). 
13 Here, I simply assume the majority report that first-person Moorean propositions are not properly 
assertable. One notable way to push back against the majority view is to focus on assertions in contexts 
where guessing seems appropriate: “The Colts are going to win the Super Bowl. Of course, I don’t know 
that for sure, but that’s my take.” For papers on how a knowledge-friendly norm of assertion might handle 
such cases, see especially Benton (2012) on prediction and Benton and van Elswyk (2020) on hedges. 
14 This is consistent with the possibility that a hearer can acquire knowledge from a speaker who in fact 
does not know what they assert (so long as the hearer doesn’t know that the speaker is ignorant). That’s 
good news since the possibility of knowledge from ignorant testifiers is crucial for Lackey’s cases of 
selfless assertions. Cf. Lackey (1999, 2007). 
15 I owe thanks to conversation with Sandy Goldberg on this point. 
16 This move does, however, raise some hard questions for audience-centric norms: Why does learning that 
the speaker doesn’t know, believe, etc. what they assert act as a defeater? Plausibly, because there’s a 
presumption that the speaker has high epistemic standing for what they assert. But whence this presumption 
if the norm of assertion is silent on the epistemic standing of the asserter? For the most direct treatment of 
this challenge, see Hinchman (2013).  
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infelicitous. But although such expressions sometimes have an air of self-defeating 
futility, some second-person variants of Moorean Paradoxes are perfectly acceptable. 
These cases make trouble for audience-centric norms and also show the limitations of a 
Gricean view whereby the primary intention guiding assertion is to bring about in one’s 
audience the belief that the asserted proposition is true (Grice 1957). 
This paper, then, has two closely related goals. The first is to argue that even if—
with Lackey, McKinnon, and myself—one rejects the view that proper assertion requires 
speaker-belief, one should hold onto the traditional view within the literature on the norm 
of assertion that it is epistemic position of the speaker that licenses assertion rather than 
of the audience. Assertoric license comes speaker-side, not audience-side. The second 
goal is to explore second-person variants of Moorean paradoxes—too long upstaged by 
their first-person counterparts—and to suggest that they often contribute to a 
conversation despite necessarily failing to inform their audiences by making perspectival 
gaps between addresser and addressee salient. Thinking about uninformative assertions 
will also give us the chance to reflect on the relationship between aims and norms: good 
norms allow us to systematically achieve our aims, but that doesn’t mean that the content 
of our aims and our norms will be particularly similar.  
In §2, I present felicitous assertions of second-person variants of Moorean 
paradoxes and discuss how they can be conversationally useful. In §3, I argue that these 
(and related) assertions pose a difficult challenge to audience-centric norms of assertion 
before turning to objections in §4. In §5, I reflect on lessons learned about the 
relationship between the aims of assertion and its norm(s). 
2. What Can’t Be Taught 
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This section has two goals. First, I argue that some second-person Moorean 
assertions are properly assertable. This will set up §3 in which I argue that the existence 
of felicitous second-person Moorean assertions is at odds with extant audience-centric 
norms of assertion: second-person Moorean assertions never put their audiences in 
anything like a position to know the asserted content. Second, I argue that second-person 
Moorean assertions can be conversationally useful in virtue of making salient the 
presence of two distinct perspectives, the addresser’s and the addressee’s. Reflections on 
the usefulness of Moorean paradoxes will inform the discussion of assertion’s aims in §5. 
2.1 Moorean Sentences 
I can’t know that “p, but I don’t know that p.” If I did, then I’d know p. But if I 
knew that p, I couldn’t know that I don’t know that p. So, I can’t know both conjuncts 
together.17 Similarly, on the assumption that knowledge entails belief, I can’t know that 
“p, but I don’t believe that p.” If I did, then I’d know and so believe that p. But if I knew 
that p then I’d believe it, and so I couldn’t know that I don’t believe that p. Nevertheless, 
you, reader, can know the proposition, “p, but you”—that is, I the author—“don’t know 
(or believe) that p.” After all, there are many true things that I don’t know. And there is 
no contradiction in your knowing that p and your knowing that I don’t know it. In short, 
people cannot know of themselves that “p, but I don’t know that p,” but they can know of 
others, “p, but you don’t know that p.” The same goes for states that are entailed by 
knowledge, such as “p, but you don’t believe that p,” or “p, but you’re not justified in 
 
17 See Moore (1942) and Williamson (2000). 
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believing p,” and so on. We’re necessarily better at detecting present false belief in others 
than we are in ourselves.18 
Moorean paradoxes and their ilk show that some propositions are partial: they are 
knowable by some but not by others. Partial propositions make trouble for information-
sharing. As concerns knowledge, second-person Moorean sentences are determined to 
fall on those without ears to hear: what is non-paradoxical in the mouth of the speaker is 
transformed into a paradox in the ear of the addressee. For while I can know <p and you 
don’t know that p>, you can’t know <p and you don’t know that p>. You can’t know both 
conjuncts together. 
Nevertheless, it is (I will argue) sometimes perfectly acceptable for speakers to 
utter second-person Moorean propositions. This is somewhat surprising. What could 
speakers hope to accomplish by telling their audience something they could never learn? 
We’ll discover that such assertions often manifest the presence of two perspectives: the 
asserter’s and the audience’s. They make clear that the asserter and speaker have different 
sets of belief and also that different sets of potential beliefs are rationally or 
psychologically available to them. Making these perspectives salient is a valuable tool for 
shaping the future direction of a conversation.  
2.2 Felicitous Second-Person Moorean Assertions 
Let’s now consider acceptable second-person Moorean assertions. First, imagine a 
conversation with a climate change denier. Normally, when conversationalists disagree, 
it’s appropriate for disputants to share their reasons to try to resolve the dispute before 
 
18 The relevance of second-person Moorean sentences has been strangely muted in a literature on norms of 
assertion that is mesmerized by their first-person counterparts. One exception is Dennis Whitcomb (2013) 
who considers second-person variants in an illuminating way to reflect on the nature of evidence. 
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moving on: we tend to seek as wide a common ground as possible. But let’s suppose that 
in this case you can tell that a conversation about climate change will be unproductive. 
Your conversation partner is showing bad epistemic faith by blatantly ignoring 
evidence—they are actively, not just passively, ignorant.19 It becomes clear that a belief 
in the truth of global warming is not psychologically accessible for them. Although you 
yourself are quite confident that climate change is a real phenomenon, your belief is 
based largely on the testimony of the scientific community: you don’t have access to 
much first-order evidence that someone who distrusts the scientific community might 
find persuasive. And, frankly, you’re tired and aren’t likely to be charitable enough to 
have a pleasant or productive conversation. After listening to a couple of minutes of your 
friend’s arguments, you finally assert: 
1. Global warming is really happening, even though you don’t believe it. 
There’s no way your friend can come to know that they themselves don’t believe in 
global warming and that it’s real. But (1) is fine to assert, nonetheless.  
If you haven’t informed—or even attempted to inform!—your friend, what, if 
anything, have you accomplished? You’ve expressed your public perspective. By 
asserting, you have declared a stance: you’re committed to the world’s being a certain 
way, a way that involves your interlocutor’s being ignorant of global warming. When we 
assert, we do (at least) two things. We put forward the asserted content with assertoric 
force. But we also represent ourselves as being assertorically committed to it. We put 
ourselves or our assertoric authority behind the assertion. This is why we can be properly 
blamed when we assert falsely or baselessly without excuse.  
 
19 Cf. Mills’s distinction between passive and active ignorance (as applied to white ignorance): “Imagine 
...an ignorance that is active, dynamic, that refuses to go quietly” (2007, 13). 
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Often, we assertively express our stances in order to get our interlocutors to agree 
with us about the asserted content. That cannot be the goal in (1), but that does not mean 
the assertion is futile. What, then, have you accomplished? That answer may depend on 
the specific relationship between you and your friend, but one thing you may have done 
is to change the direction of the conversation, or perhaps even to end it. You’ve 
expressed a public stance that is unshareable with your interlocutor. By doing so 
blatantly, you make it clear that you have renounced the goal of changing your friend’s 
mind on climate change or of trying to see things from their perspective. This may be 
especially helpful if you, the speaker, judge that airing the hearer’s objections would be 
counterproductive. Your perspectives are too far apart to beneficially engage in 
conversation on the subject, at least for the time being. 
Before considering other cases, we should make an important clarification that 
bears on the argument in §3. I said that there’s no way your friend can come to know the 
asserted proposition. But that’s not quite right. Your friend can’t come to know the 
asserted proposition right now.20 Suppose that five years from now, your friend has 
ceased to be a climate change denier—they could then come to believe, perhaps partly on 
the basis of your past testimony, “Global warming is really happening, even though I 
didn’t believe it (five years ago).” So, perhaps second-person Moorean sentences are 
capable of putting their audiences in a position to know. What’s unique about them is that 
they don’t put their audiences in a position to know them at the time of utterance.  
 
20 If propositions are tensed, then the initial example already shows that some propositions are assertable 
despite being unknowable for the audience, since even if the audience later learned, “p, but I didn’t know 
that p,” they wouldn’t be learning the very same proposition. But let us grant the objector that propositions 
are untensed.  
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Indeed, some assertions of second-person Moorean propositions might be best 
understood this way.21 But not all. Note that in the climate change case, even if it’s 
possible that your friend ultimately comes to believe what you’ve asserted, getting your 
friend to know what you say just isn’t the point of your assertion. You had given up hope 
of gaining a convert. Indeed, by expressing your perspective in this way and potentially 
ending the conversation, you are probably making it less likely not more that they will 
come to learn anything about global warming from you. That should make us suspicious 
that the assertion is ultimately licensed by its downstream ability to put the audience in a 
position to know.  
But second, we can change the proposition so that your friend can never come to 
know it. Suppose you know your friend is set in their climate-change-denying ways, and 
that they’ll never be persuaded. Hoping to avoid a recurrence of frustrating conversations, 
you assert: 
1*. Global warming is really happening, even though you’ll never believe it.  
 
This new assertion is properly assertable even though your friend can never come to 
know (1*), even in the future: (1*) is unknowable for audiences at any time. I’ll continue 
to focus on present-tense versions of Moorean paradoxes because doing so allows us to 
see a wider range of their conversational uses. But in each case, I will include an “eternal 
counterpart” via footnote. We will return to discussion about whether audience-centric 
norms can explain such assertions in §3. 
 
21 E.g. assertions of the form “You’ll [only] understand that p when you’re older” (assuming that 
understanding is factive). 
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Let’s consider another example of a felicitous second-person Moorean assertion 
that has a different conversational purpose. Imagine this conversation between a 
conservative who watches Fox News and a liberal who believes Fox News is unreliable. 
2. Liberal: Even Fox News says that Trump’s justification for his 
immigration policy greatly exaggerates the risk of terrorism. 
 
Conservative: Wait a minute, I thought you didn’t trust Fox News. 
 
Liberal: Of course, Fox News is unreliable, but you don’t know that.22 I’m 
trying to make an argument that persuades you. 
 
Liberal is trying to give evidence that meets Conservative where they are. Instead of 
offering the argument that they themselves would find most convincing, they are giving 
an argument that Conservative would find persuasive. By taking up Conservative’s 
perspective in this way, Liberal ends up citing some evidence that they believe is weak 
(the testimony from Fox News) because they think Conservative may take it to be strong 
evidence. When Conservative astutely notices that Liberal is citing an argument that 
Liberal wouldn’t accept as persuasive (though of course, Liberal thinks the premises are 
true), Liberal responds with a second-person variant of a Moorean paradox. In doing so, 
they mark a sharp distinction between their two perspectives. This, in turn, allows the 
explanation that the argument is targeted solely at Conservative’s perspective. 
In our story, Liberal and Conservative are trying to arrive at common ground 
despite having very different political starting points. Liberal’s second-person Moorean 
assertion allows them to signal where they want to find common ground (on 
immigration) and where they are, for the moment at least, willing to agree to disagree (on 
the reliability of Fox News).  
 
22 Eternal Counterpart: “Fox News is unreliable, but I know you’ll never know that.” Or “Fox news is 
unreliable, but I know you’ll never be persuaded of that.” 
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Recall that assertions typically invite challenge from one’s audience. If Liberal 
had simply said, “Fox News is unreliable,” then they would have invited dispute over 
whether or not Fox News is reliable. But by embedding that claim within a second-person 
Moorean sentence, Liberal effectively manages to set the record straight on Fox News 
while simultaneously avoiding debate about Fox News.23  
But this isn’t like the global warming case, in which one speaker asserts 
something that cannot be common ground in hopes that the conversation will end. Rather, 
by expressing an unshareable perspective about the reliability of Fox News (Conservative 
can’t know that they don’t know Fox News is unreliable and that it’s unreliable), Liberal 
hopes to continue the conversation by redirecting it back to the topic of immigration. 
Once again, the perspective expressed by the assertion helps direct the future path of the 
conversation even though it (necessarily) fails to knowledgeably transmit the asserted 
content.  
Not every second-person, Moorean-style assertion is quite so blatant. Recall 
Christopher Robin’s conversation with Pooh: 
3. You’re braver than you believe (Geurs 1997).24 
Less lyrically: “You’re braver than degree X, but you don’t believe that you’re braver 
than degree X.” This is something that Pooh can’t know given Pooh’s first-person 
perspective. In some ways, that’s the point. Christopher Robin is inviting Pooh to see 
himself from a different perspective than his own: Through Christopher Robin’s eyes, 
Pooh sees a braver bear. Of course, if Pooh does eventually manage to change their 
perspective in the right way, similar assertions will no longer be true: if Pooh believes he 
 
23 I’m grateful to conversation with Matt McGrath on this point. 
24 Eternal Counterpart: “You’re braver than you could ever believe that you are.” 
   
  
156 
 
is brave enough, it will no longer express something true to tell Pooh that he is “braver 
than he thinks.” But the point of the assertion was to change Pooh’s view of himself, not 
to get Pooh to believe the asserted proposition. What these cases show us is that 
sometimes assertion isn’t (just) about communicating information: sometimes it’s about 
influencing perspectives. 
I’ve said that expressing a second-person Moorean sentence emphasizes the 
presence of two distinct perspectives, the speaker’s and the audience’s. Second-person 
Moorean sentences (or at least their eternal counterparts) are not rationally accessible to 
the people they are told to: they can only be received as paradoxes.  
But this is only the first step. Once this distinction between perspectives is drawn, 
it can be put to various uses. In the global warming case, the speaker draws the 
distinction to forswear the goal of engaging with the audience’s perspective. But in the 
Fox News case, the speaker draws the same distinction not to avoid engagement but to 
make it possible—to advance an argument that will appeal to the audience given their 
vantage point though it holds little appeal to the speaker from theirs. In both cases, the 
distinction is drawn so that the speaker can choose the terms of (dis)engagement with an 
audience whose perspective differs from their own. 
Other times, the distinction is drawn not to tell the audience how the speaker is 
choosing to engage the audience’s perspective, but to change the audience’s perspective. 
Plausibly, this is what happens to Pooh. Christopher Robin’s assertion is best understood 
as an invitation for Pooh to change his perspective on himself, to see himself through 
Christopher Robin’s eyes. That is, after all, a more accurate perspective regarding Pooh’s 
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bravery. In each of the cases, the primary goal is not to communicate information, but to 
direct, clarify, entrench, or change the perspectives operative in the conversation. 
3. Against Audience-Centric Norms of Assertion 
Following Williamson (2000), first-person Moorean paradoxes have been a 
central data point to explain (or explain away) in the literature on the norm of assertion. 
Second-person variants have largely been ignored. As we’ve seen, however, second-
person variants of Moorean paradoxes are theoretically interesting. They have the 
intriguing twin properties of (i) necessarily failing to inform the intended audience of the 
asserted content and yet (ii) potentially being both permissible and conversationally 
useful assertions. 
The felicity of some second-person Moorean sentences is, I will now argue, a 
mark against extant audience-centric norms of assertion. Recall the three audience-centric 
norms with which we began this paper: 
TKR: One must ((assert p) only if one’s audience comes thereby to be in a 
position to know p) (García-Carpintero 2004, 134). 
 
PKA: One’s assertion that p is proper only if it is fit to give a hearer knowledge 
that p (Pelling 2013, 297). 
 
PTW: Assert [that p] only when you could provide testimonial warrant [that p] to 
a potential addressee (Hinchman 2020, 556). 
 
I address each in turn.  
3.1 TKR: Transmission of Knowledge Rule 
Suppose that one should assert that p only if one’s audience comes thereby to be 
in a position to know that p (TKR). Should we then expect to be able to tell someone 
second-person Moorean sentences such as, “p, but you don’t believe that p”? No, for it’s 
impossible for one’s intended audience to thereby learn that proposition. And if it’s 
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impossible for an agent to know a proposition, then they are not in a position to know it.25 
TKR wrongly predicts that second-person variants of Moorean propositions should be 
unassertable.  
3.2 PKA: Provision of Knowledge Account 
Suppose that one should assert that p only if it is fit to give a hearer knowledge 
that p (PKA). Should we then expect to be able to tell someone, “p, but you don’t believe 
that p”? It seems not. For plausibly if it’s impossible for an agent to know a proposition, 
then it is not fit to give them knowledge that p. Especially if the reason for the 
impossibility is that the proposition is just not the sort of proposition that can be known 
by the addressee, and not, for instance, that the agent just happens to lack the cognitive 
resources or strength of evidence to know it.  
But perhaps this depends on what exactly is meant by “fitness.” Does what 
Pelling means by “fitness” rule out the felicity of second-person Moorean assertions? 
Here, things get tricky. Pelling defines fitness to give knowledge in terms of faultiness: 
an assertion is fit iff it is not faulty (Pelling 2013, 303). But Pelling only gives us a 
definition of evidential faultiness: an assertion is evidentially faulty iff something about 
the “evidential basis explains why it doesn’t give knowledge in the normal way” (Pelling 
2013, 302). And the way in which second-person Moorean assertions are unfit to give 
knowledge has nothing to do with evidence. Notice, for instance, that the evidence I (the 
speaker) have for the proposition <p, but you don’t believe that p> could be arbitrarily 
 
25 I defend this principle in Willard-Kyle (2020, 337–38). 
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strong: I (the speaker) could know it with rational certainty. But no matter how strong my 
evidence, you will never be able to know it.26  
So, if second-person Moorean propositions are faulty with respect to giving an 
addressee knowledge, they are faulty in some non-evidential way. Pelling only discusses 
ways that assertions can be evidentially faulty or unfit to give knowledge. But since 
second-person Moorean sentences clearly can’t give knowledge to their addressees, they 
seem to be faulty or unfit in some way: perhaps they are propositionally faulty in virtue 
of there being something about the proposition (or proposition-addressee pairing) that 
explains why it does not give knowledge in the normal way. 
Although this explanation of the way that second-person Moorean sentences are 
unfit to give their addressees knowledge goes beyond Pelling’s official account, it agrees 
with Pelling’s overall gloss on the concept of fitness. Why introduce a notion of “fitness 
to give knowledge” in the first place? Because (Pelling rightly notes) an agent might 
assert that p very quietly, or in a language the addressee doesn’t understand, or in an 
epistemic context in which there is too much misleading evidence for the addressee to 
take the speaker’s word, and so on (Pelling 2013, 296). In these sorts of situations, it is fit 
to give the addressee knowledge. They would be in a position to know it in better 
auditory, conversational, or epistemic contexts even though, contingently, the addressee 
won’t actually end up in a position to know the asserted content.  
Intuitively, second-person Moorean propositions are radically unlike the sorts of 
cases that motivate Pelling’s introduction of “fitness.” It’s a necessary feature of second-
 
26 Indeed, as Whitcomb (2013) argues, the addressee’s evidence for <p, but you [the addressee] don’t know 
that p> could be arbitrarily strong (short of giving knowledge) and yet fail to put them in a position to know 
it. 
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person Moorean assertions—not a contingent fact about the local context—that 
addressees cannot come to know them. It seems, then, that such assertions should count 
as unfit to give knowledge.  
And, indeed, elsewhere, Pelling argues that a certain proposition is fit to give 
knowledge because if the addressee forms a true belief in the normal way on the basis of 
the speaker’s testimony that the proposition is true then the addressee would also thereby 
acquire knowledge (Pelling 2013, 310–311). But second-person Moorean propositions 
necessarily fail this test. Pooh could come to truly believe, “I am braver than I believe,” 
not recognizing the incoherence this commits him to—he is, after all, a silly old bear—
but Pooh would not thereby come to know the proposition, which is unknowable for him. 
That second-person Moorean sentences necessarily fail this positive test for fitness is 
further evidence that they are unfit to give an addressee knowledge. 
Where does this leave us? We’ve been trying to evaluate whether or not it is fit to 
give knowledge of a second-person Moorean proposition to an addressee. I’ve suggested 
that the intuitive answer is no. After all, it’s conceptually impossible for the addressee to 
come to know it. And to borrow a test that Pelling sometimes employs, if the addressee 
were to truly believe it on the basis of testimony they would not thereby count as 
knowing it. Admittedly, the reason knowledge isn’t given in such cases doesn’t have to 
do with evidential deficiencies, but that (I suggest) is because evidential deficiencies 
aren’t the only way fitness to give knowledge can be revoked. Although second-person 
Moorean sentences are unfit for giving knowledge, they can be proper to assert. The PKA 
thus delivers the wrong verdict. 
3.3 PTW: Provision of Testimonial Warrant 
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Let us now turn to Hinchman’s norm: one should assert that p only when one can 
provide testimonial warrant that p to a potential addressee (PTW). There are two notable 
ways that Hinchman’s norm differs from previous audience-centric norms: (1) the shift 
from knowledge to testimonial warrant, and (2) the shift from actual to potential 
addressee. Will either of these adjustments rescue audience-centric norms? 
Hinchman shifts from knowledge to testimonial warrant, but there are a number 
of other epistemic properties weaker than knowledge that an audience-centric account 
could shift to in order to avoid the challenge from second-person Moorean assertions. I 
will address this class of views in detail in §3.4. But first, I’ll say something brief about 
why we should be suspicious that the shift to warrant in particular will solve the problem. 
Even though warrant is weaker than knowledge, it is plausible that it is 
conceptually linked to knowledge. Hinchman writes that “the core thought” behind his 
proposal is that “the normative aim of assertion is not simply to express knowledge but to 
give your addressee knowledge” (Hinchman 2020, 579, note 12). Warrant of the sort that 
can’t even potentially put an addressee in a position to know doesn’t do enough to 
properly promote the aim of giving the addressee knowledge. But if having testimonial 
warrant does entail at least the possibility of being in a position to know, then no 
addressee can have testimonial warrant for a second-person Moorean assertion. So, it 
seems that Hinchman’s conception of warrant will either (a) be too weak to secure the 
core knowledge-transmitting thought behind his proposal or else (b) face the same 
challenge from second-person Moorean assertions as audience-centric accounts that 
feature knowledge.  
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We’ll reconsider conceptions of warrant and related epistemic states more 
carefully in §3.4. For now, we turn to Hinchman’s second refinement from actual 
addressee to potential addressee. In second-person Moorean assertions, although one’s 
intended audience cannot come to know (or be warranted in believing) the asserted 
content, third parties can. For instance, although Pooh cannot learn (when addressed to 
him) that “You are braver than you believe,” Piglet can learn the same proposition in a 
different guise: “Pooh is braver than he believes.” So, perhaps Christopher Robin is 
licensed to tell Pooh “You are braver than you believe,” not because Pooh (the actual 
addressee) could receive testimonial warrant but because Piglet (a potential addressee) 
could.  
Relatedly, Hinchman makes a nuanced distinction between mere assertions and 
tellings. Mere assertions need not have any particular audience (as when one speaks 
aloud to oneself) although (according to Hinchman) they are still guided by our ability to 
inform a possible interlocutor. But tellings take a particular audience into account: “to 
count as telling A that p in full sincerity S must intend that A would be fully warranted in 
believing that p on S’s say-so” (Hinchman 2020, 570).27 
This maneuver successfully deflects the objection as (so far) developed for 
audience-centric accounts of assertion. But the problem quickly resurfaces in two ways. 
First, the cases of second-person Moorean assertions considered in this paper are not 
mere assertions but also tellings. When Christopher Robin says, “You are braver than you 
believe,” he is directly addressing Pooh; he is not merely saying the sentence (as it so 
happens) in Pooh’s presence. So, even if this audience-centric norm of (mere) assertion 
 
27 As noted earlier, Pelling makes a similar distinction and ultimately classifies his norm as a norm on 
telling rather than asserting (Pelling 2013, 348, fn. 9). 
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can allow for second-person Moorean sentences, the accompanying view about telling 
falters.  
Second, we can imagine cases in which permissible second-person Moorean 
assertions rule out any potential addressee coming to learn the asserted content. Suppose, 
for instance, that Christopher Robin and Pooh were the only two people who ever existed 
or would exist. Pooh would be Christopher Robin’s only potential addressee; 
nevertheless, it would remain assertorically proper for Christopher Robin to tell Pooh 
“You’re braver than you believe.”  
Or consider Cassandra, to whom Apollo gave both the gift of prophecy and the 
curse of never being believed when prophesying. When Cassandra foretells the 
destruction of Troy, she asserts properly even though, given her curse, she cannot be 
believed. Or take the boy who cried wolf. If he has cried wolf loudly and widely enough, 
then when he finally does meet the wolf, he might properly (and tragically) assert: 
4. There really is a wolf, even though no one (else) could ever (reasonably) 
believe me (that there is a wolf)! 
 
This, too, is a second-person Moorean sentence, and so unknowable (and unable to 
produce testimonial warrant). But neither Cassandra nor the boy (who, in our versions of 
the stories, are wise to the predicaments they have landed in) can imagine any potential 
audience who would come to believe them by their say-so.  
Hinchman nuances audience-centric norms in two interesting ways: shifting from 
knowledge to warrant and from actual addressee to potential addressee. The shift to a 
potential addressee is not sufficient to block the challenge from felicitous second-person 
Moorean assertions. Let’s now turn to audience-centric views that focus on weaker 
epistemic requirements than knowledge.  
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3.4 Providing Less Than Knowledge 
Let’s take a step back. All extant proposals of audience-centric norms involve 
knowledge, at least indirectly. And that is what makes unknowable (for the addressee) 
second-person Moorean sentences so tricky to handle on these accounts. This is no 
accident: there’s good reason to think that knowledge and assertion are, in some way, 
intimately related.28 But there’s conceptual space for audience-centric proposals that 
focus on some epistemic accomplishment less demanding than knowledge.29 For 
instance, one could go in for this norm: Assert that p to some addressee A only if you 
could thereby make it justified for A to believe that p. 
In this section, I’m going to suggest that we should be skeptical that weakening 
audience-centric norms of assertion in this way will be very helpful. There are two basic 
reasons for this. The first is that some weaker epistemic states that one might try to 
induce in one’s audience are still tethered to knowledge in such a way that they won’t be 
able to handle second-person Moorean assertions either. Consider again the concept of 
“warrant.” I suggest that the following principle is true: 
No Known Unknowability: If S is warranted in believing that p, then it’s not the 
case that: S knows <S is not in a position to know that p>. 
 
Someone who knows that they aren’t in a position to know that p yet believes p anyway 
believes p recklessly.30 They have formed their belief despite knowing that it isn’t good 
enough for knowledge. They are committed to a belief-version of a (first-person) 
 
28 Apart from the audience-centric proposals already considered, that knowledge is (in some way) 
intimately connected to assertion has been defended in Unger (1975), Williamson (2000), DeRose (2002), 
Benton (2011, 2016), Sosa (2011), Turri (2011), Goldberg (2015), Benton and van Elswyk (2020) and 
Willard-Kyle (2020). 
29 Thanks especially to Elise Woodard for raising this point. 
30 I mean that they have behaved epistemically recklessly. There may be pragmatic or moral reasons to 
believe what we know we cannot know. 
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Moorean paradox: they are doxastically committed to “p, and I don’t know that p.” At 
least they are committed to each conjunct.  
As established, addressees are not in a position to know second-person Moorean 
assertions. And the addressees may well know that they are not in a position to know such 
assertions. In fact, we often assumed that addressees were aware that they couldn’t know 
what the speaker was saying in our explanations for why such assertions could be 
conversationally useful. Since second-person Moorean sentences can be asserted even 
when their audiences know that they are unknowable for them, then if No Known 
Unknowability is a constraint on warrant, it’s not true that all proper assertions can 
provide testimonial warrant to their addressees. 
The point generalizes. For it’s hard to ascribe positive epistemic status to agents 
who believe what they know they can’t know. Consider the following analogues: 
J-No Known Unknowability: If S is justified in believing that p, then it’s not the 
case that: S knows <S is not in a position to know that p>.31 
 
Ra-No Known Unknowability: If S is rational in believing that p, then it’s not 
the case that: S knows <S is not in a position to know that p>.32 
 
Re-No Known Unknowability: If it is reasonable for S to believe that p, then it’s 
not the case that: S knows <S is not in a position to know that p>.33 
 
 
31 Although Kvanvig defends a justified belief norm of assertion for speakers, he writes that the 
justification relevant to assertion is of the sort “that puts one in a position to know” (Kvanvig 2009, 149). 
32 Igor Douven defends a stronger variant of this principle: RBi(φ) ⇒ Cri(Ki(φ)) ≽ Cri(¬Ki(φ)) (2009, 371). 
Roughly, rationally believing a proposition entails having a higher credence that one knows it than that one 
doesn’t.  
33 Although explicitly working within idealized model, Williamson (2013) defends a principle that suggests 
several versions of No Known Unknowability: Bp=¬K¬Kp (if one believes that p, then one doesn’t know 
that one doesn’t know that p). Assuming <S knows that S is not in a position to know that p> entails <S 
knows that S does not know that p>, then Bp⊨¬K¬PtKp. A fortiori, whenever one justifiedly or rationally 
or reasonably or warrantedly believes that p, one doesn’t know that one is not in a position to know that p.  
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These are not entirely uncontroversial, and I don’t have space to argue for each of these 
here.34 Nevertheless, the plausibility of each principle shows that it’s not so easy for 
audience-centric norms to avoid the challenge of permissible second-person Moorean 
assertions just by swapping out knowledge for another epistemic category.  
The second reason to be suspicious that switching epistemic targets would save 
audience-centric norms is the prevalence of permissible second-person Moorean-like 
sentences. Consider this general schema: 
Never Will You Ever: p, even though never will you ever φ that p. 
What I want to suggest now is that (as we’ve already seen in part), there are permissible 
assertions of this general form that substitute something other than “know” for φ. 
Consider these assertions: 
5. Global warming is really happening, even though you’ll never believe/think 
that’s true. 
 
6. You’re been suckered into a conspiracy theory, and I fear there’s no getting 
out. Global warming is really happening, even though you’ll never reasonably 
believe it. 
 
7. I see why, given the echo chamber that you are stuck in and the authorities you 
have trusted, you are not rationally entitled to believe that global warming is 
happening. Still, global warming is really happening, even though you’ll never 
be rationally entitled to believe it.  
 
Are such sentences a problem for all audience-centric norms of assertion that are weaker 
than knowledge? Not necessarily in the same way that second-person Moorean assertions 
are. The proposition “p, but you don’t know that p” (and, for that matter, “p, but you 
 
34 Lackey (2007) seems committed to the falsity of Re-No Known Unknowability, for instance. Those 
who think that belief is a very weak kind of commitment in the mode of Hawthorne, Rothschild, and 
Spectre (2016) may think that it is correspondingly easy to have positively evaluable beliefs in things 
known to be unknown. 
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don’t believe that p”) is unknowable for the addressee; but “p, but you don’t believe that 
p” is not, perhaps, strictly unbelievable for the addressee.35  
Still, I think such assertions are awkward for audience-centric accounts to explain. 
Suppose that some instantiation of the following norm is true: 
Norm: Assert that p only if by so doing you will potentially enable your 
addressee to φ that p. 
And suppose also that S could properly assert to an audience A a proposition with this 
form: 
 Never Will You Ever φ: P, even though never will you ever φ that p. 
If S’s assertion is true, then A will never ever φ that p. So, asserting that p to A would not 
potentially enable A to φ that p. So, according to Norm, asserting p to A would violate 
the norm of assertion.  
But as we’ve seen, there are many acceptable ways to assert propositions that 
instantiate the Never Will You Ever schema. They don’t crash. And the certainly don’t 
crash as decisively as first-person Moorean assertions. 
Does every possible audience-centric account fall prey to a version of this 
challenge? It’s hard to say with certainty. There are a lot of values we could plug in for φ. 
Nor should any single piece of data singlehandedly rule a norm in or out of contention: 
there’s a lot of linguistic data to accommodate. Nevertheless, it’s striking that second-
 
35 It seemed plausible earlier in the paper to suppose that Pooh stumbled into believing “I am braver than I 
believe,” not recognizing the incoherence this committed him to. See also Sorensen (1985, 496) on 
nonobvious Moorean sentences.  
But some (perhaps idealized) models do rule out the believability of blatant Moorean assertions (like “p, 
but you don’t know that p”). Robert Stalnaker defends a principle for strong belief whereby: if S believes 
that p, then S believes that S knows that p (2006, 179). When combined with the principle that beliefs are 
consistent (2006, 179), Stalnaker’s picture entails that “p, but I don’t know that p” is not just unknowable 
but unbelievable. For if an agent did believe it, they would believe both that they know that p and that they 
don’t know that p, and this is inconsistent. 
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person Moorean assertions (and variations thereof) tend to sound much better than their 
first-person counterparts. This is a serious mark against audience-centric views. 
Maintaining that the epistemic position of the speaker, not of the audience, licenses 
proper assertion allows us to preserve the insight that not all assertion is intended to 
communicate information. Sometimes, assertion can be productive by expressing the 
speaker’s assertoric stance even when convincing the addressee is impossible. 
4. Objections 
In this section, I consider three objections: (1) that non-audience centric norms 
cannot explain why some second-person Moorean sentences do sound paradoxical, (2) 
that second-person Moorean “assertions” may belong to some other speech-act type, and 
(3) that second-person Moorean assertions are not strictly felicitous but rather (often) 
blameless violations of an audience-centric norm of assertion. 
Objection 1: But many second-person Moorean sentences do sound paradoxical, 
or at least very odd. Imagine asserting, out of the blue, 
8. ?It’s raining, but you don’t know that it’s raining. 
It’s hard to make sense of this assertion. Audience-centric norms have the advantage 
when explaining why utterances like (8) sound odd.  
Answer: One thing to note is that although (8) sounds decidedly odd in most 
contexts, it doesn’t obviously sound odd in the same way that first-person Moorean 
assertions do. As Sorensen notes, “In the first person examples [of Moorean assertions], 
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the speaker seems to be contradicting himself. In the second person examples, the 
speaker seems to be saying something which is self-defeating” (Sorensen 1985, 491).36 
I think that these two different phenomenologies—the self-contradictory 
phenomenology and the self-defeating phenomenology—point to two different 
explanations of infelicity. Moreover, while I think it is self-defeating in many contexts to 
utter a second-person Moorean assertion, there is an explanation for why second-person 
Moorean assertions are not self-defeating when speakers do note expect (or aim) to be 
believed. Assertions of second-person Moorean propositions that are not self-defeated in 
the relevant way can be felicitous and, thus, still speak against audience-centric norms of 
assertion. 
For second-person Moorean assertions, much hangs on whether the audience is 
prepared to take the speaker at their word. Suppose that the speaker does expect to be 
taken at their word. Then asserting, “p, but you don’t believe that p” is what Hintikka 
(1962, 90‒91) calls an “antiperformatory” assertion: asserting the proposition makes it 
false. For assuming that the audience believes the speaker, the audience will come to 
believe that p. And then it won’t be true that “you [the audience] don’t believe that p.” 
When the speaker is trusted, second-person Moorean assertions are self-defeating in the 
sense that asserting them has the immediate effect of making them false. 
Similar observations apply to second-person Moorean assertions of the form “p, 
but you don’t know that p.” For, assuming that the audience trusts the speaker and 
believes that p on the speaker’s say so, then if the speaker had any right to assert p and p 
 
36 Sorensen explicitly says this regarding propositions of the form <p, but you don’t believe that p>. When 
later discussing propositions of the form <p, but you don’t know that p>, Sorensen does say that there is a 
temptation to “dismiss [them] as contradictions,” though less so than for first-person versions (1985, 503). 
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is true, the audience will typically come to know that p. So, if p is true, then the second-
person Moorean assertion will be false in virtue of being uttered. And if p is false, then it 
will already have been false. Either way, the truth of the assertion is defeated. 
But what about cases in which audience is not prepared to take the speaker’s word 
on the subject? When audiences don’t trust speakers, the self-defeating tendency of 
second-person Moorean assertions is defused. This is exactly where felicitous, second-
person Moorean assertions can be found. 
When second-person Moorean assertions are self-defeating, it is because when the 
speaker says p this has the effect of getting the audience to believe (and in the good case 
know) that p, and so the second conjunct of the Moorean assertion becomes false through 
utterance. When audiences aren’t prepared to take the speaker’s word for it, this effect is 
removed, and so second-person Moorean assertions do not become false through 
utterance. 
Here is an example. In The Lord of the Rings, Frodo meets a mysterious character 
named Strider who claims to be a good guide to Rivendell—a place Frodo desperately 
needs to go. But cautious of accepting an unknown guide, Frodo demands of Strider an 
account of himself, to which Strider wryly responds, “[W]hy should you believe my 
story, if you do not trust me already? Still here it is” (Tolkien 1984, 178). Strider might 
just as well have said, 
9. You won’t be able to know what I’m about to tell you about myself (namely p), 
but p.  
 
This is a second-person Moorean assertion. In context, (9) is a perfectly sensible thing to 
assert. And it’s sensible to assert at least in part because Strider does not expect Frodo to 
believe the story about himself or to be able to know that his story is true just by his say-
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so. And indeed, in each of our original cases, there is at least some doubt as to whether 
the speaker will be believed. The climate change denier won’t stop being a climate 
change denier at their friend’s say-so, for instance.  
 When audiences clearly expect to be believed, second-person Moorean sentences 
tend be awkward: they are self-defeating. But one thing we’ve learned from §2 is this: 
sometimes, we can properly assert even when we don’t expect our assertion to be 
believed. If audience-centric norms of assertion were true, then all second-person 
Moorean assertions would be infelicitous. But at least when speakers expect not to be 
believed, they can felicitously assert second-person Moorean propositions. 
Objection 2: The apparent assertions of this paper aren’t assertions at all: they 
only look that way because they are in the indicative.37 When I say, e.g., “Global 
warming is really happening, even though you don’t believe it,” I may be stopping the 
conversation or expressing my frustration that we can’t communicate about a topic I care 
about, but I’m not asserting. Any real assertion (the objector insists) would involve 
aiming to get the audience to be positioned to know what I say thereby! 
Answer: But even if the utterances are stopping or expressing something, they are 
accomplishing that task by asserting something. The reason the conversation (sometimes) 
stops or frustration (or another attitude) is expressed is because the audience takes the 
speaker to have really taken a stance on the asserted content—a stance that the addressee 
cannot share.  
Moreover, there’s good reason to think that second-person Moorean sentences can 
be genuine assertions. First, we typically take first and third person versions of Moorean 
 
37 I’m grateful to Laura Callahan and Sandy Goldberg for raising the possibility of this interpretation. 
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sentences to be assertions, so it would be odd if second-person variants were exceptional. 
If we didn’t take first-person Moorean sentences to be assertions, their infelicity wouldn’t 
shed any light on the nature of assertion. But the infelicity of first-person Moorean 
sentences is frequently interpreted as evidence for some norms of assertion and against 
others. 
Second, uttering second-person Moorean sentences seems to enable knowledge by 
testimony to bystanders who overhear an assertion but are not among the audience. 
Suppose that Christopher Robin tells Pooh, “You’re braver than you believe” in the 
presence of Piglet. As noted before, Pooh cannot learn the content of the sentence, but 
Piglet can. That is, Piglet can learn that “Pooh is braver than Pooh believes.” Moreover, 
Piglet seems to learn this in the normal way that one acquires knowledge through 
(overhearing) testimony. And this is hard to explain if Christopher Robin has not 
genuinely asserted something with the content “Pooh is braver than Pooh believes.” If 
Christopher Robin were merely expressing, “Hurray for Pooh’s bravery,” or if 
Christopher Robin were merely recommending that Pooh increase his estimation of his 
own bravery (as one could do for pragmatic reasons as well as veritistic ones), then it 
would be an awful coincidence that Piglet is in a position to learn, apparently by 
testimony, the very proposition Christopher Robin would otherwise be asserting.  
Finally, Pooh can object to Christopher Robin’s utterance as one would object to 
an assertion. In response to “You are smarter than you think,” Pooh can reply, “No, that 
is not true: I really am a Bear of Very Little Brain.” But “that’s not true” is not a 
reasonable response to a (mere) expressive or recommendation. Note, too, that Pooh’s 
objection lacks the sauciness of deliberate misinterpretation that typically accompanies 
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responses that target the grammatical mood of an utterance rather than its intended 
conversational force. By objecting, Pooh is not acting like the smart-aleck who passively 
responds to the order “Can you pass the salt?” by merely answering as though to a 
(genuine) question, “Indeed, I can,” without bothering to reach for the shaker. 
Objection 3: Second-person Moorean paradoxes are improper, as audience-centric 
norms indicate. But they are excused. That’s why the examples in this paper sound ok 
even though they are, strictly speaking, improper.38 
Answer: Many factive norms of assertion utilize some kind of distinction between 
primary and secondary impropriety (cf. DeRose 2002) or blameworthy and blameless 
violations of the norm (cf. Williamson 2000). And our ears are not always sufficiently 
attentive to the differences between utterances that are blameless violations and justified 
non-violations. So, the audience-centric theorist is well within their rights to argue that 
the examples of this paper are excused or blameless violations, but violations, 
nonetheless. 
But in order for that response to be satisfying, we’d need an explanation why 
second-person variants of Moorean paradoxes are often excused. And it’s not obvious 
what that explanation would be. Two prominent kinds of excuse are (a) ignorance that 
one is violating the norm or (b) overriding pragmatic or moral reasons to violate the 
norm. But (a) the protagonists in our example are not necessarily ignorant that they are 
telling someone something that they can’t know; indeed, some of them are counting on it. 
So, ignorance is not an applicable excuse. And although moral and pragmatic reasons can 
rarely be fully excised from any example, (b) the cases of this paper do not appear to rely 
 
38 I’m grateful to Dennis Whitcomb for suggesting this objection. 
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on cases with trumped up pragmatic or moral stakes. Thus, the examples of this paper are 
best understood as fully proper assertions and not excused violations. 
5. Aims and Norms 
Second-person Moorean assertions make trouble for audience-centric norms of 
assertion. But those norms are trying to latch onto something important: the Gricean 
thought that assertion is for audiences. 
In this section, I’ll argue that respecting the difference between aims and norms 
allows us to preserve much of value from audience-centric proposals: audiences feature 
prominently in the typical aims of assertion, and these aims play a role in guiding the 
speaker-side norm. It’s not the case, however, that it is always the aim of an asserter to 
inform an audience, nor (I will suggest) is there an essential link between assertion and 
some audience-involving aim or other.  
Aims are importantly different from norms. Aims define success whereas norms 
include a notion of permissibility (Marsili 2018, 642).39 Permissible failures and 
impermissible successes are both conceptually possible. Consider the norms that govern 
good driving: stop at stop signs, drive on the right side of the road, don’t drive too fast, 
etc. None of these is an aim of driving. People do not drive in order to drive on the right 
side of the road. The aim is (generally) to get where you’re going.  
We can distinguish between the aims of a practice as a whole and the aim of a 
particular move within that practice (cf. Kemp 2007). My goal in swerving left at a 
particular moment may be to avoid crashing into another car. But my reason for making 
 
39 This is not to deny that overlap is possible. Success can be normatively required as when “failure is not 
an option.” But overlap is not conceptually required.  
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that particular move is not my reason for driving. We can distinguish, too, between aims 
that are more or less intimately connected to a practice. Ishani Maitra explains: 
Any baseball player has a variety of purposes while playing the game. These may 
include: whiling away some time, hitting a home run, entertaining spectators, and 
winning the game, to mention just a few. However, one of these purposes—
namely, winning...—seems more intimately connected to the game than the 
others, in the sense... that it is a purpose that baseball players have qua players of 
the game (Maitra 2011, 284–285). 
 
We’ve distinguished norms from various kinds of aims. The state tells you how to drive 
not where or why. But that is not to say that the norms and aims are unrelated. The norms 
on driving do (generally) enable people to fulfill their (typical) driving aims in a fair and 
orderly way. Not having a norm to drive on one side of the road would lead to more 
accidents and stop people from achieving their aim of safely getting where they are 
going. The norm “Always drive in circles” wouldn’t be a good norm precisely because 
that norm would undermine drivers’ typical aim of getting folks where they’re going.  
The relationship between norms and aims is not always straightforward. Some 
norms for driving help the aims of pedestrians rather than drivers, for instance, by 
requiring drivers to stop at crosswalks occupied by pedestrians. And even the norms of 
driving that ultimately promote our driving aims in the long term often frustrate our 
driving aims in the short term. This is why people (too) often violate the driving norms in 
order to achieve their driving aims. At a surface level, at least, a speed limit is directly at 
odds with my aim to get somewhere quickly. The same goes for the norm to stop at red 
lights, even when there doesn’t seem to be anyone else around. But by all abiding by the 
speed limit and stop-at-red-lights norms, we generally and collectively do better at safely 
fulfilling our driving aims than if we did not.  
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Just as the rules of the road help us (collectively and generally) achieve our 
typical driving aims—even though the aims are not referenced in the rules—so a speaker-
side norm of assertion can help us achieve our typical audience-involving aims. Suppose, 
for instance, that the aim of a speaker in making a particular assertion is to inform an 
audience of the asserted content. Succeeding in this aim requires convincing the audience 
that the asserted content is worthy of their belief. 40 If the practice of assertion includes a 
norm that prohibits asserting content that is not belief-worthy for the speaker, then 
addressees are more likely to feel it is safe to believe the asserted content. At least if the 
norm is enforced well-enough and if the speaker is likely enough to abide by the norm. 41 
After all, there is (defeasible) reason to think that if something is belief-worthy for you 
(the asserter), then it’s belief-worthy for me (the addressee).42  
I don’t claim that this is the only story that one could tell linking the norms of 
assertion with (one of) its typical aim(s), namely, to inform audiences. In fact, I think a 
similar story is available to the audience-centric norms that I have otherwise been 
criticizing. The modest point here is that it’s possible for speaker-side norms of assertion 
to nevertheless recognize that informing an audience is an aim, or even the principal aim, 
of asserters. As we’ve seen, the content of the norms of a practice don’t need to be 
particularly similar to the content of its typical aims. And it turns out that speaker-side 
norms of assertion can be at least partly explained in terms of facilitating a practice that 
makes it easier for us to collectively achieve our audience-side aims. And so, if those 
 
40 I leave open for our purposes whether truth, reasonability, or knowledge, etc., qualifies as belief worthy.  
41 Whether the audience needs to know that I am likely to abide by the norm to be properly informed 
depends at least in part on debates between reductionists and anti-reductionists about testimony.  
42 This general story is not new. But one important feature for our purposes is that the story is told in terms 
of belief-worthiness rather than belief. This allows us to accommodate Lackey’s cases of selfless assertion, 
in which speakers assert something that is not believed by the speaker (e.g. that vaccines do not cause 
autism) but is belief-worthy for the speaker. 
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speaker-side norms do a better job of explaining the linguistic data, then the mere fact 
that audience-side aims go unmentioned in speaker-side norms is not a serious mark 
against them. 
Perhaps informing an audience (or putting them in a position to know) is the aim 
most intimately connected with the practice of assertion.43 Still, I think we should be 
cautious of thinking that informing an audience is in any way essential to the practice of 
assertion. Once a set of norms is in place, they can enable the pursuit of aims other than 
the dominant aim (if there is one). Consider again the case of driving. If there is a 
dominant aim of driving,44 it is plausibly to get people where they want to go. Certainly, 
we would not have developed sprawling highway systems and intricate vehicular 
regulations if driving were not a very useful mode of transportation. But once in place, 
one can pursue less typical aims while abiding by the norms of driving. One can joyride. 
Or take a passenger where they don’t want to go (like a child to the dentist). One can 
even drive aimlessly, as a pedestrian might wander. Even if the norms of assertion are 
principally meant to facilitate audience-centric aims, they can host a much wider variety 
of speaker-aims. 
As joyriding does for driving, second-person Moorean assertions showcase 
appropriate, if perhaps atypical, aims that someone might have for making an assertion. 
As argued in §2, they can help speakers to highlight a perspectival gap, to end a 
 
43 This is contentious. Marsili (2018) makes a plausible case that the aim of assertion is truth, a thesis also 
considered in Dummett (1973). But dialectically, we may grant it to those who find audience-centric norms 
of assertion appealing. 
44 And there may not be a dominant aim of driving. Is there an aim that all drivers have qua drivers in the 
way that all competitors have the aim to win qua competitors? Not obviously. As Maitra (2011) critically 
notes, the literature on the norm of assertion has been dominated by an analogy to the norms in games. It is 
hoped that thinking about the norms of a different kind of activity, such as driving, suggests different 
parallels.  
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conversation, to agree to disagree, to advance an argument that meets the audience where 
they are, or to change an addressee’s perspective. When Christopher Robin tells Pooh, 
“You’re braver than you (will ever) believe,” he succeeds in the aim of encouraging 
Pooh even though he necessarily fails to inform him of the asserted content.45 
The typical or dominant aim of that speakers have in assertion is indeed to 
communicate information to one’s audience—perhaps even to put them in a position to 
know. But there can be a wide range of individual aims in making an assertion, not all of 
which need conform to the typical aim. One could hold onto the idea that although an 
individual may properly aim for any number of things in making an assertion, the aim of 
the practice is to inform audiences. This may be right. But if so, we should be careful not 
to enforce too much conformity between the aim of the practice and the (even 
cooperative, audience-driven) aims that speakers might have for employing that practice. 
Assertion may have developed as a practice for sharing information,46 but the practice is 
elastic, allowing speakers to permissibly pursue a wide range of creative purposes. 
6. Conclusion 
Audience-centric norms like Pelling’s, García-Carpintero’s, and Hinchman’s are a 
helpful corrective to a literature that has too often excluded concern for the hearer, but 
they do so at the expense of the speaker. Assertion is (typically) an activity for pairs: the 
speaker and the hearer. The aims of assertion are often hearer-directed, but assertoric 
license comes speaker-side: the speaker’s epistemic position is the grounds that enables 
 
45 Of course, sometimes we (e.g.) encourage someone by informing them of what we say. But this cannot 
be the case here since Pooh cannot learn the asserted content. 
46 In comparing the practice of assertion to the practice of driving, I’ve suggested that there’s a degree of 
contingency about what norms apply to the practice of assertion such as we have it. But I hope to remain 
neutral on whether those norms are constitutive of our practice or not. If they are constitutive of our 
practice of assertion, then I take it that it is also a matter of contingent fact that we developed a practice of 
assertion rather than another practice like it but different in essence. 
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proper assertion to the audience. Audience-accommodating norms—like Lackey’s, 
McKinnon’s, and mine—enable flexible transmission of information by not requiring that 
speakers attain the same epistemic success they hope to impart to their hearers; moreover, 
they do this while avoiding the false predictions that audience-centric norms encounter in 
second-person Moorean sentences by maintaining that it is the epistemic position of the 
speaker that licenses proper assertion. 
Examining second-person Moorean sentences more carefully reveals that such 
assertions can help both speaker and hearer by making salient their distinct perspectives. 
Whether it is by stopping a conversation or starting one, inviting someone to change their 
perspective or daring them to do so, these assertions enable the speaker and hearer to 
negotiate the direction of their conversation across perspectival gaps. This in turn 
highlights the diversity of proper assertoric aims that are compatible with a simple 
epistemic norm.47
 
47 I’m grateful to D Black, Laura Callahan, Liz Camp, Sam Carter, Tez Clark, Carolina Flores, Danny 
Forman, Chris Frugé, Michael Glanzberg, Sandy Goldberg, Verónica Gómez Sánchez, Matt Jope, Jennifer 
Lackey, Matt McGrath, Ezra Rubenstein, Ernie Sosa, Jeff Tolly, Caroline von Klemperer, Dennis 
Whitcomb, and Elise Woodard for excellent discussion on assertion. 
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